On Human Rights: The Use of Human Right Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts by Paust, Jordan J.
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 10 Issue 2 
1989 
On Human Rights: The Use of Human Right Precepts in U.S. 
History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts 
Jordan J. Paust 
University of Houston 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Natural 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jordan J. Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human Right Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an 
Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543 (1989). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol10/iss2/9 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE USE OF HUMAN
RIGHT PRECEPTS IN U.S. HISTORY AND
THE RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE
REMEDY IN DOMESTIC COURTS
Jordan J. Paust*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 543
II. THE ACTUAL USE OF HUMAN RIGHT PRECEPTS ....... 546
A. General Use in U.S. History (1728-1948) ........... 546
B. Use by the Judiciary as Constitutional Rights and
Standards ......................................... 570
1. General Trends in Juridic Use .................. 572
a. 1783-1893 .................................. 572
b. 1894-1989 .................................. 584
2. Trends Toward More Explicit Content ......... 596
III. THE RIGHT TO A REMEDY AND RELATED CONCERNS.. 611
A. The Precepts and Predominant Trends ............. 611
B. Deviant Opinions in Tel-Oren ...................... 628
IV. CONCLUSION .......................................... 650
I. INTRODUCTION
Early in the history of the United States, human rights, then often
termed the "rights of man," were understood to be those natural,
unalienable rights of all persons that no government on earth could
deny - rights that are a part of law, whether written or unwritten,
and that free and democratic governments are formed to further and
to protect. As Alexander Hamilton recognized in 1775, "the sacred
rights of mankind... are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole
volume of human nature ... and can never be erased or obscured by
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mortal power."' Yet, as Hamilton must have known, some of mortal
stature would try.
In what may have been the most recent effort to ignore the perva-
sive expectation of early Americans among others that human rights
are indeed the right of each human being, a circuit court judge has
stated, incorrectly:
It is important to remember that in 1789 there was no concept of inter-
national human rights; neither was there, under the traditional version of
customary international law, any recognition of a right of private parties
to recover.... Clearly, cases [involving human rights] ... were beyond
the framers' contemplation.
2
One of the purposes of this article is to dispel any such illusion by
documenting the actual use of human right precepts in U.S. history,
including use in the volumes of judicial opinion. As Hamilton seemed
early to affirm, some may choose to ignore actual trends in the use of
human rights and to hide them, but they cannot erase human history
even at the hand of a federal judge.
The first section of this article documents the actual use of human
right precepts and is organized into two subsections: (a) general use in
U.S. history (1728-1948), and (b) use by the judiciary as constitutional
rights and standards. In the first subsection, an effort is made to docu-
ment relevant human right expressions of the Founders of our Repub-
lic and of others throughout our history until the adoption in 1948 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.3 The Declaration has
become the primary instrument at the international level providing a
1. A. HAMILTON, THE FARMER REFUTED (N.Y. 1775), quoted in B. WRIGHT, AMERICAN
INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW 90-91 (1931).
2. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 811 (1985). The phrase "international human rights" would have
been somewhat strange in 1789 for a reason that Judge Bork may not have appreciated. First,
human rights were not merely "international" or "domestic," but both at once; see also infra
note 178; pts. II.B and III herein. As noted above, they were expected to be natural, unalienable
rights of all humankind and rights that are a part of law (whether written or unwritten). And for
the Founders, what we term international law was directly incorporable (whether customary or
treaty-based) for both public and private rights and duties (to be civilly or criminally sanctioned).
See infra text accompanying notes 501-504. Today, most would consider these to be customary
and/or treaty-based, and thus human rights under or protected by international law (not merely,
if even, "natural" rights, but "unalienable" nonetheless). Even today, the phrase "international
human rights" is somewhat awkward. Human rights is the preferable phrase. They are not
rights merely at an "international" level, but, as with the expectations of the Founders, rights of
all and at all levels or in all contexts and against all governments. Second, one of the "interna-
tional" bases for such rights was reflected in phrases such as the "law of nations." See infra notes
11, 13, 19, 21, 32, 107, 154, 166-167, 188, 291; see also infra text accompanying notes 204, 208,
215, 227, 231, 251, 291, 498-499. The phrase "international law" has been known to appear only
since the early 19th century. See infra notes 233, 533; The Aurora, 2 F. Cas. 227, 228
(D.C.D.R.I. 1813) (No. 660) (first known federal case to use phrase "international law," also
used "law of nations"). It was also not as common in the 19th century.
3. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
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general specification of what, for past generations, had been natural,
self-evident, and imprescriptible. As the subsection demonstrates,
there is a rich history of the use of human right precepts in the United
States. Concern for human rights has been prominent at critical stages
in the growth of our nation and has been associated with most major
politico-legal developments in our history. By 1789, that history was
replete with references to human right precepts; and later trends in use
of these precepts were fairly steady, at least through the early twenti-
eth century.
The second subsection, on use by the judiciary, attempts to provide
the fullest exposition to date of the actual trends in use of human right
precepts by our courts. Although much has been written recently con-
cerning the litigation of human rights, almost no attention has been
paid in the literature to actual uses of "human right" and equivalent
phrases by U.S. courts, trends in use, and categories of use. Com-
puter-assisted research has made it possible to identify recent trends
and to explore actual patterns of relevant judicial decisionmaking in
much of the twentieth century. More tedious methods of research and
more recent computer data banks have also made it possible to pro-
duce a similar documentation of judicial use of human right precepts
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Interesting historic uses
have emerged and are integrated in this section for as thorough a dis-
closure as is presently possible.
Although quite significant, the fact that justices from the United
States Supreme Court have used the concept at least since the 1790s
and that the phrase "human right(s)" appears in seventy-five Supreme
Court decisions up to 1989 (with sixty-nine of these appearing in the
last fifty years) has previously escaped the attention even of human
rights litigants. Although litigants often focus on only a few lower
federal court opinions, the use of human right precepts at such levels
of federal decision-making can be identified in more than one thou-
sand cases. Further, although most recent uses of human right
precepts occur in decisions addressing constitutional normative con-
tent, a surprising number of constitutional law scholars, and not too
few judges, seem to be needlessly unaware of the use of human rights
by Supreme Court justices and by lower courts as constitutional stan-
dards. This second subsection provides the needed information, and it
is organized further into two subsections: (1) general trends in use,
and (2) trends toward more explicit content. The first part provides a
general focus on actual patterns of use of human rights and equivalent
phrases, including an identification of the Supreme Court justices who
have utilized human rights in their opinions. The second part investi-
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gates the details of actual use, including specific judicial language asso-
ciated with human right norms and the constitutional rights or
principles aligned with human rights in Supreme Court opinions.
As the trends demonstrate, an increasingly vital and vibrant rela-
tionship between human rights and constitutional rights and principles
has existed and grown since the time of the Founders. Although a
primary purpose of the article is to achieve greater understanding of
that relationship and of the actual trends in use, it is also important to
identify potential applications of human right precepts and some of
the hurdles recently posed to a more thorough use of human rights in
domestic litigation. Potential uses are mentioned in the section on
past trends in judicial decision, but they are considered also in the
third section of the article, a section exploring the right to an effective
remedy for human right deprivations, recent attempts by lower court
judges to deny or interfere with that right, and related concerns about
the incorporation of human rights into domestic legal processes.
Through better understanding of the prior use of human right precepts
in our history and by opposing attempts to erase or obscure that his-
tory, we might further guarantee the rights of all who come within the
jurisdiction of our courts.
II. THE ACTUAL USE OF HUMAN RIGHT PRECEPTS
A. General Use in US. History (1728-1948)
From the dawn of our Republic and throughout our constitutional
history there have been numerous references to the "rights of man,"
"rights of mankind," and "human rights." These and similar phrases
were used interchangeably by the Founders and early justices to ex-
press a pervasive expectation among early Americans that human
rights are indeed the right of each human being. Moreover, as evi-
denced also in other writings,4 the denial of human rights led to the
condemnation of British rule, the American Revolution and the crea-
tion of the original amendments to the United States Constitution.
Among the initial uses of such phrases were those of one Daniel
Dulaney, Attorney General of Maryland, and John Barnard, a minis-
ter from Massachusetts. Both had referred to the "Rights of Man-
kind," Dulaney in a pamphlet published in 17281 and Barnard in a
4. See, e.g., Paust, The Human Right to Participate in Armed Revolution and Related Forms
of Social Violence. Testing the Limits of Permissibility, 32 EMORY L. J. 545 (1983) [hereinafter
Paust, Human Right to Revolution]; Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New
Form of Guarantee, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 231, 245-47, 254-55 (1975) [hereinafter Paust, Human
Rights]. "
5. D. DULANEY, THE RIGHT OF THE INHABITANTS OF MARYLAND TO THE BENEFIT OF
[Vol. 10:543
Spring 1989] Human Rights in US. Courts
sermon in 1734 - the latter recognizing: "the natural Rights of Man-
kind, which it is the End of all Government to preserve ... -"6 One
year later, Benjamin Franklin defended the right of his minister to
refuse to supply copies of allegedly heretical sermons to his accusers,
Franklin noting that for one to consider the minister's refusal to be an
admission of guilt would be "contrary to the common rights of man-
kind, no man being obliged to furnish matter of accusation against
himself."' 7 No doubt they, as many early Americans,8 had been influ-
enced by the English philosopher John Locke who had himself ex-
pressed an earlier concern for "the natural Rights of Man." 9 Also of
influence among the colonists was the argument of William Molyneux
at the end of the 1600s that the Irish should be "governed only by such
laws to which they give their own consent," and that to govern other-
wise would be against "the common rights of mankind." °10 The phrase
"common right of all mankind" had also been used as early as 1625 by
Hugo Grotius,II the "father" of international law and a writer of un-
THE ENGLISH LAWS (1728), quoted in B. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 59; see also C. MULLETT,
FUNDAMENTAL LAW AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1760-1776, at 74-5 (1933) (also
spelled Dulany).
6. J. BARNARD, MASS. ELECTION SERMON (1734), quoted in B. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 46
n. 1.
7. Quoted in Smith v. Fair, 363 F. Supp. 1021, 1023 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
8. On the influence of Locke on the Founders, see, e.g., B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORI-
GINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27-30, passim (1972); N. SCHACHNER, THOMAS JEFFER-
SON - A BIOGRAPHY 75-76, 130, 314, 391, 965 (5th ed. 1969); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 8, 48, 290, 371 (1969); Stem, John Locke and the
Declaration ofIndependence, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 186 (1966); Gay, America the Paradoxical,
62 VA. L. REV. 843, 850 (1976); Paust, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 250, and references cited
therein.
9. Quoted in Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HARV. L. REV. 149, 386 n.69 (1929).
10. See C. MULLETr, supra note 5, at 59.
11. See H. GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, BOOK Two, ch. 2, § 1 (1625), re-
printed in HUGO GROTIUs, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 78 (L. Loomis trans. 1949). Among
the common rights listed by Grotius were the "right to buy" certain "life needs - food, clothing,
medicines"; "the freedom to propose and contract marriages"; a right of foreigners to equality
with other foreigners; the "right of embassy"; the "right of burial"; and "certain other rights...
which owe their origin to the voluntary law of nations, such as the right to things possessed for a
long time, the right of succession.. ., and the rights resulting from a contract, however unequal."
See id. at ch. 2, §§ 18-22; ch. 18, §§ I and 3; ch. 19, §§ I and 6. Grotius added that there exists a
"right of all human society" to freedom from oppression and that war against an oppressive ruler
can be a permissible responsive action. See id. at ch. 25, § 8. Grotius also considered rights
under the law of nations to impose "obligations on us." Id. at ch. 18, § 1; see also id. at ch. 19,
§ I ("obligation"); H. GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, BOOK ONE, ch. 3, § 16 (1625)
(kings are bound by the law of nations). And Grotius quoted the Roman jurist Pomponius
concerning the existence of "a crime against the law of nations." Id. at ch. 18, § 6; see also id. at
ch. 21, § 3 ("offenses which affect human society at large ... and which other states or their
rulers have a right to deal with"), translated in part as "crimes against mankind at large" in 1
Op. Att'y Gen. 509, 513 (1821). Grotius also recognized the need for "reparation" for infrac-
tions of the law of nations. See H. GROTIUS, supraat ch. 20, § 1; see also H. GROTIUS, THE LAW
OF WAR AND PEACE, BOOK THREE, ch. 18, § 6 (1625) (individual is "bound to make good the
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doubted influence among the American colonists. t2 Perhaps of influ-
ence, as well, were the English judicial opinions of this era and just
before the American Revolution which referred expressly to the
"rights of mankind."
3
References to the rights of man became more frequent in the
1750s, marking the beginning of a pre-revolutionary era in which the
belief in human rights gained a fervent acceptance. By 1756, the Con-
necticut Gazette had referred to the "natural Rights of Mankind,"' 4 a
phrase that appeared again in 1764 in the New-York Gazette' 5 and
may well have appeared in other papers in that period and before.'
6
Also in 1764, Richard Bland wrote of "the Rights and Liberties of
Mankind."' 7 In 1763, John Adams, then a young attorney, had recog-
nized the value of English common law in promoting "the unalienable,
indefeasible rights of men";' 8 and soon thereafter even Blackstone, in
the first volume of his Commentaries on the Laws of England would
refer expressly to "the rights of mankind" and to "absolute rights of
man".19 English traditions and the belief in natural rights also led
harm done"). At nearly the same time, Chief Justice Coke had recognized that pirates are "hos-
tis humani generis." See King v. Marsh, 3 Bulstr. 27, 81 Eng. Rep. 23 (1615). The writer Gentili
had also recognized that pirates violate "the law of nations." See A. GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI
LIBRI TRES (1612) (Q. C. Rolfe trans. 1933).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 163-66 n.a (1820); Talbot v.
Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 140, 148, 150, 160 (1795); Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1118
(C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 509, 513 (1821); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 32, 35-6
(1793); Gay, supra note 8, at 846; Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original
Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 689 (1972), reprinted in IV THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 573, 590 (R. Falk ed. 1976) (also listing other textwriters on international law).
13. See, e.g., Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2359, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 231 (K.B. 1770); Roach
v. Garvan, 1 Ves. Sr. 157, 159, 26 Eng. Rep. 683 (1748), quoted in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,
173 (1895). Millar was cited in Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 682 (1834) (Thompson,
J., dissenting). Later in Canada, this trend continued. See, e.g., The Happy Couple, Stuart 65
[165 E.R. 1011] (Vice-Admiralty Court of Nova Scotia, Canada 1805)(right of vessel to "carry
arms for self-defense.., is, undoubtedly, one of the most sacred and imprescriptible rights of
mankind ... under the law of nations"), reprinted in COMMONWEALTH INTERNATIONAL LAW
CASES 36 (C. Parry & J. Hopkins, eds. 1976).
14. Connecticut Gazette, April 10, 1756, quoted in C. ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUB-
LIC 143, 495 n.162 (1953).
15. New-York Gazette, Oct. 18, 1764, quoted in C. ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 142, 493
n. 130. One of the primary purposes of government, the Gazette declared, involves "the preserva-
tion of the natural Rights of Mankind." Id.
16. See also Maryland Gazette, July 15, 1727; id. at May 26, 1730, cited in C. ROSSITER,
supra note 14, at 493 n. 130.
17. R. BLAND, THE COLONEL DISMOUNTED 22 (Williamsburg 1764), quoted in C. Ros-
SITER, supra note 14, at 269.
18. J. ADAMS, LIFE AND WORKS 440 (1851), quoted in Corwin, supra note 9, at 169.
19. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 125, 129 (1765).
Although nearly 2,500 copies of his work had been sold in America before the Revolution, Black-
stone was not to be followed in all respects. His writings were denounced in particular by
Thomas Jefferson. See, e.g., Corwin, supra note 9, at 405; N. SCHACHNER, supra note 8, at 36;
Chafee, Freedom on Speech in Wartime, in 2 AALS, SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
Human Rights in US. Courts
James Otis, in his pamphlet The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted
and Proved, to recognize in 1764 that "there are natural, inherent, and
inseparable rights as men," 20 rights that Otis based in part also on the
law of nations.21 Both in 1764 and 1765, Samuel Adams wrote that
rights such as the right to self-government, trial by jury, and self-taxa-
tion were "founded in the common Rights of Mankind." 22 And what
John Adams termed "our Rights as Men, and our Priviledges [sic] as
Englishmen" formed the basis for his argument in 1765 that the Brit-
ish Stamp Act was "utterly void, and of no binding Force upon us."
'23
Later that same year, the assemblies of Pennsylvania and Massa-
chusetts would confirm Adams' expectation and set the stage for defi-
ance of British rule. John Dickinson prepared the first draft of a
Pennsylvania resolution24 which declared in September of 1765 that
"the Constitution of Government in this Province is founded on the
natural Rights of Mankind, and the noble Principles of English Lib-
erty."'25 Samuel Adams helped to prepare the Massachusetts resolu-
tion of October, 1765, which noted: "there are certain essential rights
. . . which are founded in the law of God and nature, and are the
common rights of mankind."' 26 The Massachusetts resolution also
confirmed:
That the inhabitants of this province are unalienably entitled to those
essential rights, in common with all men; and that no law of society can,
consistent with the law of God and nature, divest them of those rights. 27
In 1766, Richard Bland's publication, An Inquiry into the Rights of
the British Colonies, reconfirmed the expectation that the "Rights of
Mankind... flow from" the law of nature, a law which, he and many
LAW 1024, 1030 (1938). On Blackstone's conception, see also Golding, The Primacy of Welfare
Rights, I SOCIAL PHILOS. & POLICY 119, 123 (1984). In 1758, E. Vattel's influential THE LAW
OF NATIONS had been printed and it used the phrases "natural and inviolable right" and "natu-
ral rights of man." See infra notes 248, 411.
20. Quoted in Corwin, supra note 9, at 399.
21. See C. MULLETT, supra note 5, at 82.
22. See id. at 126. See also C. ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 388, 531 nn.132-133 (Samuel
Adams and declaration of the Town of Boston in 1765, referred to in the Boston Gazette, Sept.
23, 1765).
23. Quoted in E. MORGAN & H. MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT CRISIS: PROLOGUE TO
REVOLUTION 140 (1953); see also R. POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUAR-
ANTEES OF LIBERTY 64 (1957); infra note 28.
24. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 77.
25. Pa. Res. of Sept. 21, 1765, quoted in E. MORGAN & H. MORGAN, supra note 23, at 113.
26. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 72; E. MORGAN AND H. MORGAN, supra note 23, at 113
(Mass. Res. of Oct. 25, 1765); Maclver, European Doctrines and the Constitution, in THE CON-
STITUTION RECONSIDERED 51, 53 (C. Reed ed. 1968). The phrase "laws of God and nature"
appeared later in an 1825 House Committee report on the slave trade. See The Antelope, 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 66, app. note I(A) (1825).
27. Quoted in E. MORGAN & H. MORGAN, supra note 23, at 113.
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of his contemporaries thought, is certainly "not contrary to the com-
mon Understandings of Mankind."' 28 Similarly, in 1768, William
Hicks wrote of "the natural rights of mankind" possessed by the colo-
nists.29 As early as 1767, slavery was questioned as a violation of "the
birthright of all mankind, Africans as well as Europeans."' 30  The
drafting skills of Samuel Adams were prominent once again in the
1772 Declarations of Rights as Men prepared on behalf of the citizens
of Boston,31 rights to which persons were entitled "by the eternal and
28. R. BLAND, AN INQUIRY INTO THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES 11, 14 (1766),
quoted in B. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 80. For early judicial acceptance of the criterion of
common expectation, see, e.g., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat,) 518, 707
(1819) (Story, J., concurring) ("common sense of mankind"); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 43, 50 (1815) (Story, J.) (the "common sense of mankind"); Ervin's Appeal, 16 Pa. 256,
263 (1851) (Coulter, J.) ("the common sense of the people"); Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20
Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 315 (Mass. 1825) (principle "founded in common sense and common jus-
tice"); Bowman v. Middleton, I S.C.L. (I Bay 252, 254) 101, 102 (S.C. 1792) ("against common
right"); Ham v. McClaws, I S.C.L. (1 Bay 93, 98) 38, 40 (S.C. 1789) ("plain and obvious princi-
ples of common right and common reason" will void an inconsistent statute); see also Bank of
Columbia v. Okey, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819) ("the good sense of mankind"); Hursh v.
North, 40 Pa. 241, 243 (1861) ("custom.. .is law by the usage and consent of the people"); J.
KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 5 (absolute, natural rights "are clearly under-
stood and settled by the common reason of mankind"), 10 ("the judgment and the practice of
mankind") (1827). Early in English history it was held that a parliamentary act that was against
"common right and reason" was void. See C. MULLETT, supra note 5, at 37, quoting the trial of
the Despensers, I State Trials 33 (Howell, ed.); see also C. MULLETT, supra, note 5 at 39 n.20, 45
(Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Reps. 107, 118 [1610], C. J. Coke: "when an act of Parliament is against
common right and reason... the common law will control it and adjudge such act to be void"),
49 n.48 (John Davys, Reports (1628), common law is "the Common custome of the realme ..
ius commune"). Coke's words were also used by the colonists. See Gay, supra note 8, at 846; C.
MULLETT, supra note 5 at 106; E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY
141 (1963); B. KNOLLENBERG, ORIGIN OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: 1759-1766, at 163-64
(1960) (James Otis of Boston); see also id. at 164 ("in February, 1766, the County Court of
Northampton County, Virginia, Justice Littleton Eyre presiding, unanimously advised the of-
ficers of the court to proceed without regard to the Stamp Act in as much as they conceive the
said Act to be unconstitutional."); I MAYS, EDMUND PENDLETON (1721-1803): A BIOGRAPHY
172 (1952) (same decision by the Louisa County Court in 1766). After the American Revolu-
tion, Coke's famous recognition fell into disfavor in England as it gained new acceptance in
America, See, e.g., B. KNOLLENBERG, supra, at 163, 350 nn. 25-26.
International law was also thought to have a similar base in human expectation. See, e.g.,
The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187-88 (1871) (Strong, J.) ("common consent of mankind,"
"common consent of civilized communities"); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1863)
("The law of nations is also called the law of nature; it is founded on the common consent as well
as the common sense of the world"); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 115, 119, 121 (1825);
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199, 227 (1796)("established by the general consent of man-
kind"). See also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 66 (1765):
"The law of nations is... established by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the
world;" H. GROTIUS, supra note 11, at preface, § 40; ch. 1, § 14 (law of nations based on "some
general consensus of opinion" and "derives its forceful authority from the will of all, or at least of
many nations").
29. W. HICKS, THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF PARLIAMENTARY POWER CONSIDERED
(1768), reprinted in M. JENSEN, TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1763-1776, at 164,
183 (1978).
30. Virginia Gazette, Mar. 10, 1767: Pennsylvania Chronicle, May 1 and Sept. 7, 1767,
quoted in C. ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 438.
31. See L. WHIPPLE, OUR ANCIENT LIBERTIES 34, 37 (1972) (Dec. of Nov. 20, 1772).
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immutable laws of God and nature, as well as by the laws of Na-
tions."' 32 And the 1774 resolutions adopted by the freeholders of Al-
bermarle County, Virginia, no doubt mirrored the influence of
Thomas Jefferson.
33
In a resolution of July 26, the Virginians from Albermarle County
declared that only their own duly constituted and appointed legisla-
ture could govern them and that they held rights such as this (i.e., to
self-government) "as the common rights of mankind."' 34 Only eight
days earlier, the freeholders of Fairfax County, Virginia, had similarly
affirmed the right to self-government, adding in a resolution of July 18,
1774, that its denial by the British "is totally incompatible with the
privileges of a free people and the natural rights of mankind. ' 35 In
1774, Governor Wright of Massachusetts affirmed such rights as being
the "indelible rights of mankind."' 36 That same year Granville Clark
of Pennsylvania also wrote of the natural rights of man in his work
The Declaration of the People's Natural Right.37 Similarly, John Dick-
inson of Pennsylvania, in his Essay on the Constitutional Power of
Great Britain over the Colonies, wrote of the right of local legislation
"founded [in part] on the immutable and unalienable rights of human
nature." 3
8
1774 was also the year that the loyalist Thomas Chandler, in his
Friendly Address to All Reasonable Americans, wrote of the need to
conform to the British will, arguing that an Apostle, "who had a due
regard for the rights and liberties of mankind," had ordered submis-
sion to the Emperor Nero.39 Such twists of meaning found favor with
other loyalists. It led, for example, to Peter Van Schaack's open defi-
ance of the state of New York in 1777 and of the movement for inde-
pendence, a defiance which he justified in part on "the sentiments of
Mr. Locke and those other advocates for the rights of mankind." 4
It was another from New York, however, whose writing reflected a
more common understanding of the "essential," "natural," and "sa-
32. See C. MULLETT, supra note 5, at 99.
33. See C. ANTIEAU, RIGHTS OF OUR FATHERS 157 (1968).
34. See id.
35. See id. at 159.
36. See C. MULLETT, supra note 5, at 110.
37. See C. ANTIEAU, supra note 33, at 158.
38. See C. MULLETT, supra note 5, at 143.
39. See B. BAILYN, supra note 8, at 313.
40. See id. at 29. In that same year, 1777, in England, Richard Price published the third
edition of his work ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE AND VALUE OF CIVIL LIB-
ERTY (3d ed. 1777), which referred to the "rights of mankind." See id. at 11-14, 17.
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cred rights of mankind. ' 41 Alexander Hamilton stated in 1775 that he
was "convinced that the whole human race is entitled to" such rights,
adding:
the sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among old
parchments or musty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in
the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of divinity itself, and
can never be erased or obscured by mortal power.
42
On the eve of the Revolution, in April of 1776, John Adams reflected
similar sentiments when he wrote of the need to "study the law of
nature," the histories of other people, and "the conduct of our own
British ancestors, who have defended for us the inherent rights of
mankind against foreign and domestic tyrants and usurpers.
' '43
By this time, the Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Tak-
ing Up Arms had already been proclaimed by "Representatives of the
United Colonies of North America" meeting in Philadelphia.
44
Thomas Paine's classic revolutionary pamphlet, Common Sense,
which referred expressly to "natural rights of all Mankind" and to
"the Rights of Mankind," 45 had been published and widely read."
And the more famous Declaration of Independence would soon be
penned with a fervent reference to the rights of man that would be
revered for ages to come: "We hold these truths to be self-evident:
that all men are created equal; that they are endowed, by their Crea-
tor, with certain unalienable Rights; that among these are life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness.
'47
Here, of course, is our early history and that of a revolution based
on human rights. What would follow was a Union based upon a fed-
eral constitution and what President John Quincy Adams would refer
to as "the great result of this experiment upon the theory of human
41. See A. HAMILTON, supra note 1; see also B. BAILYN, supra note 8, at 188.
42. See A. HAMILTON supra note 1. On the jurisprudential orientation expressed by Hamil-
ton, see also Paust, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 256-57, n.93, passim.
43. Adams, To the Inhabitants of the City and County of New York, Apr. 13, 1776 (pseudo-
nym "Sentinel"), quoted in G. WOOD, supra note 8, at 6.
44. Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms, July 6, 1775, reprinted in
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 295-99 (R. Perry & J. Cooper eds. 1972). The Continental Con-
gress had also proclaimed in the Declaration of Rights of 1774 that the British government was
exercising "unconstitutional powers" and had violated "indubitable rights and liberties" of the
Americans "which can not be legally taken from them, altered or abridged by any power
whatever, without their own consent .. " Declaration of Rights, Oct. 14, 1774, reprinted in R.
Perry & J. Cooper, supra, at 286, 288.
45. See THE ESSENTIAL THOMAS PAINE 23, 67 (S. Hook ed. 1969).
46. See R. Perry & J. Cooper, supra note 44, at 315 (Common Sense published on Jan. 8,
1776).
47. The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
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rights."' 48 But in May of 1776, Congress had called merely for each of
the colonies to form separate governments, and this occurred soon
thereafter. 49 By June of 1776, some three weeks before the Declara-
tion of Independence, the new Constitution of Virginia proclaimed:
"That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have
certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of soci-
ety, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity." 50
In October of 1776, the new Constitution of Georgia was framed
and its preamble related expressly to British acts of oppression as be-
ing "repugnant to the common rights of mankind." 51 Later, the con-
stitutions of thirty-one states would refer to such inalienable rights,
52
and twenty-seven state constitutions would contain a provision like the
ninth amendment to the U.S. Constitution, proclaiming that the
enumeration of certain rights shall not be construed to impair or deny
the existence of others retained by the people. 53 Of these, and from
the years 1790 to 1836, eight constitutions or declarations would also
mention expressly "the invaluable rights of man." In order of first
appearance, these were the constitutions or declarations of: Penn-
sylvania, 54 Kentucky, 55 Tennessee,56 Louisiana,57 Indiana, 58 Illinois,59
Missouri, 6° and Arkansas. 61 In August of 1776, the Continental Con-
48. See J. Q. Adams, Inaugural Address (March 4, 1825), reprinted in 2 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 294, 295 (J. Richardson ed. 1896).
49. See R. Perry & J. Cooper, supra note 44, at 316.
50. VA. CONST., § 1 (1776), reprinted in R. Perry & J. Cooper, supra note 44, at 316. This
was the first of the new state constitutions. See also infra note 71.
51. GA. CONST., preamble (1777), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS 777 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909); see also id. at 777 n.a (Georgia Constitution was framed in Oct.,
1776).
52. See Abbott, Inalienable Rights and the Eighteenth Amendment, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 183,
187 (1920); see also Paust, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 249-50, n.62.
53. See Abbott, supra note 52, at 187.
54. Pa. Declaration of Rights (1790), in R. Perry & J. Cooper, supra note 44, at 327. Profes-
sor Kauper made the interesting point that state constitutions containing "declarations of right,"
like that of Pennsylvania, did so in order to further the common understanding that "constitu-
tions did not create these rights; rather the constitutions simply declared those rights which were
derived from what was stated in the Declaration of Independence to be... self-evident truth...
[concerning] certain inalienable rights...." Kauper, The Higher Law and the Rights of Man, 18
U. OF MICH. LAW SCHOOL LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES, no.2, at 9, 10 (1974). See also C.
HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 55 (1930).
55. Ky. CONST., art. XII, § 7 (1792), reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS 1274 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909).
56. TENN. CONST., art. XI, § 19 (1796), reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTI-
TUTIONS 3423 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909).
57. LA. CONST., art. VI, § 21 (1812), reprinted in 3 F. Thorpe, supra note 55, at 1390.
58. IND. CONST., art. I, § 9 (1816), reprinted in 2 F. Thorpe, supra note 51, at 1058.
59. ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 22 (1818), reprinted in 2 F. Thorpe, supra note 51, at 983.
60. Mo. CONST., art. XIII, § 16 (1820), reprinted in 4 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTI-
TUTIONS 2164 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909).
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gress also cited "the rights of human nature" during a call to foreign
officers to join those serving the Revolution.
62
During the year 1778, Theophilus Parsons, later Chief Justice of
Massachusetts, wrote of "the natural rights of mankind. ' 63 By 1783,
the preamble to a Massachusetts statute referred similarly to "the nat-
ural rights of all men" to their literary productions.64 It was also in
Massachusetts, in 1783, that what might have been the first judicial
use of the phrase "natural rights of mankind" appeared. In Common-
wealth v. Jennison,61 the Supreme Court charged a jury considering a
criminal prosecution for the enslavement of a black person that per-
petual servitude could no longer be tolerated, the court noting that
"[s]entiments more favorable to the natural rights of mankind... have
prevailed since the glorious struggle for our rights began." 66 As the
Massachusetts court further confirmed:
these sentiments led the framers of our Constitution ... to declare -
that all men are born free and equal; and that every subject is entitled to
liberty, and to have it guarded by the laws.... In short, without resort-
ing to implication in construing the Constitution, slavery is as effectively
abolished as it can be by the granting of rights and privileges wholly
incompatible and repugnant to its existence.67
Coincidentally, the "glorious struggle" against Britain ended that
same year with the signing of the Treaty of Paris; and it was the Brit-
ish plenipotentiary who had signed that treaty, David Hartley, who
wrote to Benjamin Franklin (in an effort' to gain a new alliance with
the United States) that "Great Britain & America are as yet the only
true supports throughout the world of the principles of liberty & of the
rights of mankind. ' 68 As yet, the French Revolution and the French
61. ARK. CONST., art. II, § 7 (1836), reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS 269 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909).
62. See 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 474, 475 (1854), quoting Resolution of Aug. 27, 1776, 1 J. OF
CONG. 456 (Way & Gideon eds.).
63. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 112.
64. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 682 (Thompson, J., dissenting), quoting Mass.
Act of 1783.
65. Reprinted in W. CUSHING, Notes of Cases Decided in the Superior and Supreme Judicial
Courts of Massachusetts 1772-1789, at 50, 51 (Harvard Law School Library, typescript), re-
printed in part in W. NELSON, Americanization of the Common Law 102 (1975).
66. Id.
67. Id. On the relation of human right precepts to the slavery question, see also supra text
accompanying note 30, and infra notes 80, 103, 137-147, 149, 159-162.
68. See Oberg, One Man Who Saw Far Beyond a Revolution, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1983, at
22, col. 5 (letter). Earlier, another Englishman, Gentleman Johnny Burgoyne, had written to
Charles Lee (then an American Major General): "I am no stranger to the doctrines of Mr.
Locke and other of the best advocates for the rights of mankind . Letter of July 9, 1775,
quoted in C. ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 353. The letter was reprinted in several American
newspapers in 1775. See id. at 525 n.119.
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Declaration des droits de l'homme were some six years away.
In the next two years, Thomas Jefferson would draft the slightly
less famous Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty, which expressly de-
clared "that the rights hereby asserted are of the natural rights of
mankind,"' 69 and James Madison would write of "the right of every
man to exercise" the "unalienable right" of religion. 70  It was Jeffer-
son, as well as Franklin, who would come to know several prominent
advocates of the rights of man in France, including Lafayette,
Rochefoucauld, Condorcet, 71 and others;72 and it was Jefferson who
would aid in the intellectual efforts culminating in the French Decla-
ration of 1789. 73 Later, in contrast to the sentiments expressed by the
British plenipotentiary, Jefferson would note: "The appeal to the
rights of man, which had been made in the United States, was taken
69. See N. SCHACHNER, supra note 8, at 160; Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values,
53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 745 & n. 215 (1980); quoted in Valley Forge Christian College v. Ameri-
cans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 503 n. 14 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 35 n.15 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) (quoting a 1779 proposal by Jefferson). On the influence of the Virginia statute in
France, see Kent, The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, in GREAT EXPRESSIONS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 145, 164 & n.45 (R. MacIver ed. 1950); see also R. Bainton, The Appeal to
Reason and the American Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED 126 n.10 (C.
Reed ed. 1968).
70. J. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 1785, in THE
COMPLETE MADISON 299 (S. Padover ed. 1953), quoted in Wallace v. Jalfree, 105 S. Ct. 2479,
2488 n.38 (1985) (Stevens, J., opinion).
71. On Condorcet's views concerning the rights of man, see B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF
WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 722 (1945); Kent, supra note 69, at 168; C. BECKER, THE DECLARA-
TION OF INDEPENDENCE 229-33 (1960). Condorcet once remarked: "The first Declaration of
Rights that is entitled to be called such is that of Virginia" and its author, George Mason, "is
entitled to the eternal gratitude of mankind." Quoted in Miller, Comments, THE GEORGE MA-
SON LECTURES (1976).
72. See N. SCHACHNER, supra note 8, at 312, passim; see also C. BECKER, supra note 71, at
231-33; Howard, in THE GEORGE MASON LECTURES, supra note 71, at 18.
73. See id.; D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 222-23 (1951). The French
Declaration stated: "The aim of all political association is the protection of the natural and
imprescriptible rights of man's liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression," quoted
in Murphy, supra note 69, at 753 n.242. The French Declaration was adopted in 1789 by the
French National Assembly and was prefixed to the French Constitution of 1791. See H. LAU-
TERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 88 (2d ed. 1968). Thomas Paine had
also helped in the formation of the French Declaration. See S. Hook, supra note 45, at ix-x. On
the influence of Franklin, see also Kent, supra note 69, at 164 n.44. On the influence of the
American declarations, see Bainton, supra note 69, at 126 n.10, citing G. JELLINEK, DIE ER-
KLARUNG DER MENSCHEN UND BORGERRECHTE (1st ed. 1895, translated by M. FARRAND,
THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF CITIZENS [1901]); see also C. BECKER,
supra note 71, at 229-33. Copies of the French Declaration were smuggled into Latin America
soon thereafter, translated and secretly printed. By 1797, a conspiracy movement in Venezuela
led by Gual and Espana had been influenced by such viewpoints in the U.S. and France, includ-
ing those expressed in the French Declaration. See J. TREND, BOLIVAR AND THE INDEPEN-
DENCE OF SPANISH AMERICA 17, 49 (1951). On Feb. 15, 1819, at Angostura (now Ciudad
Bolivar), Simon Bolivar's Message to the new Congress of Venezuela noted that they had de-
clared the Rights of Man and that these were: the liberty of acting, thinking, speaking and
writing. See id. at 105, 108.
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up by France, first of the European nations."' 74
Back in the United States, the references to human right precepts
continued. In 1786, John Quincy Adams published his Defense of the
Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, in which
he referred expressly to "the rights of mankind. ' 75 In 1787, Thomas
Cooper's Propositions Respecting the Foundations of Civil Government
spoke of "the natural rights of mankind"; 76 and in 1788 Johnathan
Jackson published Thoughts upon the Political Situations of the United
States, in which he referred expressly to the "rights of man."' 77 In a
letter of September 7, 1787, Jonas Phillips warned members of the
Constitutional Convention of dangers posed to Jews from certain
drafts and reminded: "all men have a natural and unalienable Right
To worship almighty God according to the dictates of their own Con-
science .... -78 And Luther Martin, in a speech before the Maryland
legislature of November 29, 1787 on the Constitutional Convention,
pointed out that equality of suffrage is based in part on the "rights of
men,' 79 that the slave trade is "contrary to the rights of mankind...
the common rights of men . . . [and] those rights to which God and
nature had entitled us, not in particular, but in common with all the
rest of mankind." Martin also noted that slavery "lessens the sense of
the equal rights of mankind, and habituates us to tyranny and
oppression."
'80
At the time of the new Constitution of the United States and the
Alien Tort Statute, 81 both James Madison 82 and Gouverneur Morris
74. See D. MALONE, supra note 73, at 355. As Malone notes, "American sentiment was
overwhelmingly sympathetic with the Revolution in France when Paine's pamphlet The Rights
of Man appeared in an American edition . . . Like Paine, [Jefferson] . . . connected the two
revolutions, and he believed that their fortunes were interrelated, if not inseparable. The firm
establishment of the French government would be followed, in his opinion, by the spread of
liberty all over Europe .... Id. at 355-56; see also infra note 85. On the recognized "roots" of
human rights "in the conception of natural rights... found throughout Europe" and the early
influence of the French Declaration of 1789 in Europe (especially in: the Netherlands, Belgium,
Switzerland, Germany, Italy, Austria), see Scheuner, Comparison of the Jurisprudence of Na-
tional Courts with That of the Origins of the Convention as Regards Other Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 214 (A. Robertson ed. 1968).
75. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 122.
76. See id. at 308, quoting Cooper at 3.
77. See id. at 123 n.2.
78. Reproduced in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 78 (M.
Farrand ed. 1937).
79. Id. at 186.
80. Id. at 211-12.
81. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789), now codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350.
82. Madison is quoted in Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States, in THE GREAT RIGHTS
86 (Cahn ed. 1963), quoted in Blocker v. Board of Education, 226 F. Supp. 208, 225 (E.D. N.Y.
1964).
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of New York 83 referred to the "rights of mankind." Similarly, the
anti-federalist John Williams of New York complained, like so many
of his persuasion, that "the inestimable rights of mankind" were not
adequately represented in the proposed Constitution. 84 The same con-
cern led Patrick Henry to speak during the 1788 Virginia Convention
on the new draft Constitution of the barriers against deprivations of
"human rights" still lacking in the draft.85 It was perhaps the first
time that the phrase "human rights" was used in America, although
clearly there had already been ample use of equivalent expressions.
86
The new President, George Washington, referred to the "rights of
freemen" in his First Inaugural Address of April 30, 1789,87 and Ben-
jamin Franklin used the phrase "rights of man" in letters written to
Samuel Moore and David Hartley that same year.88 Ramsay's History
of the American Revolution, published in Philadelphia in 1789, re-
ferred also to "civil... rights of human nature,"8' 9 a phrase that un-
83. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 128, citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION 222 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).
84. 2 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 241 (J. Elliot ed. 1901).
85. See 3 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 446 (J. Elliot ed. 1901) (Henry in
Virginia, June 1788), quoted in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 320 (1972) (Marshall, J., con-
curring). During the debates in New York and South Carolina, the phrase "rights of mankind"
was also used. See 2 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 362 (J. Elliot ed. 1901) (Ham-
ilton in New York, 1788) and vol. IV, at 320 (Pinckney in South Carolina, May 14, 1788: fervent
hope that "rights of mankind" will spread all over Europe).
86. This may not have been the first use of the phrase "human rights," since it was made
without evident notice of it being any different than rights of "man" or "mankind." Moreover, it
is questionable whether use of the word "human" signaled some new concern for the equal rights
of women. It seems that greater attention to the equality of women arose toward the end of the
19th century, see infra note 172, and women did not enjoy a constitutionally recognized right to
vote until the early 20th century, but it would be speculative and too simplistic to assume that
various rights claimed in the name of "man" or "mankind" in the 18th century were not also
claimed for women (whether or not women could participate directly in the political process or
the enjoyment of other rights was delayed). Human rights precepts were used to claim rights for
others who could not vote, see, e.g. supra notes 30, 66-67, 80, and infra notes 103, 113-114, 137-
147, 149, 153, 165, 187, 242, 248, and it was clearly expected that the enjoyment of human rights
should spread throughout the world, that these were rights claimed for all persons, see, e.g.,
supra notes 1, 6, 27, 30, 42, 68, 73-74, 79-80, 85 and infra notes 88, 101, 109, 111, 114-115, 125,
127, 171, 188, 194, 206, 249-250. Even today the words "man" and "mankind" are used in a
most general sense, i.e. not to exclude women. See, e.g., infra notes 343-358, 362-363, 398, 452.
87. Quoted in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 51,
53 (J. Richardson ed. 1896). Washington had referred more broadly to "the rights of mankind"
six years earlier when writing to the state governors on the occasion of the disbanding of the
revolutionary army. See C. ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 377, 529 n.74, citing 10 THE WRITINGS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 254, 256 (W.C. Ford ed. 1891) (letter of June 8, 1783).
88. Letter from B. Franklin to S. Moore (Nov. 5, 1789) in 10 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN 63 (A. Smyth ed. 1905-1907); letter from B. Franklin to D. Hartley (Dec. 4, 1789) in
id. at 72, Franklin writing: "God grant, that not only the Love of Liberty, but a thorough
Knowledge of the Rights of Man, may pervade all the Nations of the Earth, so that a philosopher
may set his foot anywhere on its Surface and say, 'This is my country.'"
89. I. D. RAMSAY, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 30, 55 (Philadelphia 1789)
(reprinted in London in 1793), quoted in Smith, David Ramsay and the Causes of the American
Revolution, 17 WILLIAM & MARY Q. 50 (1960).
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doubtedly expressed the expectation that there were certain natural
human rights of a civil sort.
It was precisely the sort of concern expressed by John Williams
and others that would lead to the famous compromise between
Madison and others with regard to the Bill of Rights. Actually,
Madison, like Hamilton and Justice Wilson, had himself feared that a
specific enumeration of such rights might someday be interpreted so as
to deny or disparage others. He had even stated, before the assem-
blage of the first House of Representatives, that the argument that a
specification of some of the rights of man might someday be misinter-
preted to imply a denial of others was the best argument he had heard
against the enumeration of any rights in the Constitution. He felt con-
fident, however, that his new proposal - the predecessor to the ninth
amendment - would sufficiently guard against such misconceptions
in the future. 90 Madison had also been persuaded by Jefferson and the
general demands of persons in state government that a bill of rights
should be added to the Constitution along with some form of caveat to
cover the danger.9' In its final form, the ninth amendment affirms in
as clear a manner as possible that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitu-
tion, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." With its adoption, the Founders defi-
nitely expected that the rights of man would be guaranteed under the
ninth amendment, 92 as well as under those amendments enumerating
more specific guarantees. 93 Thus, all of the first nine amendments
90. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 435, 439 (1789) [1789-1791]; see also 3 Farrand, supra note 78,
at 256 (speech of C. Pinckney of Jan. 18, 1788 in the South Carolina House of Representatives:
no bill of rights because someone might deny those not enumerated, but "we certainly reserve to
our-selves every power and right not mentioned .. "). Similar points were made by James
Wilson before the Pennsylvania Convention. See id. at 144 (speech of Nov. 28, 1787), 162
(speech of Dec. 4, 1787), adding: "Enumerate all the rights of men I am sure, Sir, that no
gentleman in the late convention would have attempted such a thing ......
91. See Call, Federalism and the Ninth Amendment, 64 DICK. L. REV. 121, 125 (1960); Dun-
bar, James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42 VA. L. REV. 627, 629-31, 633-43 (1956);
Rogge, Unenumerated Rights, 47 CAL. L. REV. 787, 789, 792 (1959); see also D. MALONE, Supra
note 73, at 168-79.
92. See E. CORWIN, UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 3-5, 132 (4th ed. 1967); Paust,
Human Rights, supra note 4, at 235, passim; Kauper, supra note 54, at 10-11. Cases specifically
mentioning human rights and the ninth amendment include: Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973) (Blackmun, J., opinion); United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 76,
95 (1947) (Reed, J., opinion); Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007, 1017-18 n.25 (8th Cir. 1977);
Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 620 (5th Cir. 1972) (Wisdom, J., dissenting); see also Mapco Inc.
v. Carter, 573 F.2d 1268, 1279 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1977).
93. For judicial recognition of the fact that the amendments embody several human right
norms and were added "as essential barriers against arbitrary or unjust deprivation of human
rights," see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (Black, J., opinion). Other cases in-
cluded: Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 56 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Laird v. Tatum,
408 U.S. 1, 20 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 755 (1964)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (Black, J., opinion);
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were designed to protect human rights.
Two years after the creation of the U.S. Constitution and the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man, Thomas Paine's second in-
fluential work, The Rights of Man, was published in England and later
in 1791 in America.94 In his new pamphlet, Paine used the expression
"human right" as an equivalent to the phrase "rights of man.""a
Paine's translation of the French Declaration also contained the
phrase "human rights"; 96 and throughout this important new work on
authority and human rights Paine referred to the "natural rights of
man,"' 97 "common rights of man," 98 "equal rights of man," 99 and "the
indefeasible hereditary Rights of Man."'' ° Near the end of his publi-
cation he captured the expectations of the Founders of our Republic
and of our French allies when he wrote: "The end of all political as-
sociations is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights
of man; and among these rights are liberty, property, security, and
resistance of oppression." 10'
In the 1790s, express concern for the rights of man continued.
Soon after, and with reference to Paine's new work, John Quincy Ad-
ams wrote again of the "rights of man".10 2 In 1795 his father, John
Adams, wrote prophetically about a specific human right to freedom
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 243 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Green v. United States,
356 U.S. 165, 216 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 577 (1949) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 246 n. I (1948)
(Reed, J., dissenting) (quoting Jefferson); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 62 (1947) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 136 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting);
id. at 144 (Roberts, J., dissenting). The Founders had always thought of the rights of man as
being "constitutional rights." See e.g., N. SCHACHNER, supra note 8, at 99, 177; see also the
Virginia cases cited in note 28 supra. Undoubtedly for this reason, both Virginia and North
Carolina proposed the same amendment to the Constitution, declaring: "all men have an equal,
natural and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion .. " quoted in Wallace v. Jaffree,
105 S. Ct. at 2509 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
94. See D. MALONE, supra note 73, at 354-55.
95. See S. Hook, supra note 45, at 131, Paine stating: "Immortal power is not a human right,
and therefore cannot be a right of Parliament .... ; and as Government is for the living, and not
for the dead, it is living only that has any right in it." On this point, see also id. at 128-130; supra
text accompanying notes 27 and 50; Paust, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 240-44, 249-50, 252;
Paust, Human Right to Revolution, supra note 4, at 550-53.
96. See S. Hook, supra note 45, at 186.
97. See id. at 151-52, 173, 213; see also id. at 231 ("rights of man").
98. See id. at 152.
99. See id. at 149, 198.
100. See id. at 227.
101. Id. at 213. On these points, see also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553
(1876).
102. See 1 WRITINGS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 69, 83 (W. Ford ed. 1913) (letters of "Pub-
licola" of June 11 and June 22, 1791).
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from slavery that would become of growing concern and divide a
nation:
I was concerned in several Causes in which Negroes sued for their Free-
dom before the Revolution .... The Arguments in Favour of their
Liberty were much the same as have been urged since in Pamphlets and
Newspapers, in Debates in Parliament & c. arising from the Rights of
Mankind .... 103
Also in 1795, one of the early law books, A System of the Laws of the
State of Connecticut,'°4 referred expressly to "the rights of man," both
natural and civil. 10 5 Additionally, Supreme Court Justice Patterson
made his first specific reference to the "rights of man" in Vanhorne's
Lessee v. Dorrance,10 6 (although Justice Wilson had already referred to
"the natural rights of man" in an historic 1793 charge to a grand
jury, 107 and Chief Justice Jay had referred to the "rights of men" in his
opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia '0 8 in 1793).
On May 1st, 1794, the Democratic and Republican Societies met
together in Philadelphia and affirmed a common goal to "preserve and
disseminate their principles ... until the Rights of Man shall become
the supreme law of every land, and their separate fraternities be ab-
sorbed in one great democratic society comprehending the human
race."' 9 In 1798 that shared goal was partly abandoned, however,
when Congress debated whether the new territory of Mississippi
would have a government founded upon "the rights of man" and free
from slavery."t0 As noted previously, it was a goal shared in part by
others across the Atlantic, even in the face of anti-democratic
103. 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 48 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965) (quoting letter
to Dr. Jeremy Belknap, 21 March 1795). On the slavery question, see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 30, 66-67, supra note 26, and infra notes 137-147, 149, 159-162; G. BUCHANAN, THE
QuEsT FOR FREEDOM: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT (1976).
104. VOL. 1 (Z. Swift ed. 1795).
105. Id. at 176.
106. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795) (Patterson, J.) ("the right of acquiring and possessing
property, and having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of
man").
107. Henfield's Case, I 1 F. Cas. 1099, 1120 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (Wilson, J., charge
to grand jury) ("Emigration is, undoubtedly, one of the natural rights of man"). On the point
mentioned by Justice Wilson, see also infra text accompanying notes 127, 164-165; infra note
157. Concerning the historic import of Henfield's Case with regard to criminal sanctions against
individuals for violations of international law, see Paust, After My Lai: The Case for War Crime
Jurisdiction Over Civilians in Federal District Courts, 50 TEX. L. REV. 6, 8-12 (1971), reprinted in
4 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 447 (R. Falk ed. 1976).
108. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 478 (1793) (Jay, C. J.).
109. Quoted in Bozeman, The Roots of the American Commitment to the Rights of Man, in
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 51, 83 (U.S.C. conf. proceedings 1978) (1980), citing E. P. LINK,
DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN SOCIETIES, 1790-1800, at 109 (1965).
110. See I ORATIONS AND ADDRESSES OF GEORGE WILLIAM CURTIS 22 (C. Norton ed.
1894) (quoting Congressman Thatcher of Massachusetts).
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adversity. 11
During the new century, references to human right precepts con-
tinued. In 1800, Jefferson wrote of threats to the "rights of man"
posed by the close association of government and the clergy. 11 2 Jeffer-
son made new reference to the rights of man in his Second Inaugural
Address of March 4, 1805, where he assured his audience that the
American Indians are "[e]ndowed with the faculties and the rights of
men,"113 an expectation affirmed some twenty-seven years later by
Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Washington in Worcester v. Geor-
gia.114 In his Sixth Annual Message to Congress, on December 2,
1806, President Jefferson also voiced approval of the withdrawal of
"citizens of the United States from all further participation in those
violations of human rights which have been so long continued on the
unoffending inhabitants of Africa." ' 5 In a letter to a federal judge in
1812, Jefferson reaffirmed the fact, well-known by this time, that the
American colonists brought with them not merely "common law
rights," but also "the rights of men."
1 16
The phrase "natural rights of man" appeared that same year in
Reverend Samuel Smith's Lectures on Moral and Political Philoso-
phy. 11 7 Two years later, John Taylor's tract, An Inquiry into the Prin-
111. See, e.g., supra notes 9-11, 13, 19, 40, 68, 71-74; see also infra notes 134, 165-67. Such
expectations had been shared also by Ludwig van Beethoven. Beethoven had been working on a
symphony since 1798 to commemorate Napoleon Bonaparte, his democratic ideals and the new,
republican Europe that could follow the Revolution in France; but when he heard that Napoleon
had crowned himself Emperor, Beethoven was enraged. "So he is just like all the rest ....
Beethoven shouted. "He will stamp out human rights and become a greater tyrant than the
others," Beethoven declared, and he ripped Napoleon's name from the new score, now renamed
"Eroica."
For this interesting story, I thank Leonard Burkat. See Program Notes for Symphony No. 3
in E-Flat Major, Op. 55, "Eroica," Hous. Symphony Mag., Dec. 1983, at 24. Mr. Burkat had
obtained the quoted material from F. G. WEGELER & F. RIES, BIOGRAPHISCHE NOTIZEN OBER
LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN 78 (Koblenz 1838). In a letter to the author of Jan. 14, 1984, Mr.
Burkat thoughtfully provided other translations: A. THAYER, LIFE OF BEETHOVEN 349 (E.
Forbes ed. 1964) ("trample on all the rights of man"); BEETHOVEN: IMPRESSIONS OF His CON-
TEMPORARIES 54 (0. G. Sonneck ed. 1926) ("tread all human rights underfoot").
112. Letter from T. Jefferson to J. Moor (1800), quoted in McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618,
623 n.4 (1978) (Burger, C. J., opinion).
113. Quoted in 1 J. Richardson, supra note 87, at 378, 380.
114. 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832) (Marshall, C. J., opinion) ("The Indian nations had always been
considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their natural rights .. "); id.
at 579 (Washington, J.) (every nation has right by law of nature, "abstract right of every section
of the human race"). Later, this right was qualified as being "possessory" only and not a right to
"title." See The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 74 (1831), adding that such is a
right of "occupancy" and self-government.
115. Quoted in J. Richardson, supra note 87, at 408; see also Bozeman, supra note 109, at 84.
116. Quoted in J. LIEBERMAN, MILESTONES! - 200 YEARS OF AMERICAN LAW 15 (1976)
("The truth is that we brought with us the rights of men"). On Jefferson's point, see also Paust,
Human Right to Revolution, supra note 4, at 547, 561-62, and references cited therein.
117. VOL. II, at 188 (1812), quoted in B. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 252.
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ciples and Policy of the Government of the United States, criticized
Adams for supposedly rejecting natural law "philosophy in favour of
human rights." 118 In New Hampshire, in 1817, the state supreme
court affirmed that "legislative power" is limited by "the inalienable
rights of mankind."' 19 By this time also the U.S. Supreme Court had
referred once again to "natural inherent right[s]"' 20 and to "rights of
humanity" in time of war. 12' Further, the second volume of Kent's
Commentaries on American Law referred expressly in 1827 to "the
natural rights of mankind" and "natural, inherent, and unalienable
rights" that the new nation had recognized and sought to assure.
22
Additionally, in 1820, Jefferson wrote that George Wythe had been
devoted to "the natural and equal rights of man,"' 23 and in 1822, Jef-
ferson had written that "freedom of religion" is "the most inalienable
and sacred of all human rights."'
124
John Quincy Adams, as the new President in 1825, observed before
the nation "that the great result of this experiment upon the theory of
human rights has at the close of that generation by which it was
formed been crowned with success .... 125 It would lead countless
others abroad to try to emulate that success and still others to try to
join us on our shores. 126 In 1832, Benjamin Oliver similarly wrote:
"That a citizen of any community ... has a right to leave. . ., and to
reside in some other country, . . . seems to follow of course, from the
preceding view of the natural rights of mankind, and the origin of gov-
ernments."' 127 One year later, President Andrew Jackson declared:
"It is the right of mankind generally to secure by all means in their
118. Quoted in B. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 166.
119. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, I N.H. 111, 114 (1817) (Richardson, C. J., opinion).
120. Mima Queen and Child v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290, 298 (1813).
121. The Julia, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 181, 193 (1814). For use of related phrases, see infra
notes 141, 156, 172, 213, 242.
122. J. KENT, supra note 28, at 1, 3-4.
123. T. Jefferson, Notes for the Biography of George Wythe, quoted in A. DILL, GEORGE
WYTHE: TEACHER OF LIBERTY 82 (1979).
124. T. JEFFERSON, ANNUAL REPORT TO PRESIDENT AND DIRECTORS OF THE LIBERTY
FUND OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA (1822), quoted in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Education, 333 U.S. 203, 246 n.Il (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting).
125. J.Q. Adams, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1825), reprinted in 1 J. Richardson, supra note
48 at 294, 295. In a speech before Congress in 1837, John Quincy Adams also declared: "the
right of petition is not a right derived from the Constitution, but a preexisting right of man,
secured by a direct prohibition of the Constitution to Congress... That right God gave to the
whole human race... this right belongs to humanity .. " quoted in D. DEWEY, UNION AND
LIBERTY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 125 (1969).
126. See infra text accompanying notes 135-136.
127. B.S. OLIVER, RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN (1832), quoted in C. ANTIEAU, supra
note 33, at 161. On this point, see also supra text accompanying note 107; infra notes 135, 157,
164-65.
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power the blessings of liberty and happiness .... ,,128 And John
Quincy Adams remarked, in 1835, that "[t]he theory of the rights of
man has taken deep root in the soil of civil society .... ,"129
Although Jackson and Adams may not have foreseen the event, on
March 2, 1836, the Texas Declaration of Independence claimed the
"inherent and inalienable right of the people" to pursue their "inesti-
mable and inalienable rights" through a new body politic.1 30 In an
1839 speech in New York, Adams referred again to "the rights of
man" and "the rights of mankind,"'' a while that same year a national
convention of the Cherokee Indians referred to their "unalienable
rights" to form a body politic.' 32 In the meantime, a book published
in London in 1819 proclaimed that "human rights ... have their ori-
gin... and obligatory force in the immutable Law of God" and that
any law contrary to such is "void and of no effect."' 33 Such precepts
were evident also in later publications. For example in New York, in
1829, Thomas Skidmore's book, The Rights of Man to Property, was
published; and in 1834 Jonathan Dymond's Essays in the Principles of
Morality, and on the Private and Political Rights and Obligations of
Mankind made its appearance in New York.
In 1853, a widely read reference set contained a book on American
History which expanded upon the earlier observations of Presidents
Adams and Jackson, and of Benjamin Oliver. As the book
proclaimed:
Young America has taught lessons of great import to the Old World.
Throughout Europe, the high claims of legitimacy have been weakened.
The rights of man are more extensively recognized, the obligation of the
governing power to secure the happiness of the people at large, is gener-
ally admitted.' 3
4
The same reference work declared later: "The thousands that flock to
our shores, are so many living witnesses in behalf of our country, and
afford an overwhelming refutation of the slanders poured out upon us
by the enemies of liberty and human rights."' 135 There was a great
128. Speech before the Senate and House, Jan. 16, 1833, reprinted in J. Richardson, supra
note 48, at 610, 621.
129. Quoted in B. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 211.
130. Texas Declaration of Independence (1836); see also Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. (14
How.) 38, 41 (1852) (argument of counsel) ("unalienable rights").
131. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 74, 172.
132. Convention of July 12, 1839, quoted in The Cherokee Trust Funds, 117 U.S. 288, 304
(1886).
133. J. CARTWRIGHT, NEW PREAMBLE AND EXPLANATORY TABLE OF CONTENTS, OF A
BILL OF RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 5 (London 1819).
134. S. G. GOODRICH, LIGHTS AND SHADOWS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 12 (Cabinet Library
series, Boston, 1853).
135. Id. at 19.
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deal of truth at least in the latter statement. It was a time when many
more Europeans sought refuge in America after the wave of liberal
revolts in 1830 and 1848 and the subsequent crackdown by those in
power. 136 Thus, although the reference book was generally correct,
the "lessons of great import" would be applied more fully in Europe
only later.
What were curiously ignored, however, were the cries of others on
our shores for "liberty and human rights," cries echoed more clearly
in other writings at least since the 1830s. In his Essay on Slavery pub-
lished in 1835, William Channing recognized that slavery is inimical
to "the reality and sacredness of human rights. . .," and that "slavery
is an infraction of them. . .,"137 a point that William Lloyd Garrison
had made in 1833 while referring to "the rights of man."' 38 Channing
also recognized that human rights are universal rights of every human
being, rights that were affirmed in the Declaration of Independence. 1
39
In defense of the evil institution of slavery, and missing the point, one
J. Paulding wrote in 1836 that the Declaration of Independence "was
not an elaborate metaphysical discussion of human rights, but a mere
assertion of great general principles." 40 E.P. Hurlbut's Essays on
Human Rights and Their Political Guarantees, published in 1845, af-
firmed Channing's view that human rights are "the rights of human-
ity," "the rights of man," and related to the historic Declaration.
141
The voices for the abolition of slavery continued to proclaim their
cause in the name of human rights. For example, in the late 1840s an
antislavery paper published in Wisconsin, the American Freeman, op-
posed a "white-manhood" suffrage provision in the new constitution
136. See, e.g., 11 FUNK AND WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA Germany 149, 168-69
(1979).
137. W. E. CHANNING, ESSAY ON SLAVERY (1835), quoted in B. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at
228 n.2.
138. See 1 WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON, 1805-1879: THE STORY OF His LIFE TOLD BY His
CHILDREN 407 (1885-1889); S. LYND, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN RADICALISM
109 (1968). In 1860, Garrison also wrote: "rights of man... [do not derive] from any book, but
from his own nature." See W. L. GARRISON, THE "INFIDELITY" OF ABOLITIONISM 9-10 (N.Y.
1860).
139. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 228. The relation of the thirteenth amendment's prohi-
bition of slavery to human rights and to the Declaration would be recognized later by the
Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 105, 110 (1872) (Field, J.,
dissenting). For a related point, see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 575, 620
(1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
140. See B. WRIGHT supra note 1, at 236, quoting J. K. PAULDING, SLAVERY IN THE
UNITED STATES (1936).
141. See id. at 259. Hurlbut's work is also cited in E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST Gov-
ERNMENT 78 n.27 (1948). On the use of the phrase "rights of humanity," see also supra text
accompanying notes 121, and infra text accompanying notes 156, 213, 242; infra note 172.
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of Wisconsin as being in "contempt for the rights of man." 142 Before
the U.S. House of Representatives in 1848, Horace Mann's speech
against slavery echoed the then familiar call that the evil institution
was an "invasion of the rights of man," a violation of the "universal
rights of man." 143 Earlier, in 1842, Joshua Giddings had drafted a
Congressional resolution which stated that slavery is "an abridgment
of the natural rights of man.'" Charles Elliott's The Sinfulness of
American Slavery referred similarly to the "rights of man" and the
"rights of mankind" in 1851; 14 -5 William Hosmer added in 1852 that
"when the fundamental law of the land is proved to be a conspiracy
against human rights ... then and in so far, law ceases to be law, and
becomes a wanton outrage on society."146 Two years earlier, in a
speech on the Compromise Bill, Senator William Seward had made an
eloquent appeal:
The abstractions of human rights are the only permanent foundations of
society. It is by referring to them that men determine what is established
because it is RIGHT, in order to uphold it forever .... The Constitu-
tion of the United States confers no power upon Congress to deprive
men of their natural rights and inalienable liberty. 14
7
During this era, Abraham Lincoln referred to the "personal rights
of man;"' 148 and Frederick Robinson, a former president of the Massa-
chusetts senate, argued before a convention of Democratic voters in
Massachusetts in 1851 of "the necessity of recurring to those funda-
mental principles of human rights on which our free institutions are
established" in order to end slavery and promote human dignity.1
49
Also during this period, Thoreau's work on Civil Disobedience related
to "the rights of man" in 1849,150 a phrase that appeared in other
writings in the 1850s.15i Judicial decisions in the state supreme courts
142. Quoted in T. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL - THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE
NORTH 1780-1861, at 126 (1974).
143. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 215.
144. Quoted in S. LYND, supra note 138, at 144.
145. See id. at 220.
146. See id. at 223, quoting W. H. HOSMER, THE HIGHER LAW 178 (1852).
147. Quoted in B. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 221 n.3, citing B. SEWARD, 1 WORKS at 102-04.
On human rights as a foundation for society, see also Paust, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 231-
32, 267.
148. B. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 175 (Lincoln praising Jefferson).
149. See id. at 158.
150. See id. at 225; Thoreau, Civil Disobedience (1849), reprinted in WALDEN AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF HENRY DAVID THOREAU 635, 659 (B. Atkinson ed. 1965).
151. See, e.g., J. BOUVIER, INSTITUTES OF AMERICAN LAW 92-93 (Philadelphia 1858) ("free
communication of... thoughts and opinions is one of the most precious rights of man;" "right to
enjoy property is ... absolute right of man."); C. Norton, supra note 110, at 22 (in 1856), 26 (in
1856), 66 (in 1859), 99 (in 1862: "the very root of the American doctrine of liberty, which is the
equality of human rights based upon our common humanity"), 100-04 (in 1862: "human
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of Alabama, Arkansas and Vermont also used human right precepts
during this period. 5
2
Senator Charles Sumner, another ardent supporter of the aboli-
tionist struggle, reflected that "side by side with the growth of Na-
tional Unity was a constant dedication to Human Rights". 153  While
addressing the law of nations in 1851, Sumner noted: "The influence
we now wield is a sacred trust, to be exercised firmly and discreetly, in
conformity with the Laws of Nations, and with an anxious eye to the
peace of the world, but always so as most to promote Human
Rights."' 5 4 In 1863, Sumner also argued that intervention in foreign
countries is permissible if "obviously on the side of Human Rights."
155
Interestingly, in 1853, when Austria seized a person in Turkey who
was entitled to protection from the United States, the U.S. Secretary of
State complained to Austria that its custody of that person had been
obtained in violation of Turkish law and "the rights of humanity."'
156
After the Civil War, the use of human right precepts continued
both in the United States Supreme Court' 57 and in Congress, which
rights," "rights of mankind"), passim. In 1874, Curtis also considered slavery to be a "crime
against humanity." See 3 ORATIONS AND ADDRESSES OF GEORGE WILLIAM CURTIS 208 (C.
Norton ed. 1894).
152. See Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328, 340 (1854); Borden v. State, 11 Ark. 519, 529 (1851);
In re Dorsey, 8 Ala. (7 Port. 293, 378) 85, 110 (1838); see also Beebe v. The State, 6 Ind. 501,
506-10, 550 (1855) ("natural rights").
153. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 175 n.3, quoting 12 THE WORKS OF CHARLES SUM-
NER 238 (1877).
154. Sen. C. Sumner, letter to a Faneuil Hall meeting, 1851, reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF
CHARLES SUMNER 446 (1875-1883).
155. Speech on "Our Foreign Relations" (Sept. 10, 1863), in 7 THE WORKS OF CHARLES
SUMNER 376, 410-12, 441, 470-71 (1875-1883).
156. Letter from Sec. of State Marcy to Mr. Hulsemann of Austria (Sept. 26, 1853) in I
MESSAGE AND DOCUMENTS 1853-54, at 30, 47 (S. Doc. No. 1, 33d Cong., 1st Sess.; and Exec.
Doc. 1, Message from the President of the United States to the Two Houses of Congress, at the
Commencement of the First Session of the Thirty-third Congress); reprinted in 3 J. MOORE, A
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 824, 833-34 (1906). During the episode, the U.S. minister
resident at Constantinople, G. Marsh, wrote to Secretary Marcy of the Austrian "outrage upon
the rights of humanity, their violation of the principles of international law .. " Letter from
Marsh to Sec. Marcy, July 7, 1853, in S. Doc. No. 40, 33d Cong., ist Sess., at 26 (Dec. 5, 1853);
and in H.R. Doec. No. 91, id. at 32, 37 (U.S. Serial Set No. 724). Later, the U.S. consulate in
Smyrna wrote to Mr. Marsh of "an infraction of the rights of men." Letter from E. Offley to G.
Marsh (Oct. 1, 1853), in S. Doec. No. 40[K], id. at 53; and in S. Doec. No. 53[E], id. at 19 (U.S.
Serial Set No. 698).
157. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 48.9 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542, 553 (1876); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67, 110, 116, 127 (1872); Exparte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2. 119 (1866); see also Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282-83 (1900)
("certain natural rights"); Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 757 (1884)
(Field, J., concurring) ("inalienable ... right of men"); Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 107 (1883)
(Grey, J.) (1868 Act declared "right of expatriation to be a natural and inherent right of all
people"); In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905, 907-08 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884) ("right of man to change his
home and allegiance is recognized as inherent and inalienable ... a natural and inherent right of
all people"); cases cited infra at note 165.
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paid particular attention to human rights while approving the 13th,
14th and 15th Amendments and recognized, in fact, that the amend-
ments were designed to serve human rights.158 Senator E.C. Ingersoll
of Illinois noted, for example, that the Thirteenth Amendment would
assure "that the rights of mankind, without regard to color or race, are
respected and protected." 159 During the 1866 session of Congress, W.
Lawrence of Ohio also noted that "[1]egislative powers exist in our
system to protect, not to destroy, the inalienable rights of man.
' 16
Speaking in support of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1869, Senator
Sumner pointed out that state rights had been exalted to promote
slavery, but that with the Union victory state rights must "yield to
human rights, and the nation be exalted as the bulwark of all."' 161 He
added:
Beyond all question the true rule under the national Constitution, espe-
cially since its additional amendments, is that anything for human rights
is constitutional. Yes, sir; against the old rule, anything for slavery, I
put the new rule, anything for human rights.
162
As the Supreme Court would later recognize, the 1871 Civil Rights
Act also had a human rights purpose.163 Similarly, Congress declared
in 1868 that "the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right
of all people.' 164 That same year a treaty between China and the
United States affirmed "the inherent and inalienable right of man to
change his home and allegiance," 165 a right that later became ineffec-
tive for those of particular races or nationalities when Congress denied
entry to unfavored groups or set racially-oriented quotas to deny free
entry.
158. See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. at 577; Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. at 84; Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. at 136, 144; Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 67;
Hamilton, The Path of Due Process of Law, in THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED 173-74 (C.
Reed ed. 1968).
159. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2989-90 (1864), quoted in Buchanan, Legal History
of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 Hous. L. REV. 1, 10 (1974); and ten Broek, Thirteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States, 39 CAL. L. REV. 171, 178 (1951).
160. Buchanan, supra note 159, at 19; ten Brock, supra note 159, at 195-96.
161. Quoted in D. DEWEY, supra note 125, at 173.
162. Id. at 173.
163. See, e.g., Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 400
(1979) (quoting Rep. Shellabarger: 1871 Civil Rights Act has a purpose of aiding "the preserva-
tion of human liberty and human rights"); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 357 (1979); Monell v.
Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 684 (1978). At the lower court level, see Novotny v.
Great Am. Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 584 F.2d 1235, 1248, 1254, 1261 (3d Cir. 1978);
Thompson v. New York, 487 F. Supp. 212, 213 (N.D.N.Y. 1980). The 1871 Act was a precursor
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
164. 15 Stat. 223, ch. 249, quoted in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 715
(1893); In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905, 907-08 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884).
165. Art. 5, 16 Stat. 740 (1868), quoted in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 716,
733, 752 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 592 (1889).
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At this time, Johann Bluntschli, a Swiss scholar of international
law and professor at Heidelberg, published two works which expressly
referred to "human rights." Modern Law of Nations of Civilized
States, published in 1867, recognized that "treaties the contents of
which violate the generally recognized human right... are invalid."'
166
Bluntschli's other work, a code of international law, affirmed that:
"Human rights remain in force during war."'
67
By 1874, the third edition of Francis Lieber's book On Civil Lib-
erty and Self-Government noted that liberty of conscience "is one of
the primordial rights of man,"' 168 and that "the individual rights of
man become more distinctly developed with advancing civilization"' 169
- a development that Professor Lieber associated also with "self-de-
termination."' 170 Similarly, others wrote of the "absolute rights of
man"; 171 and at the end of this era a new call for human rights and
self-determination was heard as persons such as Theodore Parker de-
clared: "woman ... is here to develop her human nature, enjoy her
human rights, perform her human duty .... ,,172 Clearly the nine-
166. Quoted in M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 341 (1980). Bluntschli's work was also quoted in subsequent Nuremberg pro-
ceedings. See T. TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NU-
ERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 226 (1949) ("states
are allowed to interfere in the name of international law if 'human rights' are violated to the
detriment of any single race," quoting J. BLUNTSCHLI, DAS MODERNE V6LKERRECHT DER
CIVILISIERTEN STAATEN 270 (3d ed. 1878).
167. BLUNTSCHLI ON THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY - A TRANSLATION FROM His
CODE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15, para. 24 (F. Lieber trans. 1866) (copy in the Lieber collec-
tion, U.S. Army T.J.A.G. School, Charlottesville, Va.). The title of Bluntschli's work was DAS
MODERNE KRIEGSRECHT DER CIVILISIERTEN STAATEN ALS RECHTSBUCH DARGESTELLT
(1866).
168. F. LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 97 (3d ed. 1874).
169. Id. at 39.
170. See id. at 38-39, passim. Lieber probably obtained the phrase "self-determination" from
earlier writers such as Richard Price. See, e.g., R. PRICE, THE NATURE AND DIGNITY OF THE
HUMAN SOUL (London 1766); OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY 1-6 (8th ed.
London 1778); ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE AND VALUE OF CIVIL LIBERTY
2 (London 3d ed. 1777) ("power of self-determination which all ... possesses"); see also supra
text accompanying note 10. On the interrelation of these precepts today, see, e.g., Paust, Author-
ity: From a Human Rights Perspective, 28 AM. J. JURiS. 64 (1983); Human Right to Revolution,
supra note 4.
171. See, e.g., T. POWELL, ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW 125 (2d ed. Philadelphia 1878);
see also T. SMITH, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW; OR OUTLINES OF THE SYSTEM OF CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL LAWS IN FORCE IN THE UNITED STATES, AND IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE
UNION 53-61 (rev. ed. 1882) (absolute, inalienable, natural rights of the people); 1 J. TUCKER,
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF ITS GENESIS, DE-
VELOPMENT, AND INTERPRETATION 8, 34-5 (H. Tucker ed. 1899) ("right of each man... Inter
homines... ; jural rights of man"); W. GUTHRIE, LECTURES ON THE FOURTEENTH ARTICLE OF
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 67 (1898) ("fundamental and
inalienable rights ... inherent in every man").
172. Sermon of T. Parker, in I HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 277 (E. Stanton, S. B.
Anthony & M. Gage eds. 1881), quoted in B. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 178; see also id. at 177
(address of suffragists to the women of Ohio: "Rights are coeval with the human race, of univer-
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teenth century, like the century that preceded it, was replete with
human rights concerns and developments, both legislative and judicial,
that were designed further to guarantee the human rights of Ameri-
cans and of others within our jurisdiction.
Early into the twentieth century these concerns continued. Elliot's
Biographical Story of the Constitution, published in 1910, noted that
the "inherent and inalienable rights of man... [were] incorporated in
the Declaration of Independence and the Bills of Rights;" 173 but
others argued that such rights were not being adequately imple-
mented. As one writer lamented in 1912 concerning the Court's shift-
ing use of the Fourteenth Amendment:
It was to be a charter of liberty for human rights against property rights.
The transformation has been rapid and complete. It operates to-day to
protect the rights of property to the detriment of the rights of man.1
74
Another writer offered a more promising observation in 1914. Noting
the views of French and German scholars concerning the "rights of
man" that were set forth in a new 1912 edition of the French text
Manual de Droit International Public,1 75 he affirmed that increasing
attention was being paid to "the fundamental rights of the individual
- the rights of man," by international legal scholars.
1 76
Also in 1914, in order to stimulate greater attention to human
rights by all U.S.-Americans, President Woodrow Wilson used the oc-
casion of this country's celebration of its Declaration of Independence
to say: "America will come into the full light of the day when all shall
know that she puts human rights above all other rights and that her
flag is the flag not only of America but of humanity."
177
Reflecting eighteenth and nineteenth century expectations, Carl
Becker observed in 1922 that the transnationally renowned Declara-
tion of Independence had reflected "a philosophy of human rights
sal heritage, and inalienable [for]... every human being .. "). In speeches in 1867 and 1870 on
the right of suffrage, George Curtis also made several references to human rights and to natural,
unalienable rights of women. See 1 C. Norton, supra note 110, at 186, 189, 217. One should not
assume that these were the first times that human rights were claimed for women. See supra note
86.
In 1874, Curtis had also considered slavery to be a "crime against humanity." See 3 ORA-
TIONS AND ADDRESSES OF GEORGE WILLIAM CURTIS 208 (C. Norton ed. 1894). The slave trade
would again be recognizably related to "crimes against humanity" in 1921 by a former U.S.
Secretary of State. See Lansing, Notes on World Sovereignty, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 13, 25 (1921).
173. E. ELLIOT, BIOGRAPHICAL STORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 6 (1910).
174. C. COLLINS, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATES 137-38 (1912).
175. See BONFILS MANUAL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC paras. 154-57 (P. Fauchille
ed. 6th ed. 1912) (Fauchille, Pasquale Fiore, Heffter).
176. Snow, The American Philosophy of Government and Its Effect on International Rela-
tions, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 191, 201-02 (1914).
177. Address of President Woodrow Wilson in Philadelphia, 3 PUBLIC PAPERS 147 (July 4,
1914).
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which is valid, if at all, not for Americans only, but for all men." 178 In
fact later, in 1925, the American Institute of International Law pre-
pared a draft code of public international law which recognized sev-
eral "international" or "universally recognized rights" of
individuals; 179 and in 1929 the Institut de Droit International, meeting
in New York, adopted a Declaration of the International Rights of
Man.' 80 Commenting on expectations evident at the 1931 meeting of
the Institut de Droit International, the American scholar James Brown
Scott declared: "the rights set forth [in the 1929 Declaration] ... are
inherent in the nature and dignity of the human being, not derived
from the State, they should not be submitted to the control or final
decision of any State."' 8' Views such as these would compel Ameri-
cans to participate in the drafting of a new declaration for all of hu-
mankind in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
18 2
Finally, with the Universal Declaration, what had been self-evident
and inalienable for past generations was now documented more clearly
as a set of common legal expectations of and for all humankind.
B. Use by the Judiciary as Constitutional Rights and Standards
When one realizes that there is a human rights dimension to every
178. C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 225 (1922); see also H. LAUTER-
PACHT, supra note 73; Murphy, supra note 69, at 703, 749-50, also quoting Abraham Lincoln on
similar points. On the transnational influence of the Declaration of Independence and the Amer-
ican Revolution, see Paust, Human Right to Revolution, supra note 4, at 547, 560-62, and refer-
ences cited therein; see also American Institute of International Law 1916 Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Nations, reprinted in 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 124, 125 (1916) (Declaration of
Independence "and the universal practice of the American Republics" - also declaring, impor-
tantly for our inquiry here: "International law is at one and the same time both national and
international").
179. American Institute of International Law, Project No. 4, art. 2 ("the international rights
of individuals, namely, the rights which natural or juridical persons can invoke in each nation
....) and Project No. 13, preamble and art. 1, reprinted in 20 AM. J. INT'L L., SPEC. Supp. 300,
304, 326 (1926). For related views in the early part of this century, see infra notes 296-317, 601-
602.
180. Institut de Droit International, Annuaire, Session de New York 298-300 (1929), re-
printed in part in Scott, Nationality, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 556. 560 (1930).
181. Scott, The Two Institutes of International Law, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 87, 93, 178 (1932).
182. On the background of the Universal Declaration and its reception today as, at least in
part, customary international law, see, e.g., M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra
note 166, at 272-74, 302, 325-30, and authorities cited therein; Lillich, The Current Status of the
Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSI-
BILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 1, 28-29 (R. Lillich ed. 1983); Paust, Human Rights: From
Jurisprudential Inquiry to Effective Litigation, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 228-30, 233-37, 241, 244,
257 (1981) [hereinafter Paust, Effective Litigation), and references cited therein; infra notes 369-
370. Eleanor Roosevelt was a primary drafter of the historic Declaration and a moving force
behind its adoption. See, e.g., M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 166, at 274
n.365, 519.
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form of human interaction,8 3 one recognizes the ubiquitous nature of
human rights and can begin to recognize, as several judges throughout
our history undoubtedly have, the broad potential of human right
norms for the identification, clarification and supplementation of con-
stitutional rights and standards.'
8 4
In this section, the judiciary's use of human right precepts is ana-
lyzed, with primary attention to the federal judiciary. The section ad-
dresses historic usage in two parts: (1) general trends, and (2) trends
toward more explicit content. The first part is primarily an overview
and provides an introductory investigation. It explores the initial ju-
ridic uses of human right precepts in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries as well as more recent patterns concerning the where, when,
who and what of United States Supreme Court use of human right
precepts. More specifically, the first part provides needed documenta-
tion of the general history of the use of these precepts, Supreme Court
justices who have adopted and refined them, types of equivalent
phrases extant in judicial decisions, and other types of trends that are
helpful for scientific exploration of the nature and growth of human
right precepts as tools for constitutional decisionmaking.
The second part investigates specific judicial language and rights or
principles that have been aligned with human right precepts in
Supreme Court and other federal cases. It is organized loosely around
general rights or interests that judges have either expressly or implic-
itly associated with human right precepts. Such an inquiry should
demonstrate partly the how and why of judicial use, and it does, but
the reader will note that human rights applications are potentially un-
ending, especially in cases addressing constitutional rights and stan-
dards. As documented in the previous section on general use in U.S.
history, the Founders had thought of human rights as being "constitu-
tional rights" even before the early state constitutions and the U.S.
Constitution, 185 and both the early amendments and a number of sub-
sequent amendments to the United States Constitution were added in
part to guarantee human rights. 8 6
183. See, e.g., M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 166, at xviii, 87, 367,
372, 399-400, passim.
184. On constitutional choice concerning the tasks of identification, clarification and supple-
mentation, see Paust, The Concept of Norm: Toward a Better Understanding of Content, Author-
ity, and Choice, 53 TEMPLE L. Q. 226, 238-48, passim (1980).
185. See supra note 93.
186. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 90-93, 156-160; supra notes 93, 139.
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1. General Trends in Juridic Use
a. 1783-1893
As noted previously, what may have been the first judicial applica-
tion of human right precepts in America occurred in 1783. In that
year, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts related "natural rights of
mankind" to the prohibition of slavery in the case of Commonwealth v.
Jennison.I8 7 Justices of the United States Supreme Court also made
their first use of human rights precepts in the eighteenth century. In
1793, while addressing the interrelationship between natural law, the
law of nations and individual responsibility, Justice Wilson referred to
"the natural rights of man" in Henfield's Case. 188 During that same
year Chief Justice Jay used the similar expression "rights of men" in
Chisholm v. Georgia,189 a case decided after the first known use of the
phrase "human rights" during argument by counsel. 190 Justice Patter-
son declared in the 1795 decision in Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance 191
that "the right of acquiring property, and having it protected, is one of
the natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of man.' 192 This right to
property, Chief Justice Marshall affirmed later in 1827, is a "right
which every man retains."' 193 In 1795, Justice Iredell also used the
phrase "natural unalienable right," but without full acceptance of the
concept. 194 In the reports of lower federal courts, one also finds refer-
ence in the 1790s to unalienable "natural rights"' 95 and to "the rights
187. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67. Similar use of the phrase "rights of man" was
made during argument before the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1845. See P. FINKELMAN,
SLAVERY IN THE COURTROOM 141 (1985) (argument of A. Stewart in The State v. Post, 20 N.J.
Law (I Spencer) 368 (1845)). But see Commonwealth v. Ayes, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193, 210-11,
215, 217 (1836) (slavery was "contrary to natural right" - contra naturam - but "not contrary
to the law of nations").
188. 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1120 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360) (Wilson, Iredell, & Peters, JJ.,
charge to grand jury) ("Emigration is, undoubtedly, one of the natural rights of man"). In
Henfield's Case, the district attorney Rawle also mentioned "the rights of man," noting that
"[t]he rights of man are the rights of all men in relation to each other ... [and that plerfect
equality is one of those rights." See id. at 1118.
189. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 478 (1793) (Jay, C. J.).
190. See id. at 421 (argument of counsel).
191. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 304 (1795) (Patterson, J.).
192. Id. at 310.
193. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 346 (1827) (Marshall, C. J.). See also id.
at 345 ("natural rights"). For use of similar phrases by Marshall, see infra notes 216 and 229. In
Ogden, Justices Thompson and Trimble also used the phrase "natural right." See id. at 309, 319.
194. See Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 133, 162 (1795) (Iredell, J.). There, counsel had
also used the phrases "natural rights." "inherent rights of man," and "natural rights of man"
which every government or nation must pay homage to. See id. at 141 (argument of counsel).
195. See United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 828-29 (D. S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175) (argu-
ment of counsel).
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of mankind." 1 96
In the early nineteenth century, state courts also made express use
of human right precepts. In 1815, the Supreme Court of Massachu-
setts declared that "every man has a natural right to exercise... em-
ployments [as an auctioneer, attorney, or tavern keeper, etc.] free of
tribute."' 197 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire recognized in
1817 that the legislative power is limited by "the inalienable rights of
mankind."' 98 And with striking confirmation of the supremacy of
human rights, the Supreme Court of Alabama declared in 1838: "any
act of the legislature which violates any of these asserted rights, or
which trenches on any of these great principles of civil liberty, or in-
herent rights of man, though not enumerated, shall be void."' 99 At
the same time, the Alabama court used the expression "dearest rights
of man.
''200
Use of the phrase "human right" occurred in a decision by the
Supreme Court of Arkansas in 1851,201 a decision addressing the con-
cept of "natural rights" 20 2 as well. The dissenting opinion there also
addressed "natural inherent rights" 20 3 and "natural, inherent right[s]
196. See Letter from A. Moultrie (counsel for defendant) to B. Moodie (British Consul in
Charleston), reproduced at 27 F. Cas. 840 (reporter's notes re: United States v. Robins).
197. Portland Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass. 252, 256 (1815) (Parker, C. J., opinion).
198. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 1 N.H. 111, 114 (1817) (Richardson, C. J., opinion).
199. In re Dorsey, 8 Ala. 85, 110 (1838) (Ormond, J). Although not using the phrases inves-
tigated here, Justice Chase's opinion in Calder v. Bull was certainly supportive of the use of
natural law in judicial decisionmaking and the conclusions reached in Dartmouth College and In
re Dorsey. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387-88 (1798) (Chase, J., opinion); see also
Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 160, 162 (1792) ("municipal law . . . may facilitate or
improve ... [the law of nations], provided the great universal law remains unaltered"). There
were, however, contrary views expressed later in dictum in other state courts. See Weister v.
Hade, 52 Pa. 474, 478 (1866), quoting Louisville and Nashville R.R. v. County Court of David-
son, 33 Tenn. 429 (1854) (Caruthers, J.) ("not for the judiciary . . . to inquire whether the
legislature has violated.., the general principles of liberty and the rights of man ... ; but only
whether it has transcended the limits prescribed for it by the Constitution"). The later cases are
thus curiously out of line with predominant patterns of expectation and are all the more curious
in view of the fact that the constitutions of Pennsylvania and Tennessee had a provision similar
to the ninth amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantying the priority of unenumerated
rights. See supra notes 54 and 56; see also Commonwealth v. Franklin, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 255, 258
(1802) (argument of counsel), quoting state constitution ("certain inherent and indefeasible
rights"); Watson v. Mercer, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88, 103 (1834) (argument of counsel) (same). Ap-
parently the full extent of the dictum was never litigated or tested. Even later, the supremacy of
inherent rights of man was reaffirmed. See, e.g., Falstaff Corp. v. Allen, 278 F. 643, 647 (E.D.
Mo. 1922) ("inherent rights of mankind" cannot be violated by states or Congress); Board of
Commissioners of Seward County v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 90 F. 222, 226 (8th Cir. 1898) (state
legislative power is restricted by "the inalienable rights of man"); infra text accompanying note
208.
200. In re Dorsey, 8 Ala. at 110. Also utilized was the phrase "great natural rights." Id. at
112.
201. Borden v. State, 11 Ark. 519, 529 (1851).
202. Id. at 527.
203. Id. at 557.
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of universal obligation. ' '204 In 1854, the Supreme Court of Vermont
recognized that "all men have certain natural, inherent, and inaliena-
ble rights ... natural rights of men ... natural rights of persons. ' 20 5
The phrases "natural rights" and "reserved natural rights" were also
used by the Supreme Court of Indiana in 1855.206 Additionally in
1869, the Supreme Court of California recognized that the newly
adopted thirteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects "per-
sonal liberty, one of the absolute rights of man."' 20 7 Earlier, the
Supreme Court of California had recognized that vested property
rights of private persons were guaranteed "[b]y the law of nations,
independent of treaty stipulations," that cession of territory did not
impair such rights, and that "[b]y the law of nations those rights...
were 'sacred and inviolable'. ... 208 And in 1872, the Supreme Court
of Maine referred to the "inherent rights of the people" while address-
ing the limits of legislative power, the guarantee of due process of law,
and the phrase "law of the land. ' '2°
9
In the meantime, the U.S. Supreme Court had also continued its
attention to natural, inherent rights, although specific judicial refer-
ence to the phrase "human rights" appeared only in 1810 and would
not occur again until after the Civil War.210 In the 1810 case, in
Fletcher v. Peck, Chief Justice Marshall became the first Supreme
Court Justice to use the phrase "human rights" while recognizing,
quite importantly, that our judicial tribunals "are established ... to
decide on human rights. ' 211 In an 1813 case, the Court used the
phrase "natural inherent right, ' '212 and in an 1814 decision it recog-
204. Id. at 568.
205. Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328, 340, 342 (1854).
206. Beebe v. The State, 6 Ind. 501, 508-10 (1855) (Perkins, J.); id. at 550 (Gookins, J.). For
cases in other states see, e.g., White v. White, 5 Barb. 474, 484 (N.Y. App. Div. 1849) ("natural
rights"); Parham v. The Justices, 9 Ga. 341, 352 (1851); Billings v. Hill, 7 Cal. 1, 12, 16 (immuta-
ble laws of natural justice bind States, nations and individuals vis a vis each other), 17 ("inherent
and inalienable rights of human nature that no government can justly take away"); see also,
Riggs v. Martin, 5 Ark. 506, 508 (1844) ("maxim of universal justice pervading the whole system
of the common and civil law"). Other uses may be identified as computer banks cover the earli-
est state court opinions.
207. People v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658, 664 (1869).
208. Teschemacher v. Thompson, 18 Cal. 11, 22-23 (1861), quoting Strother v. Lucas, 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) 410, 436 (1838).
209. State v. Doherty, 60 Me. 504, 509 (1872) (Dickerson, J.).
210. Again, statements here represent the author's best guess as to actual patterns of use in
the late 1700s ind early 1800s. Computer banks of Lexis for the Supreme Court now go back to
1790. Not considered in the following analysis is Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 375
(1856) (Campbell, J., dissenting) (individuals "come into society with rights which cannot be
invaded without injustice"), since no mention of natural law or rights or related phrases appears.
211. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133 (1810) (Marshall, C. J., opinion).
212. Mima Queen and Child v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290, 298 (1813) (Duvall, J.).
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nized possible application of "the rights of humanity" in time of
war.213 The Court noted in Green v. Biddle,214 that rights in real es-
tate were more than "ordinary rights of individuals" and, as demon-
strated by "the ordinary practice of nations in their treaties," were
"rights which no civilian would suppose could be affected by a change
in sovereignty. '215 In 1829 Chief Justice Marshall declared that the
"right to contract... is a natural original right. ' 216 And in 1830, in a
dissent, Justice Johnson argued that the right to emigrate and change
allegiance had too many qualifications as to time and circumstance to
be "inherent and unalienable.
' 2 17
Argument of counsel before the Court also made use of human
right precepts during this time. In 1805 counsel made reference to the
"natural right to migrate" and the "natural right" of emigration. 218
Argument of counsel in 1819, 1821 and 1824 also used the phrase
"natural right; '219 and argument concerning "the natural rights of
men" to certain species of property (i.e., copyright interests) can also
be found in reports for 1833.220 Similarly, in 1834, counsel had argued
that by the common law of England an author had "the sole and ex-
clusive property in his copy," 221 and that such a right was founded
upon the "natural right" to property.
222
213. The Julia, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 181, 193 (1814) (Story, J.). For other uses of this phrase,
see supra text accompanying notes 141, 156, and infra 242. For use of the phrase "duties of
humanity," see Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1107 ("On states as well as individuals the duties of
humanity are strictly incumbent"); 3 H. GROTIUS, supra note 11, ch. XVII, § 3 (F. Kelsey trans.
1964). For use of the phrase "principles of humanity," see DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND
NECESSITY OF TAKING UP ARMS, July 6, 1775; see also supra note 172.
214. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
215. Id. at 100 (Johnson, J.). The syllabus and counsel also referred to "unalienable" rights
of sovereignty. Id. at 2, 63. And so did Justice Washington. Id. at 85.
216. Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley's Lessee, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 492, 517 (1829) (Marshall, C. J.).
In 1823, Marshall also thought that a restriction on alienation of Indian lands "may be opposed
to natural right," yet permissible. See Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543, 591 (1823) (Marshall, C. J., opinion).
217. See Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 261 (1830) (Johnson, J., dissenting)
218. See M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 280, 323, 325 (1805) (argument of
counsel).
219. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 66-67 (1824) (argument of counsel), citing
E. VATTEL, supra note 19; Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 219 (1821) (argument of
counsel) ("a principle of universal law growing out of the natural right of self-defence"); Sturges
v. Crownshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 188 (1819) (argument of counsel); see also Stevenson's
Heirs v. Sullivant, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 207, 212 (1820) (argument of counsel) ("The security of
existing rights remains inviolable, notwithstanding" legislative change of law); Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 576 (1819) (argument of counsel)
("inviolable ... rights").
220. Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292, 303 (1833) (argument of counsel). Additionally,
counsel referred to the "natural rights at common law." Id.
221. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 596 (argument of counsel).
222. Id. at 596, 598.
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In his dissenting opinion in Wheaton v. Peters, Justice Thompson
agreed with counsel that state statutes in the United States had also
recognized and protected "the natural right which an author has to
the productions and labour of his own mind... a pre-existing right,
founded on the eternal rules and principles of natural right and justice,
and recognized by the common law."' 223 While noting several relevant
statutes, Justice Thompson also quoted a Massachusetts statute of
1783 which had recognized in its preamble that "security of the fruits
of their study and industry... is one of the natural rights of all men"
and that one of the purposes of protecting such a property interest
would be "to encourage books for the benefit of mankind. ' 224  Un-
doubtedly related to the natural right to property was the recognized
right to exchange property, a right that counsel argued in 1837:
"Every man has a natural right to buy, and sell [sugar, coffee, or cot-
ton]." 225 Counsel before the Court also argued that British judges had
pronounced void "as being in violation of natural justice and inherent
right" similarly related prohibitions of legislative impairment of con-
tracts as they affect land titles and other property rights. 226
While also addressing customary international law but finding no
general consensus or opinio juris on the prohibition of slavery, Chief
Justice Marshall recognized as "generally admitted" in 1825, "[T]hat
every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labor. '227 Jus-
tice Baldwin used the phrase "inherent right" in two cases in 1831,
but emphasized in both that it was not applicable. 228 In an 1832 opin-
ion, Chief Justice Marshall recognized that Indian nations retained
"their original natural rights, as ... possessors of the soil," with some
exceptions, 229 and Justice Washington referred to the "right of every
section of the human race to a reasonable portion of the soil," a right
which is given "to every nation" by the "law of nature. ' 230 And in
1839, counsel referred to the "natural right" of a corporation to sue in
the courts of other nations, a right that had been based on the "com-
223. Id. at 682-84 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 682. Justice Thompson also used the phrase "general rights of mankind." See id.
at 672, 675, citing Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2359 (K.B. 1769).
225. The Charles River Bridge v. The Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 451 (1837)
(argument of counsel). See also id. at 468 ("inherent and inalienable... rights"), 475 ("rights...
sacred and inviolable").
226. See Burgess Poole v. Lessee of John Fleeger, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185, 199 (1837) (argu-
ment of counsel). On this right, see also H. GROTIUS, supra note 11.
227. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 120 (1825) (Marshall, C. J., opinion).
228. See United States v. Robertson, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 641, 667 (1831) (Baldwin, J., dissent-
ing); The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 40 (1831) (Baldwin, J., concurring).
229. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) (Marshall, C. J.).
230. Id. at 579 (Washington, J.). See also supra text accompanying notes 113-114.
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ity" or "usage" of nations "and has become a positive obligation on all
nations. ' 231 Counsel added: "in general terms, ... there are, between
nations at peace with-one another, rights, both natural and individual
... [including] the right [of individuals] to sue in their courts ......
Thus, by the 1830s, the natural rights of man were recognizably inter-
related with international norms concerning both wartime and peace-
time circumstances. This is not surprising, of course, given the general
history of the use of human right precepts up to the 1830s and the
early expectations that human rights were rights of all humankind
and, thus, of significance regardless of national boundaries.
In an 1841 case, The Schooner Amistad, counsel made the argu-
ment that persons held as slaves on board a vessel that was later cap-
tured by them and taken to our shores must be set free or the U.S.
executive and the courts would become complicitors in the deprivation
of fundamental human rights. Importantly, counsel asked the ques-
tion whether "the people of the United States whose government is
based on the great principles of the Revolution, proclaimed in the
Declaration of Independence, confer upon the federal executive, or ju-
dicial tribunals, the power of making our nation accessories to such
atrocious violations of human right?" 232 In response, the Supreme
Court ordered the Executive to release the former captives. While do-
ing so, the Court noted that a conflict of rights concerning claims to
"property" and the status of the persons held as slaves (who might not
have been slaves "but kidnapped and free") was "inevitable, and must
be decided upon the eternal principles of justice and international
law." '233 The Court added:
[Wlhere human life and human liberty are in issue, and constitute the
very essence of the controversy, [a treaty concerning documents pertain-
ing to ships and their cargo] never could have intended to take away the
equal rights of all foreigners who should contest their claims before any
of our courts to equal justice; or to deprive such foreigners of the protec-
tion given them by other treaties, or by the general law of nations. Upon
the merits of the case, then, there does not seem to us to be any ground
for doubt that these negroes ought to be deemed free; and that the Span-
231. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 553, 556-57 (1839) (argument of
counsel). In the Court's opinion in the case, Chief Justice Taney made no mention of natural
rights as such, but declared: "We think it is well settled that by the law of comity among nations,
a corporation created by one sovereignty is permitted to make contracts in another, and to sue in
its courts .. " Id. at 592 (Taney, C. J., opinion).
232. United States v. The Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518, 553 (1841) (argument of
counsel); see also id. at 553 ("natural rights of men"), 556 ("inalienable rights"). John Quincy
Adams had argued for the prisoners in The Amistad. See S. LYND, supra note 138, at 145; 40
U.S. (15 Pet.) at 538.
233. Id. at 595 (Story, J., opinion).
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ish Treaty [re: ships and property] interposes no obstacle to the just
assertion of their rights.
In 1840 and 1844, Justice Baldwin repeated use of the concept of
"inviolable" rights, in these instances, rights inviolable under the Con-
stitution. 234 In 1846, U.S. government counsel argued successfully
that there was no "natural right" to transfer allegiance and citizen-
ship;235 and in 1849, counsel disagreed before the Court as to whether
the right to vote was a "natural right," "inalienable right," or merely a
"political" right.236  In 1850, counsel had also referred to the
"unalienable and indefeasible right" to alter, reform, or abolish gov-
ernment,237 an argument that would be repeated only two years
later.238 During 1850, the Court addressed another claim involving
"the rights of property" and the cargo of a ship, but without offsetting
claims to human life and liberty. While avoiding excess duties on im-
ported goods, victorious counsel argued that such taxes are illegal
"because they tend to produce fines and penalties, to derogate from
the common law, and from the rights of property, and to appropriate
private property to public use, which, being contrary to natural right
and justice, is only tolerated in cases of necessity, and upon full com-
pensation. ' '239  In 1852, counsel made arguments about other
"unalienable" property rights, 24° and in both 1853 and 1854, three
Supreme Court Justices implicitly confirmed the "natural right" of ac-
quiring and enjoying private property. 241 Counsel argued in another
1854 case that no white people "have ever denied that the Indians
were human beings entitled to the rights of humanity, to the natural
rights of holding, and acquiring, and alienating property, real and per-
sonal, including the rights of marriage and descent," an argument that
generally prevailed.242 In 1857, counsel referred in one case to "those
234. See McCracken v. Hayward, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 608, 613 (1844) (Baldwin, J., opinion);
Lessee of Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 353, 417 (1840) (Baldwin, J., concurring).
235. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 569 (1846) (argument of counsel).
236. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 19-20, 28 (1849) (arguments of counsel).
237. Butler v. Pennsylvania, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 402, 411 (1850) (argument of counsel).
238. See Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38, 41 (1852) (argument of counsel).
239. Maxwell v. Griswold, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 242, 252 (1850) (argument of counsel).
240. Goesele v. Bimeler, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 589, 593 (1852) (argument of counsel).
241. See The City of Boston v. Lecraw, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 426, 434 (1854) (Grier, J., opin-
ion) ("natural right" re: property); State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369, 397
(1853) (Catron, J., dissenting) (legislative power to regulate state bank and power of eminent
domain "both, to a limited extent, interfere with the natural right guaranteed by the constitution,
of acquiring and enjoying it"); Carroll v. Lessee of Carroll, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 275, 283 (1853)
(Curtis, J., opinion) (legislation on interpretation of wills did not violate "any principle of natural
right").
242. See United States v. Ritchie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 525, 530 (1854) (argument of counsel).
A Mexican land grant of 1837 addressed in the case had also confirmed that land belonged to a
person "by natural right and actual possession". Id. at 535 (Nelson, J., opinion).
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immutable principles of right and justice which are the foundation of
... law" 243 and argued in another "that a mother is not deprived, by
her second marriage, of the natural right of controlling the person of
her child, and determining its future home."'2 4 4 That same year, opin-
ions of the attorneys general used the phrases "right of a man to expa-
triate himself" 245 and "any man's fundamental right.
'246
During this time, however, the Missouri Compromise, which had
granted freedom to slaves in certain western territories, was struck
down at the expense of human liberty and the "natural rights" of
slaves. While dissenting in Dred Scott v. Sandford,2 4 7 Justices McLean
and Curtis referred to "the natural rights of man ' 248 and to "natural
rights" of persons. 249 But the rights of states and to property found
more favor with the majority of the Court as is evidenced by Chief
Justice Taney's comment that "general terms used in the Constitution
of the United States, as to the rights of man," did not include black
slaves. 250 Nonetheless, two years later in Georgia a federal judge de-
clared before the grand jury that earlier Congressional legislation hav-
ing proscribed international slave trading, and "having declared it to
be piracy, the natural rights of the inhabitants of Africa are secured
against the violation of them. .... 251
The use of the phrase "human rights" by the U.S. Supreme Court
appeared again in the 1866 case, Ex parte Milligan.25 2 Addressing the
right of those accused of having committed a crime "to be tried and
punished according to law," Justice Davis declared: "By the protec-
tion of the law human rights are secured; withdraw that protection,
243. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 70 (1857) (argument of counsel).
244. Jones v. McMasters, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 8, 13 (1857) (argument of counsel).
245. See 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 356, 359 (1857).
246. See 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 117, 119 (1857).
247. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
248. Id. at 557 (McLean, J., dissenting), quoting E. VATTEL, supra note 19 ("The laws of
nations are but the natural rights of man applied to nations.").
249. Id. at 574 ("The natural rights of people of color"), 575 (not true to allege "that the
Creator of all men had endowed the white race, exclusively, with the great natural rights which
the Declaration of Independence asserts"), 620 (slavery is inconsistent "with the Declaration of
Independence and with natural right"), 624 ("Slavery, being contrary to natural right, is created
only by municipal law ... without foundation in the law of nature or the unwritten common
law.") See also id. at 574 ("inalienable rights"). Justice Curtis resigned after the Dred Scott
decision, a decision that "was greeted with unmitigated wrath from every segment of the United
States except the slave holding states;" see also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 271, 615 (2d ed. 1983).
250. See id. at 409 (Taney, C.J., opinion); see also id. at 410 ("unalienable rights" today
would "embrace the whole human family").
251. Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 1026, 1030 (1859) (No. 18,269a) (Wayne, J.).
252. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 119 (1866) (Davis, J., opinion); see also id. at 126 (rights
"inviolable").
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and they are at the mercy of wicked rulers, or the clamor of an excited
people. ' 25 3  Also that year counsel used the phrases "natural right"
and "natural and inherent right" in argument before the Court254 and,
in deciding the case in 1867, Justice Field recognized that "all men
have certain inalienable rights, '255 a recognition that was undoubtedly
shared by Justice Miller who wrote in a related case of the "inaliena-
ble" right to defend one's own cause during a suit in court.
256
In 1868, Justice Swayne also used the phrase "natural right" while
addressing a statute granting immunity to a ship's pilot, adding that
such a statute "abridges the natural right of the injured party to com-
pensation, and is therefore to be construed strictly. ' 257 In 1871 Justice
Bradley, joined by Justice Swayne, recognized the "inestimable...
natural right of... bringing the offender to justice" when such person
attacks our persons and the right "of invoking the penalties of the law
upon" them.258 And in 1872 Justice Clifford repeated the recognition
of Chief Justice Marshall forty years earlier that Indians retain their
"natural rights" as possessors of the soil.259
Express use of the phrase "human rights" occurred again in 1873
in the Slaughter-House Cases, 260 with Justice Miller rightly noting that
the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments provide "additional guarantees
253. Id. Compare 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 19, 21 (1864) ("the most sacred questions of human
rights" are at stake re: Presidential review of courts-martial).
254. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 286 ("natural right"), 298 ("natural
rights"), 313 ("natural and inherent right") (1867) (argument of counsel); see also United States
v. Armijo, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 444, 446 (1866) (argument of counsel) (land grant and "natural
right"); Stanley v. Colt, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 119, 132 (1866) (argument of counsel) (altering express
provisions in a will "is contrary to the principles of natural right and justice which no legislature
can contravene").
255. Cummings, supra note 254, at 321 (Field, J., opinion). Since Justice Field related this
and similar phrases to rights of men (see infra notes 262, 270, 282) and counsel in this case had
used the phrase "natural right" in argument (see supra note 254), and since these phrases were
generally interrelated in U.S. history, Justice Field's use of the phrase "inalienable right" is
counted here as if he had said "inalienable right of man." Justice Field was quoted by counsel in
1873, but to no avail. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 134 (1873) (argument of
counsel). On Justice Field's views, see also C. SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD - CRAFTSMAN OF
THE LAW 148, 418-27 (1930).
256. Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 384 (1867) (Miller, J., dissenting). In Exparte
Garland, counsel had made related arguments. See id. at 352 ("natural right"), 356 (not a "natu-
ral right"), 357-58 (no "natural inalienable right"), 369-70 (not a "natural right") (arguments of
counsel).
257. See The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53, 63 (1868) (Swayne, J., opinion); see also id. at 66
(similar exemption in U.K. was recognizably "'fruitful of injustice,' and ...contrary to the
fundamental principles of natural right.").
258. See Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 595, 598 (1871) (Bradley, J.,
dissenting).
259. Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 244 (1872) (Clifford, J., opinion).
260. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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of human rights" to those persons covered. 261 In their dissenting
opinions, Justices Field, 262 Bradley, 263 and Swayne 264 argued the
proper application human right precepts while using the phrase
"rights of man." Thus, one finds in a single case an interchangeable
use of "human rights" and "rights of man" phrases by no less than
four justices, a practice in accord with similar patterns of use more
generally in early American history.265
In the late 1870s, 1880s and 1890s, the more popular expression
was "rights of man," although the related concept of "natural rights"
continued to receive attention. 266 As the Court affirmed in United
States v. Cruikshank in 1876:
The rights of life and personal liberty are natural rights of man. "To
secure these rights," says the Declaration of Independence, "govern-
ments are instituted among men . . ." The very highest duty of the
States, when they entered the Union under the Constitution, was to pro-
tect all persons within their boundaries in the enjoyment of these
"unalienable rights with which they were endowed by their Creator. '267
The same expression was repeated less splendidly in the Civil Rights
Cases in 1883,268 while in 1878 Chief Justice Waite had used the
phrase "unalienable right" 269 and in 1884 Justice Field used an
261. Id. at 67 (Miller, J., opinion).
262. Id. at 110 (Field, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 116 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 127 (Swayne, J., dissenting) ("Life is a gift of God, and the right to preserve it is
the most sacred of the rights of man.").
265. Such an interchangeable use in the same case would occur again in four more recent
cases: Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561, 630 (1964); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 51,
62 (1947); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1946); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536,
541 (1942); see also infra notes 314, 322.
266. See Ralston v. Turpin, 129 U.S. 663, 675 (1889) (Harlan, J., opinion) ("natural right of
an owner to make such disposition of his property .. "); Barrell v. Tilton, 119 U.S. 637, 642
(1887) (Field, J., opinion); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (Matthews, J., opinion)
(right to vote is "not regarded strictly as a natural right"); Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 629
(1885) (Miller, J., opinion) (defense of lapse of time to obligation to pay money is "no natural
right"); Rector v. Gibbon, Ill U.S. 276, 284 (1884) (Field, J., opinion); Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516, 549 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (Madison recognized that trial by jury is not a
"natural right"); see also id. at 539: "rights... immutable;" Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 19
(1879) (Swayne, J., opinion); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (Waite, C.J.,
opinion) (" 'he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties' "); Leavenworth, Lawrence
& Galveston R.R. v. United States, 92 U.S. 733, 746 (1875) (Davis, J., opinion); Randall v.
Kreiger, 90 U.S. 137, 148 (1874) (Swayne, J., opinion) (dower is not a "natural right"); see also
infra text accompanying note 279.
267. 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876) (Waite, C.J., opinion). The same point was made in 1869 by the
California Supreme Court. See supra note 208.
268. 109 U.S. 3, 48-49 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
269. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. at 165 (Waite, C.J., opinion); see also id. at 164
("natural right"); The Cherokee Trust Funds; Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. United
States and Cherokee Nation, 117 U.S. 288, 304 (1886) (Field, J., opinion) (Cherokee national
convention of 1839 use of "unalienable rights").
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equivalent phrase, the "inalienable... right of men."'270 During this
period, reference to "natural, inherent, and unalienable" rights, 27 1 "in-
alienable" rights272 and "the right of man" 273 also continued in state
-courts; and the phrase "human rights" appeared in a reporter's note to
a decision in a lower federal case in 1882 concerning the rights of Chi-
nese emigrants.
274
In 1884, 1889, and 1893, the U.S. Supreme Court quoted an article
in an 1868 treaty between China and the United States which had rec-
ognized "the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home
and allegiance" only to uphold a series of subsequent Congressional
acts which denied such a right to persons of Chinese descent. 275 The
270. Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 757 (1884) (Field, J., concur-
ring) ("inalienable ... right of men to pursue their happiness"); see also id. at 756 ("inherent
rights," "inalienable rights") 757-58 ("inalienable right"). There, Justice Field also used the
'phrases "natural right" and "certain inherent rights" as if they are interrelated. See id. at 754,
756. For a related use of the phrase "inalienable rights" by Justice Field, see supra note 255.
271. See, e.g., Atchison & Neb. R.R. v. Baty, 6 Neb. 37, 40-41 (1877).
272. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 46 La. Ann. 922, 15 So. 290 (1894), quoted in Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 584-85 (1897) ("inalienable rights ... that are inherent"); Magner v.
People, 97 Ill. 320, 334 (1881) ("right inhering"), misquoted in Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S.
, 519, 533 (1896) ("right inherent"); Commonwealth v. Jones, 73 Ky. (10 Bush.) 725, 735 (1874)
("inalienable"). See also supra note 205.
273. See People v. Marx, 99 N.Y. 377, 386 (1885).
274. United States v. Buntin, 10 F. 730, 739 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1882) (appendix - reporter's
note) (opinions of federal judges illustrate "substantial progress made towards broad and enlight-
ened views of human rights and equality").
275. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 716 (1893) (Gray, J., opinion); id. at
733 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 752 (Field, J., dissenting); Chae Chan Ping (The Chinese
Exclusion Case) v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 592 (1889) (Field, J., opinion); Chew Heong v.
United States, 112 U.S. 536, 541 (1884) (Harlan, J., opinion); id. at 566 (Field, J., dissenting); see
also Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47, 49 (1892) (appeal-statement); supra notes 164-
165. The Court in Fong Yue Ting, however, seemed to deny that there was any loss of right
under the treaty, arguing: "it appears to be impossible to hold that a Chinese laborer acquired,
under any of the treaties... ,any right.., to be and remain in this country, except by the license,
permission, and sufferance of congress .... " 149 U.S. at 723 (emphasis added). But see Article 2
of an 1880 treaty, quoted in Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 733-34 (those now in the U.S. "shall be
'allowed to go and come of their own free will and accord .. "). The same treaty language was
quoted earlier in three lower federal courts while upholding the rights of aliens under the treaty
as against inconsistent state laws. See In re Parrott, 1 F. 481, 503 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880) (Sawyer,
J.); Baker v. City of Portland, 2 F. Cas. 472, 473 (C.C.D. Or. 1879) (No. 777); In re Ah Fong, 1
F. Cas. 213, 217 n.3, 218 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (No. 102) (Field, J., opinion). The treaty language
was also quoted later in several federal cases. See, e.g,, In re Baldwin, 27 F. 187, 190 (C.C.D.
Cal. 1886); In re Impaneling and Instructing the Grand Jury, 26 F. 749, 751 (D. Or. 1886); In re
Ah Lung, 18 F. 28, 30 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883); United States v. Douglas, 17 F. 634, 635 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1883). Judge Sawyer, in In re Parrott, also quoted Justice Swayne's language noted in note
264 supra. Id. at 506. He also recognized: "The right to labor is, of all others, after the right to
live, the fundamental, inalienable right of man ... And this absolute, fundamental and natural
right was guaranteed.., under the treaty .. " Id. at 506-07. Six years later he quoted Justice
Swayne's use of "the rights of man" again. In re Tie Loy, 26 F. 611, 614 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886).
For general background and trends, see, e.g., Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under
International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 804 (1983); infra note 279. Professor James Nafziger also
quotes an 1844 New York court concerning U.S. policy "to bestow the right of citizenship freely,
and with a liberality unknown to the old world." Nafziger, supra, at 815 (quoting Lynch v.
Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583, 661 (N.Y. 1844)). Highly critical of Chae Chan Ping is a recent essay of
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Court did at least note, however, that "[b]y the law of nations" resi-
dent aliens can invoke domestic laws and even the government's pro-
tection against foreign nations.276 The same treaty language was
quoted in a lower federal court in 1884 to produce results more
favorable to such persons, the court holding that the Congressional
acts restricting the immigration of Chinese to the United States are not
applicable to a citizen of the United States born within the U.S. of
Chinese parents when such a citizen travels abroad and seeks reen-
try.2 7 7 An earlier Congressional act recognizing that "the right of ex-
patriation is a natural and inherent right of all people" was quoted in
the same opinion, 278 as it had been the year before by the Supreme
Court 279 and would be later in the 1893 decision noted above.
280
During this general period, Chief Justice Waite also referred in
1887 to "the most sacred questions of human rights" which are at
stake in a criminal trial;28' and in 1888 Justice Field used the phrases
"inalienable rights of man," "inalienable rights" and "right of man"
while identifying the right to pursue one's happiness and the right to
be free in the enjoyment of one's faculties and to pursue a lawful voca-
tion.282 In 1890, Justice Field also recognized that the right to prop-
erty had been declared early to be "one of the inalienable rights of
man; '28 3 and in 1892 Justice Gray affirmed that the rights to life and
liberty were "natural and inalienable rights of man" beyond the power
of Congress. 284 Also in 1890, Justice Fuller recognized what he
termed "the inherent right of resort to the courts, ' 285 while in 1892
and 1893 Justice Brewer used the phrase "unalienable rights" 286 and
Professor Louis Henkin. See Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century
of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987).
276. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893) (Gray, J., opinion).
277. See In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905, 907 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884) (Field, J., opinion).
278. Id. at 908; see also supra note 164.
279. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 107 (1883) (Gray, J., opinion).
280. See Fong Yue Ting, supra note 276, at 715 (Gray, J., opinion).
281. Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 558 (1887) (Waite, C. J., opinion), quoting 11
Op. Att'y Gen. 19, 21 (1864) (re: Presidential review of courts-martial). The same language
appeared later in 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 302 (1882).
282. See Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 692, 694 (1888) (Field, J., dissenting).
283. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 90 (1890) (Field, J., opinion); see also id. at 91 (no
"inherent right").
284. See Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 287 (1892) (Gray, J., opinion).
285. Morgan's La. & Tex. R.R. & S.S. Co. v. Texas Cent. Ry., 137 U.S. 171, 192 (1890)
(Fuller, C. J., opinion).
286. All with reference to the Declaration of Independence. See, e.g., Monongahela Naviga-
tion Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 324 (1893) (Brewer, J., opinion); Budd v. New York, 143
U.S. 517, 550 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143
U.S. 457, 467 (1892) (Brewer, J., opinion); see also Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. at 524 (argu-
ment of counsel) ("inalienable" right).
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in 1890 and 1892 Justices Brewer and Harlan referred to "inviolable"
rights under the Constitution. 287 Similar phrases also appeared in
other lower federal court opinions in the 1880s and early 1890s.
288
From the survey of trends thus far, it is evident that human rights
or equivalent phrases and precepts were used in some fifty cases de-
cided by U.S. Supreme Court Justices from 1793 to 1893.289 These
precepts appeared moreover in sixty-one opinions written by twenty-
eight U.S. justices in that hundred year period.29° There were sixteen
cases in the first half of the period and thirty-four cases in the second
half, thus demonstrating a doubling of the use of human rights or
equivalent precepts. Even more of the opinions appear after 1850:
forty-two out of sixty-one. Further Justice Field, the justice who
wrote more of the relevant opinions than any other, wrote during the
same latter part of the time period (although Chief Justice Marshall
had been a close second). What is evident thus far, is an early and
fairly consistent use of human rights or equivalent precepts by the
Court, with slightly greater use by the justices from 1853 to 1893. It is
a pattern different than that evident in the section on general historic
use, with the difference due perhaps to the greater attention paid
outside the Court to the slavery question prior to the Civil War.
b. 1894-1989
In 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court noted an early British opinion in
which it was recognized that a foreign marriage "'valid from being
established by the sentence of a court in France having proper jurisdic-
tion ... is conclusive, whether in a foreign court or not, from the law
of nations in such cases,'" adding: "'otherwise the rights of mankind
would be very precarious and uncertain.' "291 In 1896 and 1898 Jus-
287. See Morley v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry., 146 U.S. 162, 175 (1892) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing); York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15, 20 (1890) (Brewer, J., opinion).
288. See, e.g., United States v. Patrick, 54 F. 338, 351 (M.D. Tenn. 1893) (rights of life and
liberty are "natural and inalienable rights of man"); United States v. Sanges, 48 F. 78, 86 (N.D.
Ga. 1891) (rights of life and liberty are "natural rights of man"); Tuchman v. Welch, 42 F. 548,
557 (D. Kan. 1890) ("rights of man"); In re Tie Loy, 26 F. 611, 614 (D. Cal. 1886) ("rights of
man"); In re George Moncan, 14 F. 44, 49 (D. Or. 1882) ("inherent rights of man"); In re Low
Yam Chow, 13 F. 605, 616 (D. Cal. 1882) (same); Gray v. Cincinnati S. Ry., 11 F. 683, 685 (S.D.
Ohio 1882). See Lake Erie & W. Ry. v. Bailey, 61 F. 494, 496 (C.C.D. Ind. 1893) (a number of
men in a secret labor organization make people think that "human rights" are of no value and
might engage in illegal violence and "terrorism").
289. See supra notes 188-191, 211-270, 275-76, 279, 281-87.
290. See id. The Justices in first order of use were: Wilson, Jay, Patterson, Marshall, Duvall,
Story, Johnson, Thompson, Trimble, Baldwin, Washington, Curtis, Catron, Grier, McLean, Ta-
ney, Davis, Field, Miller, Clifford, Bradley, Swayne, Waite, Harlan, Gray, Matthews, Fuller,
Brewer.
291. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 173 (1895) (Gray, J., opinion) (quoting Lord Hardwick
in Roach v. Garvan, 1 Ves. Sr. 157, 159, 26 Eng. Rep. 683 (1748)).
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tices Brown, 292 McKenna 293 and White294 had also used the phrase
"natural right;" and in 1898, Chief Justice Fuller recognized the "in-
herent right of man" to change his home and allegiance while denying
a right freely to immigrate and become a naturalized U.S. citizen. 295
At the turn of the century, the Court recognized once again that
the right to citizenship in the United States is not among the inherent,
natural rights of all persons.296 In important dictum, however, the
Court identified "certain natural rights, enforced in the Constitution
by prohibitions against interference with them," including, impor-
tantly for this study, the rights "to free access to courts of justice, to.
due process of law and to an equal protection of the laws."' 297 Four
months earlier, Justice Harlan had quoted President McKinley while
recognizing that the Cuban people are "entitled to enjoy... that 'mea-
sure of self-control which is the inalienable right of man . .' "298 In
1900 Justice White used the phrases "natural right" and "inalienable
rights" 299 and Justices Gray and Shiras used the phrase "natural
right. ' 300 Also in 1900, counsel referred to a "natural right to la-
bor" 30 1 and, in 1901 in another case, to rights "sacred and inaliena-
ble."'302 In 1904 counsel argued that the right to "preserve life is the
most sacred right of man, ' 303 and counsel argued in 1905 that the
right to pursue ordinary vocations is "among the inherent and inalien-
292. See United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625, 628 (1896) (Brown, J., opinion).
293. See Magoun v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 288, 291 (1898) (Mc-
Kenna, J., opinion).
294. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383 (1896) (White, J., opinion); Geer v. Connecticut,
161 U.S. 519, 527 (1896) (White, J., opinion), see also id. at 533 (not a "right inherent"), quoting
Magner v. People, 97 II1. 320, 334 (1881).
295. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 730 (1898) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting);
see also id. at 713, quoting 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 356, 357 (1859) ("natural right" to leave country of
birth), id. ("natural and inherent right of all people").
296. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282-83 (1901) (Brown, J., opinion).
297. Id. at 282.
298. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 124 (1901) (Harlan, J., opinion), quoting President Mc-
Kinley's message of Dec. 5, 1897.
299. See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 55 ("right to take property by devise or descent is
... not a natural right"), 90 ("the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and property") (1900) (White,
J., opinion).
300. See Plummer v. Coler, 178 U.S. 115, 130 (quoting United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. at
628 ("Though the general consent of the most enlightened nations has from the earliest historical
period recognized a natural right in children to inherit the property of their parents, we know of
no legal principle to prevent the legislature from taking away or limiting the right of testamen-
tary disposition .... ), 133 (quoting Magoun v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 170 U.S. at 288
("right to take property by devise or descent is . . . not a natural right") (1900) (Shiras, J.,
opinion)); The Panama, 176 U.S. 535, 544 (1900) (Gray, J., opinion) (vessel at sea has "natural
right" of self-defense).
301. Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900) (argument of counsel).
302. DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 37 (1901) (argument of counsel).
303. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 17 (1905) (argument of counsel).
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able rights of man,''3°4 while in 1895 counsel had referred to a liberty
"inherent in the rights of man. '30 5 And in 1907, a New York court
declared that "certain rights pertaining to mankind ... termed 'natu-
ral rights' " include the right to inviolability of the person or to per-
sonal immunity from unreasonable interference. 306
A few opinions had also used the phrases "inalienable rights,"
30 7
"unalienable rights, ' 308 and "inherent rights" 309 in the period 1894-
1900. In the period just after 1900 until 1925, there were only a few
opinions using the phrases "natural right(s),"'310 "inalienable
rights, ' 311 or "unalienable rights; ' 312 and use of the phrases "right of
304. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 7 (1906) (argument of counsel).
305. Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 494 (1895) (argument of counsel).
There, on rehearing, Justice Harlan also used the phrase "natural right." See 158 U.S. 601, 675
(1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
306. See Gow v. Bingham, 107 N.Y.S. 1011, 1014 (1907). In Downes v. Bidwell, Justice
Brown had recognized, as "natural rights," the rights to "personal liberty" and to "immunities
from unreasonable searches and seizures." 182 U.S. at 282.
307. See, e.g., Taylor and Marshall v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 599 (1900) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting), quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 73 Ky. (10 Bush.) 725, 735 (1874); Hawker v. New
York, 170 U.S. 189, 203 (1898) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 584,
589 (1897) (Peckham, J., opinion), quoting State v. Allgeyer & Co., 48 La. Ann. 104, 107, 18 So.
904, 905 (1896); Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 165 (1895) (Brewer, J., opinion); Hooper
v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 662 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
308. See, e.g., Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 294 (1897) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Gulf,
Clo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 160 (1897) (Brewer, J., opinion).
309. See, e.g., Wilson v. Eureka City, 173 U.S. 32, 36 (1899) (McKenna, J., opinion); Miller
v. Cornwall R.R., 168 U.S. 131, 134 (1897) (Fuller, J., opinion); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409,
443 (1897) (White, J., opinion); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. at 585; Ashley v. Ryan, 153 U.S.
436, 441 (1894) (White, J., opinion) (not a "right inherent" to be corp.).
310. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 540 (1922) (Pitney, J., opinion)
(liberty of contract as a "natural right"); Ferry v. Spokane, Portland & Seattle R.R., 258 U.S.
314, 320 (1922) (McKenna, J., opinion) (dower not a "natural right"); Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250
U.S. 525, 540 (1919) (Day, J., opinion) (right to take property by devise or descent is not a
"natural right"); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 326 (1917) (Clarke, J., opinion); Henry v.
A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 52 (1912) (White, J., dissenting); Keeney v. Comptroller of New
York, 222 U.S. 525, 533 (1912) (Lamar, J., opinion); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 53
(1908) (Brewer J., opinion) (school as a corporation has no "natural right" to teach at all) [see
also id. at 61 (Harlan J., dissenting)]; Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 531 (1905)
(Brown, J., concurring) ("natural rights ... to life, liberty and property"); Hawaii v. Mankichi,
190 U.S. 197, 225 (1903) (Fuller, C. J., dissenting); Layton v. Missouri, 187 U.S. 356, 359 (1902)
(quoting state constitution as to "natural right to life, liberty and the enjoyment of the gains of
their own industry"); Orr v. Gilman, 183 U.S. 278, 283 (1902) (Shiras, J., opinion) (right to take
property by devise is "not an inherent or natural right").
311. See Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 424 (1919) (Pitney, J., opinion)
("natural and inalienable"); New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 207 (1917) (Pitney, J.,
opinion) ("natural and inalienable"); Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 238 U.S. 190, 201 (1915)
(Day, J., opinion) ("inalienable rights"); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1915) (Pitney,
J., opinion) ("inalienable natural rights") [see also id. at 17 ("human rights")]; Singer Sewing
Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U.S. 304, 316 (1914) (Pitney, J., opinion) ("inalienable rights");
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 95-96, 106, 109-10 (1908) (Moody, J., opinion); Hodges v.
United States, 203 U.S. 1, 18 (1906) (Brewer, J., opinion) ("natural or inalienable right"); How-
ard v. Kentucky, 200 U.S. 164, 172 (1906) (McKenna, J., opinion) ("inalienable right"); Great
Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 193 U.S. 532, 548 (1904) (Harlan, J., opinion) ("inaliena-
ble rights"); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 633 (1904) (Peckham, J., opinion) ("inalienable
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man," "right of mankind," and "human rights" was relatively less fre-
quent. "[R]ights of mankind" was used in 1908 by Justice Moody,
3 13
and the phrase "human rights" was used both in 1915 by Justice
Pitney, 314 and in 1920 by Justice McKenna while considering Ger-
man violations of "human rights and all international law."' 315 In
1920, Justice Clarke also used the phrase "fundamental rights of men"
while considering abuse of governmental discretion in connection with
Chinese immigrants and persons of Chinese descent. 316 Lower federal
courts also made use of such phrases,317 but with the pattern in lower
rights"); Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 361 (1904) (Brewer, J., concur-
ring) ("inalienable rights"); Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 174 (1903) (Brewer, J.,
opinion) ("inalienable rights").
312. See Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 107 (1901) (Brewer, J., opin-
ion); see also United States ex rel. The Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S.
366, 391 (1909) (argument of counsel).
313. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110 (Moody, J., opinion) (right to travel freely
did not seem to be generally expected in the early 1800s to be a "privilege ranked among the
fundamental and inalienable rights of mankind").
314. See Coopage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (Pitney, J., opinion) (14th amend. "recognizes
'liberty' and 'property' as co-existent human rights"); see also id. at 23 n. 1 ("inalienable natural
rights").
315. See Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 480 (McKenna, J., opinion).
316. See Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 464 (1920) (Clarke, J., opinion).
317. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 32 F.2d 490, 494 (1st Cir. 1929) (Anderson, J.,
opinion) ("human rights"); Nottenbaum v. Leckie, 31 F.2d 556, 560 (3d Cir. 1929) ("human
rights"); Go Lun v. Nagle, 22 F.2d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1927) ("human rights"); Ex parte Dong
Ming, 20 F.2d 388, 389 (N.D. Cal. 1927) ("human rights"); Hee v. United States, 19 F.2d 335,
341 (1st Cir. 1927) (Anderson, J., dissenting) ("fundamental human rights"); United States v.
Griffin, 17 F.2d 811, 812 (E.D. Pa. 1926) ("human rights"); Johnson v. Damon ex rel. Leung
Fook Yung, 16 F.2d 65, 66 (1st Cir. 1926) ("human rights"); Children's Hospital of District of
Columbia v. Adkins, 284 F. 613, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1922) ("human rights"); Ex parte Kozlowski,
277 F. 83, 88 (D. Del. 1921) ("human rights"); American Coal Mining Co. v. Special Coal and
Food Comm'n, 268 F. 563, 570 (D. Ind. 1920) ("human rights"); Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F.
17, 69 (D. Mass. 1920) ("human rights"); Dorrance v. Dorrance, 264 F. 53, 57 (8th Cir. 1920)
("human rights"); In re Ivertsen, 237 F. 498, 502 (N.D. Cal. 1916) ("human rights"); Behrens v.
Illinois Cent. Ry., 192 F. 581, 582 (E.D. La. 1911) ("human rights"); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 164 F. 376, 389 (7th Cir. 1908) ("fundamental human right"); Hawkins v. United States,
116 F. 569, 574 (9th Cir. 1902) ("human rights"). A total of sixteen circuit and district court
cases from 1900 to 1930 using "human right(s)." For later cases, see infra notes 361-362. The
phrase "rights of mankind" also appears in four circuit and district court cases from 1900 to
1935. See, e.g., U.S. Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1011
(S.D.N.Y. 1915); Smith v. United States, 157 F. 721, 724 (8th Cir. 1907) (most of "the rights of
mankind" have an origin in inalienable, natural rights); Falstaff Corp. v. Allen, 278 F. 643, 647
(E.D. Mo. 1922) ("inherent rights of mankind" cannot be violated by states or Congress); In re
Missouri Pacific R.R., 7 F. Supp. 1, 10 (E.D. Mo. 1934) ("rights of mankind"). Use of the
phrase "fundamental rights of men" appeared in six circuit court cases between 1900 and 1932
(all involving claims of aliens). See, e.g., Ngai Kwan Ying v. Nagle, 62 F.2d 166, 167 (9th Cir.
1932) (quoting Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 464 (1920) ("fundamental rights of men
are involved")); Fong Tan Jew v. Tillinghast, 24 F.2d 632, 636 (1st Cir. 1928); United States ex
rel. Leong Ding v. Brough, 22 F.2d 926, 927 (2d Cir. 1927); Christy v. Leong Don, 5 F.2d 135,
137 (5th Cir. 1925); United States ex rel. Schachter v. Curran, 4 F.2d 356, 358 (3d Cir. 1925);
Johnson v. Tertzag, 2 F.2d 40, 42 (1st Cir. 1924). In 1899, a district court used the phrases
"inalienable rights ... the right of men." See United States v. Sweeney, 95 F. 434, 450 (W.D.
Ark. 1899). The phrase "rights of man" appeared in three circuit court cases in the 1890s, but in
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court decisions one finds a general inattention to human right precepts
for the first third of the twentieth century.
Computer-assisted research also allows thorough investigation of
the actual patterns of use of human right precepts in the U.S. Supreme
Court since 1925. What this research reveals is the fact that use of
such precepts has increased markedly in the latter parts of the twenti-
eth century. From 1925 to 1989, the Supreme Court has used the
phrase "human right(s)" in sixty-nine cases, with nearly half of these
appearing in the last twenty-years. 318 The equivalent phrase "rights of
man" also appears in twenty-six Supreme Court decisions from 1925
to 1987, 319 with nearly half of these appearing in the last twenty years.
only one circuit court case from 1900 to 1930. See, e.g., August v. United States, 257 F. 388, 393
(8th Cir. 1918) (argument of the prosecutor below); Board of Comm'rs v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 90
F. 222, 226 (8th Cir. 1898) ("inalienable rights of man"); Jones v. Great Southern Fireproof
Hotel Co., 86 F. 370, 375-76 (6th Cir. 1898) ("inalienable rights of man," "right of man");
Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 F. 912, 928-29 (8th Cir. 1897) ("rights of man," "natural rights
of man"). However, the phrase "rights of man" appeared in several district court cases from the
1890s to 1935. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 12 F. Supp. 321, 325 (W.D. Ky. 1935); Con-
stantin v. Smith, 57 F.2d 227, 233 (E.D. Tex. 1932); Walters v. McKinnis, 221 F. 746, 750 (W.D.
Pa. 1915); United States v. Sandoval, 198 F. 539, 543 (D. N.M. 1912), quoting United States v.
Lucero, 1 N.M. 422, 426 (1869); Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. v. Gee, 139 F. 582, 584 (S.D. Iowa
1905); In re Marshall, 102 F. 323, 324 (N.D. Cal. 1900); United States v. Eberhart, 127 F. 254,
256 (N.D. Ga. 1899); Humes v. City of Little Rock, 138 F. 929, 932 (W.D. Ark. 1898); Mills v.
Green, 67 F. 818, 829 (C.C.D. S.C. 1895); In re Grice, 79 F. 627, 640 (C.C. N.D. Tex. 1897). A
related use of "rights of men" also appears in lower federal cases in the 1920s and 1930s. See,
e.g., United States ex rel. Shaw v. Van de Mark, 3 F. Supp. 101, 103 (W.D.N.Y. 1933) ("funda-
mental rights of men"); In re Sugano, 40 F.2d 961, 962 (S.D. Cal. 1930) (same phrase plus
"human rights"); Miers v. Brownlow, 21 F.2d 376, 377 (S.D. Ala. 1927) (same); Ex parte Yee
Gee, 17 F.2d 653, 656 (N.D. Cal. 1927) (same); United States v. Sanders, 290 F. 428, 436 (W.D.
Tenn. 1923) ("the rights of men"); Ex parte Gagliardi, 284 F. 190, 191 (W.D. Wash. 1922)
("fundamental rights of men"); Ex parte Radivoeff, 278 F. 227, 229 (D. Mont. 1922) (also "fun-
damental rights of men").
318. These cases are listed infra in notes 323-342. Lexis found the phrase "human right" or
"human rights" in over 195 Supreme Court cases decided between 1925 and 1989, but upon close
inspection only 69 seem relevant. Use by a justice included quotations adopted by a justice. Not
included in this survey are the arguments of counsel. See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 2
(1940) ("human rights"); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 129 (1936) ("human rights");
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 597 (1935) ("unalienable rights with which
man was endowed"). Also not included is First National Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S.
768, 782 n.18 (1978) (Powell, J., opinion) ("human right causes"). Since six Supreme Court
cases prior to 1925 contain the phrase "human rights" (see supra notes 211, 253, 261, 281, 314
and 315), seventy-five Supreme Court cases are known to involve use of the phrase "human
right(s)." Most uncharacteristically, only four of those cases appear in 1986-1989.
319. These cases are listed infra in notes 343-357. Not included in this period of the study
are: Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 458 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("rights of
freedmen"); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 262 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring & dissent-
ing) ("rights of individual"); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 293 n.10 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) ("rights of free men"); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 318 U.S. 105, 139 (1943) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) ("right of men"); Nebia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 558 (1933) (McReyn-
olds, J., dissenting) ("rights of one man"); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 537 (1927)
(argument of counsel) ("right and privilege as a free man"). Since ten Supreme Court cases prior
to 1925 contain the phrase "right(s) of man" (see supra notes 188, 192, 248, 262-264, 267-268,
282-284, 295, 298), thirty-six Supreme Court cases are known to involve use of the phrase
"right(s) of man." See also supra note 275.
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For the general period investigated, two cases were found which used
the phrase "rights of mankind, ' 320 while eight cases contain the words
"unalienable" or "inalienable right. ' 321 Only four of the cases con-
tained a use of two types of phrases. 322 Thus, use of the phrase
"human right(s)" or equivalent phrases has occurred in ninety-three
Supreme Court cases from 1925-1989, with nearly half of these ap-
pearing in the last twenty years.
These trends are more remarkable when one compares them with
those noted previously from 1793 to 1893. For the early period,
human right precepts were used by the Court in forty-six cases. Such
a frequency of use over a one hundred year period has been matched
by the Court in the last twenty years (i.e., from 1969 to 1989). Viewed
differently, the use of human right precepts by the Supreme Court has
been five times more frequent since the late 1930s than during the pre-
vious history of the Court. Thus, if the history of the Supreme Court
is divided into four periods, one finds that use of human right precepts
has been five times greater in the last quarter than during the previous
three quarters of Supreme Court decisionmaking.
When recent trends are analyzed for ten year periods from 1939-
1989, one discovers a fairly even but growing use of human right
precepts over the last fifty years, with use in nineteen cases from 1979-
320. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 503 n.14 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Jefferson's religious
freedom statute); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 35 n. 15 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dis-
senting) (same). Not included in this study is Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 202 (1927) (argument
of counsel). There are four known Supreme Court uses of this phrase, two since 1925 and two
earlier uses in 1895 and 1908. See supra notes 291, 313.
321. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 597 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring); Shearson/
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 253 n.9 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 n.38 (1985) (Stevens, J., opinion)
("unalienable right"); id. at 93 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("unalienable right"); Hewitt v. Helms,
459 U.S. 460, 483 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable
rights"); Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 469 n. 1 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Meachum); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
322 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("inalienable right"); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230
(1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("inalienable right"); Abington School District v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 213 (1963) (Clark, J., opinion).
322. These are cases involving use of the phrases "rights of man" and "human rights" in the
same case: Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (Warren, C.J.), 630 (Harlan, J.) (1964); Adam-
son v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 51 (Reed, J.), 62 (Frankfurter, J.) (1947); In re Yamashita, 327
U.S. 1, 26, 28 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536, 541
(1942) (Douglas, J., opinion). Only one early case is known, for a total of five cases with con-
comitant use of both phrases. See the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 67 (Miller, J.), 110
(Field, J.), 116 (Bradley, J.), 127 (Swayne, J.) (1873). Other cases containing two or more
equivalent expressions include: Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. at 90-91; Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. at 164-65; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. at 409, 557, 574-75, 620, 624; Worces-
ter v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559, 579; Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 309, 319,
345-46. Of course, there have also been several uses of words such as "natural" or "inalienable"
in connection with other phrases to produce a phrase, for example, "natural rights of man" or
"inalienable rights of man." See also supra note 314, infra note 361.
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1989, twenty-four cases from 1969-1978, twenty-six cases from 1959-
1968, nine cases from 1949-1958, eighteen cases from 1939-1948, and
only four cases from 1903-1938. A similar pattern is demonstrable
when one measures frequency of use of the phrase "human right(s)"
(with use in 14, 16, 19, 9, 10, and 3 cases respectively). For the period
covering 1925 through 1988, a frequency of use analysis also demon-
strates that human right precepts appear more frequently in main or
concurring opinions (in sixty-one) than in dissenting opinions (in
forty-one), although use in main opinions is nearly the same as that in
dissenting opinions. A similar pattern is evident with regard to use of
the phrase "human right(s)" (in twenty-eight main, fourteen concur-
ring, and thirty-one dissenting opinions from 1925 through 1988).
When one also identifies the types of Supreme Court justices who
used "human right" or equivalent phrases in their opinions during the
last sixty-five years, one discovers a rather large group with disparate
jurisprudential approaches to decision. Further, nearly all of the pres-
ent members of the Court have used human right precepts, and none
have expressly repudiated use of these precepts in constitutional adju-
dication. In the vast majority of uses, the justices have used human
right precepts without explanation or citation to other cases., Often
the use of such precepts is made with express or implicit expectation
that human rights are fundamental constitutional rights or legal prin-
ciples. Thus, perhaps like the Founders, members of the Court have
often assumed that human right precepts reflect primary constitu-
tional expectations that need little explanation or supplementation
with case or other precedent.
The justices who have used the phrase "human right(s)," in order
of first use from 1925, are: (1) Black,323 (2) Jackson, 324 (3) Murphy,3 25
(4) Douglas, 326 (5) Roberts, 327 (6) Reed,328 (7) Frankfurter,
329
323. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (Black, J., opinion); Green v. United
States, 356 U.S. 165, 216 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649
(1948) (Black, J., concurring); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (Black, J., opinion).
Total of 4 cases.
324. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 182 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring). One case
total.
325. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 673 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring); Duncan v.
Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 330 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. i,
26 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 136 (1945) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69 (1942) (Murphy, J., opinion). Total of 5
cases.
326. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 186 n.8 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 613 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S. 1, 20 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
279 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); Ng Kam Fook v. Esperdy, 375 U.S. 955, 956 (1963) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 674 n.6 (1963) (Douglas, J.,
opinion); Williams v. Zuckert, 371 U.S. 531, 536 (1963) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Fleming v.
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(8) Goldberg, 330 (9) Warren, 331 (10) Harlan, 332 (11) Brennan, 333 (12)
Fortas,334 (13) Marshall, 335 (14) Blackmun, 336 (15) Burger,337 (16)
Powell, 338 (17) Stevens, 339 (18) Rehnquist, 34° (19) White, 341 and
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 629 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217,
243 n.2 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959) (Doug-
las, J., opinion); New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 16 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307, 321 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United Const. Workers v. La-
burnum Const. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 670 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Wheeling Steel Corp. v.
Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 577 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
536 (1942) (Douglas, J., opinion). Total of 15 cases.
327. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 144 (1945) (Roberts, J., dissenting). One case
total.
328. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 109 n.13 (1952) (Reed, J., opinion);
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 246 n.11 (1948) (Reed, J., dissent-
ing); United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95 (1947) (Reed, J., opinion). Total
of 3 cases.
329. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 244 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Jay v. Boyd, 351
U.S. 345, 372 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954)
(Frankfurter, J., opinion); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., opin-
ion); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); American Fed. of
Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 549 n.5 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 62 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Total of 7 cases.
330. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 755 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 161 n.16 (1963) (Goldberg, J., opinion). Total of 2 cases.
331. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 119 (1966) (Warren, C.J., opinion); Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. 1, 14 n.13 (1965) (Warren, C.J., opinion); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964) (War-
ren, C.J., opinion). Total of 3 cases.
332. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 770 (1966) (Harlan, J., opinion). One ease total.
333. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assoc., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 124 n.12 (1981)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 636 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
opinion); Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 70 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Quern v. Jor-
dan, 440 U.S. 332, 357 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring); Monell v. Department of Social Serv.,
436 U.S. 658, 684 (1978) (Brennan, J., opinion); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431
U.S. 816, 846 (1977) (Brennan, J., opinion); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 343 (1977) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 517 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443, 453 (1972) (Brennan, J., opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 268 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967) (Bren-
nan, J., opinion). Total of 11 cases.
334. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 436 n.1 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting); Bloom v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 212 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring). Total of 2 cases.
335. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Woods v.
Florida, 107 479 U.S. 954, 954 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325,
348 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
opinion); Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 388 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
separate opinion); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 56 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 320 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 521 n.14 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Total of 8 cases.
336. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 33 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 109-10 n.8 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Klein-
dienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 767 (1972) (Blackmun, J., opinion). Total of 3 cases.
337. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487 (1974) (Burger, C.J., opinion).
One case total.
338. Burger v. Kemp, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3141 n.5 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting); Fiallo v. Bell,
430 U.S. 787, 793 n.4 (1977) (Powell, J., opinion). Total of 2 cases.
339. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 2696 n.34 (1988) (Stevens, J., opinion); Lake
Country Estates, In6. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 400 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
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(20) O'Connr.342 Justices who have used the equivalent phrase
"rights of man," in order of first use from 1925, are: (1) Douglas,
3 43
(2) Reed, 34 (3) Jackson, 345 (4) Murphy,346 (5) Stewart,347 (6) Clark,
348
(7) Warren, 349 (8) Goldberg, 350 (9) White, 351 (10) Harlan,352 (11) Bur-
ger, 353 (12) Rehnquist, 354 (13) Powell,355 (14) Marshall, 356 and (15)
Stevens. 357 Justices Rutledge and Brennan also used the phrase "rights
opinion). Total of two cases; see also Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 365 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
340. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 12, 20, 26 (1981) (Rehn-
quist, J., opinion). One case total; see also Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 362 (1987) (Rehnquist,
C.J., opinion).
341. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 36 n.4, 40 (1981) (White,
J., dissenting). One case total.
342. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., opinion), misquoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974) (White, J., opinion)
("constitutional rights"). One case total. Cf Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S.Ct. at 2707-08
(O'Connor, J., concurring). A new case outside the survey period is Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thun-
der Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S.Ct. 971, 980 (1989) (O'Connor, J., opinion). Total of two cases
through March, 1989.
343. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 272 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Bute v. Illi-
nois, 333 U.S. 640, 678 n.1 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942) (Douglas, J., opinion). Total of 3 cases.
344. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 51 (1947) (Reed, J., opinion); Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 127 (1943) (Reed, J., dissenting). Total of 2 cases.
345. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 544 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring). One case total.
346. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 193 (1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting); In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 28 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting). Total of 2 cases.
347. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 640 (1974) (Stewart, J., opinion);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 448 n.3 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Total of 2 cases; see also
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92-4 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The right of a man.., of
every human being"), quoted in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 781
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
348. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213 (1963) (Clark, J.,
opinion). One case total.
349. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (Warren, C.J., opinion); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 561 (1964) (Warren, C.J., opinion). Total of 2 cases.
350. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also id. at 293
n. 10 ("natural rights of free men"). One case total.
351. Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 231 (1985) (White, J., concurring); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (White, J., opinion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502 (1965)
(White, J., concurring). Total of 3 cases.
352. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 163 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting). One case total.
353. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 623 n.4 (1978) (Burger, C.J., opinion); Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 461 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Total of 2 cases.
354. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 771 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., opinion). One case total.
355. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 606 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 398 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 n.7
(1977) (Powell, J., opinion). Total of 3 cases.
356. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3267 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (Mar-
shall, J., opinion). Total of 2 cases.
357. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747, 773 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). One case total.
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of mankind" in one of their opinions. 358 Those justices who used
human right precepts most often were: Douglas (eighteen opinions),
Brennan (twelve opinions), Marshall (ten opinions), and Frankfurter
(seven opinions).
Thus, it is evident from overall trends that throughout our consti-
tutional history human right precepts have been used in at least one
hundred and sixty-six cases decided by the justices. In most instances,
there is implicit acceptance of human rights as constitutional stan-
dards; and although there is rarely any mention of specific theories of
incorporation, 359 it is clear that the Supreme Court most often utilizes
358. See supra note 320.
359. For exposition of the three primary methods of incorporation (i.e., direct, indirect, and
mirrored or equivalent incorporation), see, e.g., Paust, Effective Litigation, supra note 182, at
240-42, 244; Paust, International Law and Control of the Media: Terror, Repression and the
Alternatives, 53 IND. L.J. 621, 665-70 (1978) [hereinafter Paust, International Law]. For the use
of these or similar theories and methods of incorporation by other writers, see, e.g., K. BURKE, S.
COLIVER, C. DE LA VEGA & S. ROSENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: WHAT
IT IS AND How IT CAN BE USED IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 6-9, 15-17, 20-25, (Human
Rights Advocates, Inc., 1982); GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE (H.
Hannum ed., 1983); C. SCHREUER, DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS BEFORE Do-
MESTIC COURTS (1981); L. ERADES & W. GOULD, THE RELATION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW 226-52, 270-94, 307-42 (1961); INT'L LAW ASSOC. COMMITrEE ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON HUMAN RIOrTS LAW, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND METHODS
OF JUDICIAL INCORPORATION, PROCEEDINGS 56-65 (1984); Bilder, Integrating International
Human Rights Law into Domestic Law - U.S. Experience, 4 HoUs. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981); Burke,
Coliver, de la Vega & Rosenbaum, Application of International Human Rights Law in State and
Federal Courts, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 291 (1983); Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform
Due Process and Equal Protection Analyses, 52 U. CINN. L. REV. 3 (1983); Christenson, The Uses
of Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 39 (1981);
Claydon, International Human Rights Law and the Interpretation of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, 4 SuP. CT. L. REV. 287, 294-302 (1982); Claydon, The Application of
International Human Rights Law by Canadian Courts, 30 BUFF. L. REV. 727, 733 ff. (1982);
Cohen & Bayefsky, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Public International Law,
61 THE CAN. BAR REV. 265 (1983); Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment. The Domestic Effects of
International Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CINN. L. REV. 655
(1983) (using the phrases " 'strong' theory" for direct incorporation and "'weak' theory" for
indirect incorporation); Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A
CriticalAnalysis, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 627, 632-33, 689-90 (1986) (using direct and indirect "appli-
cation"); Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in Promoting International Human Rights Norms,
24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 153 (1978); Lillich, The Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the Interna-
tional Legal Order, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 9 (1970); Lockwood, The United Nations Charter and
United States Civil Rights Litigation : 1946-1955, .69 IOWA L. REV. 901 (1984); Louden, The
Domestic Application of International Human Rights Law: Evolving the Species, 5 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 161 (1981); Martineau, Interpreting the Constitution: The Use of Inter-
national Human Rights Norms, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 87 (1983); McDougal, The Impact of Interna-
tional Law Upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective, 4 S.D. L. REV. 265 (1959);
Randall, Federal Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm, 73 MINN L. REV. 349 (1988);
Reisman, Foreign Affairs and the Several States: Outline of a Theory for Decision, 71 PROC. AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. 182 (1977); Schachter, The Charter and the Constitution: The Human Rights
Provisions in American Law, 4 VAND. L. REV. 643 (1951); Schluter, The Domestic Status of the
Human Rights Clauses of the United Nations Charter, 61 CAL. L. REV. 110 (1973); Schneebaum,
The Enforceability of Customary Norms of Public International Law, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
289 (1982); Weiss, Quot Homines tot Sententiae or Universal Human Rights: A Propos McGov-
ern v. The Attorney-General, 46 MOD. L. REV. 385 (England 1983); Wright, National Courts and
Human Rights - The Fujii Case, 45 AM. J. INT'L. L. 62 (1951); Note, The Application of Inter-
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human right standards as juridic aids for interpretation of constitu-
tional or statutory norms. With such an extensive frequency of use,
there is simply no question whether human right standards can be or
are being applied by the Court - they are used freely and frequently
by justices with varied jurisprudential backgrounds.
These trends are also discernible in lower federal court opinions.
For example, use of the phrase "human right(s)" has appeared in over
ninety circuit court opinions since 193036o and, according to com-
puter-assisted research, in over one thousand lower federal court opin-
ions overall. 361 Approximately half of the circuit court opinions using
national Human Rights Arguments in United States Courts: Customary International Law Incor-
porated into American Domestic Law, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 207 (1982); On International
Human Rights Law in State Courts, 18 INT'L LAW. 59 (1984); see also R. FALK, THE ROLE OF
DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1964); Salzberg & Young, The
Parliamentary Role in Implementing International Human Rights: A U.S. Example, 12 TEX.
INT'L L. J. 251 (1977); Weissbrodt, Human Rights Legislation and US. Foreign Policy, 7 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 231 (1977).
Direct incorporation of human rights occurs directly by the judiciary and/or through a par-
ticular constitutional provision authorizing the incorporation of international law. See, e.g., U.S.
CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (recognizing judicial power over such matters); art. VI, cl. 2 (recogniz-
ing that treaties are part of supreme federal law). In this sense, both the incorporation of interna-
tional law (and any rights or duties thereunder) and judicial competence to identify, clarify and
apply international law are constitutionally based, although it does not necessarily follow that
rights so incorporated must thereby achieve a constitutional status in the face of conflicting fed-
eral legislation. With respect to indirect incorporation to aid in interpreting a constitutional
norm and mirrored or equivalent incorporation (e.g., through the ninth amendment), human
rights thus incorporated achieve a constitutional status and thereby prevail over an inconsistent
statute, whether or not they are treaty-based or customary at the international level; see also
Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship Between Congressional Power and International Law: Ex-
ceptions to the Last in Time Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 393 (1988)
[hereinafter Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship]; Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J.
INT'L L. 760 (1988).
360. Lexis has identified the use of the phrase "human right(s)" in more than 750 circuit
court cases from 1940; but only about a fourth of the cases are relevant, since some merely refer
to a human rights agency or commission, the title of an article, and so forth. Most of the ninety
cases are incorporated here in the study of trends toward a more explicit content. Two early
cases are identifiable on Westlaw: Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1942)("human
rights"); Shores v. United States, 80 F.2d 942, 952 (9th Cir. 1936) (Denman, J., dissenting)
("human rights"). For earlier lower federal court cases, see supra notes 188, 195, 196, 274, 288,
317, infra 361.
361. Lexis has identified use of the phrase in over 2,700 cases in the circuit and district
courts, but again these figures are suspect. See supra note 360. Very few of the district court
cases are integrated into the analysis of trends toward a more explicit content. Some recent cases
include: Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1193 n. 18 (D. Conn. 1980); Fernandez v. Wilkin-
son, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795-98 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkin-
son, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981); Tayyari v. New Mexico State Univ., 495 F. Supp.
1365, 1378-79 (D. N.M. 1980). Some of the older cases include: United States v. Weil, 46 F.
Supp. 323, 326 (E.D. Ark. 1942) ("The old inflexible rules of the common law should not and
cannot be adhered to where human rights and liberties are endangered, especially rights and
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States"); Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City
Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 758 (D. Conn. 1935) ("inherent" and "human rights" re: good
name and reputation); In re Sugano, 40 F.2d 961, 962 (S.D. Cal. 1930) ("human rights"); United
States ex rel. Murphy v. McCandless, 40 F.2d 643, 645 (E.D. Pa. 1930) ("human right"); Hanley
v. Moody, 39 F.2d 198, 200 (N.D. Tex. 1930) (both 5th & 14th amends. "recognize liberty and
property as coexistent human rights").
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the phrase "human right(s)" have been written in the last ten years;
and use of such a phrase has occurred in every circuit, although use
has been more frequent in the Second, Fifth and D.C. Circuits. A
similar though less extensive use of the phrase "rights of man" exists
in lower federal court opinions;362 but only five recent lower court
opinions are known to contain the phrase "rights of mankind, ' 363 and
only one recent lower court opinion is known to contain the phrase
"inalienable right of a human being. '
'364
Throughout our constitutional history a lower federal judge has
refused to entertain a human rights claim 365 only rarely. Thus, a judge
who refuses stands nearly alone in opposition to the expectations of
the Founders and to hundreds of federal judicial decisions utilizing
human right precepts. As in the Supreme Court, most lower courts
seem to use human rights law as an aid for interpreting relevant con-
stitutional or statutory provisions and, thus, clarifying and supple-
menting the content of such provisions. 366 Federal courts have used
human rights directly as the basis for a decision or as an alternative
basis for a decision less frequently, 367 although direct incorporation of
human rights law is constitutionally permissible.368 Additionally,
there have been increasing references to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in federal decisionmaking either as a guide for identifi-
cation and clarification of the human rights guaranteed by the United
362. Some recent cases include: United States v. Lamp, 606 F. Supp. 193, 203 (W.D. Tex.
1985); Myres v. Rask, 602 F. Supp. 210, 212 (D. Colo. 1985); Swope v. Lubbers, 560 F. Supp.
1328, 1335 (W.D. Mich. 1983); Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161, 1165 (M.D. Tenn. 1982);
Bradbury v. Wainwright, 538 F. Supp. 377, 378 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Wammack v. City of Bates-
vile, 522 F. Supp. 1006, 1008 (E.D. Ark. 1981); In re Dobric, 189 F. Supp. 638, 640 (D. Minn.
1960).
363. Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broadcasting & Cable Inc., 780 F.2d 340, 342 n.4 (3d Cir.
1986); McKnight v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 583 F.2d 1229, 1239 n.25 (3d Cir.
1978); Smith v. Fair, 363 F. Supp. 1021, 1023 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Young v. Wainwright, 320 F.
Supp. 80, 87 (S.D. Fla. 1970); Blocker v. Board of Education, 226 F. Supp. 208, 225 (E.D.N.Y.
1964).
364. Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 803 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
365. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 727 F.2d 774, 808-10, 813, 818-19 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring); id., 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981) (Green, J., opinion); In re
Alien Children Educ. Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 589-90, 593-96 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd on
other grounds Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982); Hitai v. I.N.S., 343 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1965); Camacho v. Rogers, 199 F. Supp. 155
(S.D.N.Y. 1961). Both Hitai and Camacho were decided before significant developments had
occurred at the international level which undermined the rationale behind the decisions. See
Paust, Effective Litigation, supra note 182, 235-39, and references cited therein.
366. For examples of such uses by indirect incorporation, see Paust, Effective Litigation,
supra note 182, at 240-42.
367. For examples, see id.
368. See, e.g., id. at 231-33, 236, 240; Paust, International Law, supra note 359, at 665-68;
Paust, Human Rights, supra note 4. See also Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 359. On
the judicial powers at stake, see also id. at 761-66, 771-73, 775-77.
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Nations Charter 369 or as a legally relevant set of standards for the de-
termination and application of constitutional rights.
370
2. Trends Toward More Explicit Content
In view of the trends in use of human right standards, it is fairly
clear that most of the Supreme Court justices throughout our constitu-
tional history have recognized that human rights can provide useful
content for the identification, clarification and supplementation of con-
stitutional or statutory norms. At the same time, human rights norms
may provide only a limited, general content, even a content articulated
merely at a high level of abstraction. It was this latter aspect of cer-
tain human rights norms that Justice Frankfurter once addressed, not
to deny their utility but, on the contrary, to affirm their import as
general standards:
In dealing.., with human rights, the absence of formal exactitude, or
want of fixity of meaning, is not an unusual or even regrettable attribute
of constitutional provisions. Words being symbols do not speak without
a gloss. On the one hand the gloss may be the deposit of history,
whereby a term gains technical content.... On the other hand, the gloss
369. See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 1(3), 55(c), 56. As primary treaty law, the U.N. Charter's
guarantees and obligations are also a part of supreme federal law within the meaning of art. III,
§ 2, cl. 1 and art. VI, cl.2 of the U.S. Constitution. Thus, these articles form the general constitu-
tional basis for both direct and indirect incorporation of human rights law that is also recognized
and guaranteed under the U.N. Charter. See also Paust, Effective Litigation, supra note 182, at
228, 230, 234-37, 244. Other constitutional bases for incorporation can, of course, involve use of
specific amendments or other sections of the Constitution. See supra note 366; U.S. CONST., art.
I, § 8, cls. 3 and 10; Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 359.
370. See e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 n. 14 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 n.13 (1965) (Warren, C.J., opinion); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Marti-
nez, 372 U.S. 144, 161 n. 16 (1963) (Goldberg, J., opinion); American Fed. of Labor v. American
Sash & Door, 335 U.S. 538, 549 n.5 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Rodriguez-Fernandez
v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981) (Logan, J., opinion), aff'g Fernandez v.
Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795-98 (D. Kan. 1980) (Rogers, J., opinion); Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1980) (Kaufman, J., opinion); Lareau v. Manson, 507 F.
Supp. 1177, 1193 n.18 (D. Conn. 1980); Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (Wald, J., opinion); Nguyen da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1201 n.13 (9th Cir. 1975)
(Koetrbh, J., opinion); Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123, 131 n.21 (1981); City of
Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal.3d 123, 130 n.2 (1980) (Newman, J., opinion); Cramer v.
Tyars, 23 Cal.3d 131, 151 n.1 (1979) (Newmann, J., concurring).
This is not at all surprising, however, since the Universal Declaration is the primary docu-
ment at the international level providing a more detailed specification of human rights content.
See supra note 182. As the Executive branch aptly noted in its landmark brief in Filartiga, "the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ... goes beyond the U.N. Charter in specifying and
defining the fundamental rights to which all individuals are entitled." Memorandum for the
United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) at 9, re-
printed in 19 I.L.M. 585, 592 (May 1980). The Second Circuit noted as well that a relevant
"prohibition has become part of customary international law, as evidenced and defined by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights," adding that "the Charter precepts embodied in this
Declaration 'constitute basic principles of international law,'" and that such a declaration is
"significant because [it] . . . speciflies] with great precision the obligations of member nations
under the Charter." Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 882-83.
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of some of the verbal symbols of the constitution does not give them a
fixed technical content. It exacts a continuing process of application.
371
Earlier, Justice Frankfurter had noted that "basic rights do not
become petrified as of any one time" and that "due process is not con-
fined within a permanent catalogue. ' 372 Yet, he continued:
[t]he knock at the door.., as a prelude to a search, without authority of
law but solely on the authority of the police, did not need the commen-
tary of recent history to be condemned as inconsistent with the concep-
tion of human rights enshrined in the history and basic constitutional
documents of English-speaking peoples.
373
Later, while making a similar jurisprudential point, Justice Brennan
affirmed in Furman v. Georgia that "the Framers did not envision...
[a] narrow.., role for this basic guaranty of human rights," the eighth
amendment.3 74 In the same case Justice Marshall noted Patrick
Henry's concern that an enumerated bill of rights not be read nar-
rowly to deprive persons of their "human rights, ' 375 a view shared
also by other federal judges.
3 76
Strangely, Justice Frankfurter also remarked that it " 'is very
queer to try to protect human rights in the middle of the Twentieth
Century by a left-over from the days of General Grant,' ",377 and he
declared:
We cannot expect to create an effective means of protection for human
liberties by torturing an 1871 statute to meet the problems of 1960.378
Yet, Frankfurter's point was not that the 1871 Civil Rights Act could
not properly absorb "the expanding reach of its purpose to the extent
that the words with which that purpose is conveyed fairly bear such
371. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. at 169 (Frankfurter, J., opinion).
372. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 27 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For similar points, see
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. at 212 ("the advancing conception of human rights"); Morales v.
Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335, 1338 (7th Cir. 1973) ("Our enlightened concern for individual human
rights as it has penetrated the prison compounds has taken us a long way from the judicial
attitudes of the past"), quoting Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 785 (D.R.I. 1970);
Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483, 485 (D.D.C. 1960) ("Basic human rights do not depend on
nomenclature," e.g., whether action is civil or criminal).
373. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 28. These words were quoted in Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. at 436, n. I (Fortas, J., concurring).
374. 408 U.S. at 268.
375. See id., at 320.
376. See Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697, 703 (3d Cir. 1949) ("field of human rights covered by
the privileges and immunities clause is indeed a broad one"); Thomas v. Hunter, 153 F.2d 834,
839 (10th Cir. 1946) ("too narrow a definition when the question under consideration is the
violation of human rights and liberty guaranteed by the Constitution"), quoted in United States
v. Smith, 411 F.2d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 1969).
377. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 244 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), quoting Chaffee, Safe-
guarding Fundamental Human Rights The Tasks of States and Nation, 27 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
519, 529 (1959).
378. Id. at 244.
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expansion," but that "admissible expansion of meaning through the
judicial process does not entirely unbind the courts. '379
More recently, a number of other justices have recognized that the
1871 Civil Rights Act "'is remedial and in aid of the preservation of
human liberty and human rights'" and that "'[a]ll statutes and con-
stitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are [to be] liberally and
beneficially construed.' ",380 The 1964 Civil Rights Act seems to have
had a similar human rights purpose,381 although the Court has thus
far only expressly recognized the purpose of the 1964 Act to serve
related precepts of human dignity.382 Other federal legislation has
been enacted to serve human rights,38 3 including, as recognized by sev-
eral members of the Court, the 1978 Domestic Volunteer Service Act
which seeks to assure "the protection of the ... human rights of per-
sons with developmental disabilities."3 84
379. See id.
380. See Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. at 348 (Marshall); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at 109-10
n.8 (Blackmun); Gomez v Toledo, 446 U.S. at 639 (Marshall); Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. at 636 (Brennan); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440
U.S. at 400 (Stevens); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. at 357 (Brennan); Monell v. Dep't of Social
Serv., 436 U.S. at 684 (Brennan); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Savings, 584 F.2d 1235, 1248,
1254, 1261 (3d Cir. 1978); Thompson v. New York, 487 F. Supp. 212, 213 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) -
all cases quoting Representative Shellabarger's speech during passage of the 1871 Act which was
the precursor to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Shellabarger adding: "the largest latitude consistent with the
words employed is uniformly given in such statutes. .. "
381. During hearings on an alternative draft of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Senate Com-
mittee seemed intent on implementing human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter through the
legislative proposal. See Hearings on S. Res. 1732 Before the Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 282, 307 (1963) (statement of Senator Prouty and Secretary of State Rusk); see also
Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Savings, 584 F.2d 1235, 1261 (3d Cir. 1978) (recognizing relation-
ship between "human rights" and purposes of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
382. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. at 291.
383. E.g., the 1980 Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 etseq, (1980). See S. REP. No. 96-256, at 1,
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1980, at 141 ("It gives statutory meaning to our national
commitment to human rights"), quoted in Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 989 (1 1th Cir. 1984)
(Kravitch, J., dissenting); Duran v. I.N.S., slip op. (No. 82-7193) (9th Cir. 1984); Stevic v. Sava,
678 F.2d 401, 408 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Zavala-Bonilla v. I.N.S., 730 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir.
1984). And the 1970 Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. See American
Fed. of Labor v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1979), quoting H.R. REP. No. 91-1291,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1970): "Even the price of one life is too expensive when a meaningful
occupational safety and health law could save many lives.... The well-being of every American
working man and woman is an essential human right which we can no longer deny." And 26
U.S.C. § 170(3)(vii)(1983) (tax deductible contributions to organization providing legal services
to the poor "and defense of human and civil rights"). See NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund
v. Devine, slip op. (D.C. Cir. 1984) (No. 83-1822); see also the Export Administration Act, 22
U.S.C. § 2304; the International Development and Food Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 215 In; see
also United Const. Workers v. Laburnum Const. Corp., 347 U.S. at 670 (the Wagner Act);
N.L.R.B. v. Sterling Elec. Motors, 112 F.2d 63, 65 (9th Cir. 1940) ("laborers' human right to
regulate their creative effort" was reason "that Congress created the" N.L.R.B.). For further
exposition and pertinent legislation, see also Hannum, supra note 359; U.S. LEGISLATION RE-
LATING HUMAN RIGHTS TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (Human Rights Law Group, 3d. 1982);
Weissbrodt, supra note 359.
384. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 12, 20, 26 (Rehn-
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In terms of incorporation theory it is important that legislation has
a human rights purpose, since such forms of enactment can recogniza-
bly provide the needed implementing legislation for so-called non-self-
executing treaties.3 85 In any event, it is certainly appropriate for a
court to seek to serve a stated legislative purpose; and when that pur-
pose includes the preservation, protection and/or promotion of human
rights, it is both rational and proper to look to human rights law in aid
of interpretation and application of the legislation. Thus, whether or
not international law is directly incorporable in a particular case, it
can provide useful criteria and content for judicial discovery and use
in aid of interpretation of relevant constitutional, statutory or other
legal provisions, including the common law.3 86 This is especially so
when documented human rights are sufficiently particularized to aid
in the setting of boundaries to shared meaning or to give a richer,
more detailed content.
As recognized in previous sections, the original amendments to the
U.S. Constitution and the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments all had a
human rights purpose. Indeed, as noted, the desire of each faction to
assure an adequate and effective guarantee of human rights was the
basis for the adoption of the Bill of Rights which included the ninth
amendment. It is not unusual, then, to find members of the Court
aptly affirming that "our Founding Fathers conceived a Constitution
and Bill of Rights replete with provisions indicating their determina-
tion to protect human rights. 38a 7 Nor is it unusual to find judges stat-
ing that "judicial self-restraint which defers too much to ... powers of
the states ... will not serve to enhance Madison's priceless gift of 'the
great rights of mankind secured under this Constitution,' for these se-
cure the only climate in which the law of freedom can exist." 388 As
the Court noted in 1876:
The rights of life and personal liberty are natural rights of man. "To
quist), 33 (Blackmun), 36 n.4, 40 (White), all quoting from 42 U.S.C. § 6000(b)(l),
§ 6063(b)(5)(C), the earlier § 6063(b)(24), or S. REP. No. 94-160, at 34 (1975).
385. On non-self-executing treaties see Paust, Effective Litigation, supra note 182, at 238-40,
244, and references cited therein; supra note 359. A statute's human rights purpose might also
provide the basis for a claim that a private right of action can be implied from the statute. See
generally Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); see also Randall, supra note 359; see also Note, Limit-
ing the Scope of Federal Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Statute, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 941, 948
(1984) (not exploring the point made here); Chumney v. Nixon, 615 F.2d 389, 391, 394-395 (6th
Cir. 1980) (civil cause of action implied from domestic criminal statute because of "overall con-
gressional purpose").
386. See United States v. Weil, 46 F. Supp. at 326 ("The old inflexible rules of the common
law should not and cannot be adhered to where human rights and liberties are endangered.").
387. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. at 20 (Douglas quoting Warren).
388. See Blocker v. Board of Education, 226 F. Supp. 208, 225 (E.D.N.Y. 1964), quoting W.
Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States, in THE GREAT RIGHTs 86 (Cahn ed. 1963).
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secure these rights," says the Declaration of Independence, "govern-
ments are instituted among men . . ." The very highest duty of the
States, when they entered the Union under the Constitution, was to pro-
tect all persons within their boundaries in the enjoyment of these
"unalienable rights with which they were endowed by their Creator. '389
Other justices have made specific recognitions concerning the pur-
pose of various amendments to guarantee human rights, 390 and federal
judges have even declared that it is "the whole philosophy of human
rights which makes the Constitution the great living document that it
is. ' ' 391 In affirming these sorts of recognitions, however, one justice
has also noted that "the Congress that enacted the Fourteenth
Amendment was particularly conscious that the 'civil' rights of man
should be distinguished from his 'social' rights," and that, regrettably,
one has a right to be a racist bigot and "close his home or club to any
person .... ,"392 Federal judges have also noted that judicial entertain-
ment of "exotic concepts" of deprivation might lead to a "trivializa-
tion" of the Constitution, adding: "If this should occur, some of the
monumental accomplishments in defining fundamental human rights
389. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553; see also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.
at 144 ("natural to give the shelter of the Constitution to those basic human rights for the vindi-
cation of which" Civil War was fought and "extension of federal authority so as to guard against
evasion by any State... was an obvious corollary"); Board of Comm'rs v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 90
F. at 226 (state legislative power is restrained by the inalienable rights of man).
390. Eg., Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. at 56 (6th amend.); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
at 268, 320-31 (8th amend.); United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. at 755 (5th, 6th amends.); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 343 (6th amend.); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. at 243 n.2 (4th
amend.); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. at 216 (5th, 6th amends.); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
at 28 (4th amend.); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. at 577 (14th amend.); Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. at 121-22 (original and 14th amends.); United Pub. Workers of Am. v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 95 (1st, 5th, 9th, 10th amends.); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 26 (5th
amend.); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. at 136, 144 (13th, 14th, 15th amends.); Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. at 69 (6th amend.); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 462 (6th amend.);
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. at 17 (14th amend.); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 67 (13th,
14th, 15th amends.); S.E.C. v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892, 908 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Brieant, J., dissenting)
(1st amend.); Minor v. United States, 375 F.2d 170, 175 n.1 (8th Cir. 1967) (6th amend.); United
States v. Johnston, 318 F.2d 228, 291 (6th Cir. 1963) ("first eight amendments and the Four-
teenth"); Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697, 703 (3d Cir. 1949) (re: art. IV, § 2, "field of human
rights covered by the privileges and immunities clause is indeed a broad one"; on this point, see
also Hamilton, supra note 158, at 174 (privileges and immunities in 14th amend. are "the natural
rights of man"); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 591 (1900) (Peckham, J., opinion) (privileges
and immunities include "all rights secured to our citizens by treaties"); McPherson v. Blacker,
146 U.S. 1, 38 (1892) (Fuller, C.J.) ("The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States are those which arise out of... treaties .... )); In re Parrott, 1 F. at 504-21 (privileges and
immunities given to aliens under treaty, supremacy clause, and 14th amend.); Baker v. City of
Portland, 2 F. Cas. at 473-75 (same); In re Dobric, 189 F. Supp. 638, 640 (D. Minn. 1960) (our
great American Charter, declaratory of the rights of man); Hanley v. Moody, 39 F.2d at 200 (5th
& 14th amends.); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755 ("incompatible with the
fundamental human rights protected by our Constitution") (Marshall, J., dissenting); Fisher v.
HEW, 522 F.2d 493, 496 (7th Cir. 1975) (argument re: 5th, 13th, 14th amends.).
391. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 26 (Murphy); Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 963
n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
392. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. at 313 (Goldberg).
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and liberties may be compromised. ' 393
At the same time, however, those fundamental rights must ever be
protected by the judiciary. As Justice Marshall noted in Bakke, "[t]he
denial of human rights was etched into the American Colonies' first
attempts at establishing self-government. 3 94 And in Milligan an ear-
lier Court affirmed that "the President . . . is controlled by law,"'3 95
adding, "[b]y the protection of the law human rights are secured;
withdraw that protection, and they are at the mercy of wicked rul-
ers .... "396 Recognizing a similar danger, the Court noted in 1946:
"From time immemorial despots have used real or imagined threats to
the public welfare as an excuse for needlessly abrogating human
rights." 3
97
From these statements and the historic trends noted above, it is
evident that concerns for human rights, democratic government, and
the relatively free participation of individuals in political processes
have been interrelated. Thus, one can find the Court seeking to protect
human rights and democratic values while recognizing that "each and
every citizen has an unalienable right to full and effective participation
in the political processes. ' 398 It is equally common to find the Court
affirming that "the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free
and democratic society" and that such a matter "'touches a sensitive
and important area of human rights,' and 'involves one of the basic
civil rights of man.'-399 Not surprisingly, one finds such language
393. See Campbell v. Beaughler, 519 F.2d 1307, 1309 n.2 (9th Cir. 1975), quoting Zeller v.
Donegal School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600, 607 (3d Cir. 1975).
394. 438 U.S. at 388; see also Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. at 124 (Cuban people are "entitled to
enjoy ... that 'measure of self-control which is the inalienable right of man .... '").
395. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121; see also Paust, Is the President Bound by the Supreme
Law of the Land? - Foreign Affairs and National Security Reexamined, 9 HAsT. CONST. L. Q.
719 (1982) [hereinafter Paust, Is the President Bound]; The President Is Bound By International
Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 377 (1987).
396. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 119; see also In re Sugano, 40 F.2d at 962 ("It is only by
strict observance of lawful authority by governmental officers that human rights can be safe-
guarded against arbitrary and oppressive authority"); Ex parte Kozlowski, 277 F. at 88; Hopkins
v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 F. at 928 ("not enough that the rights of man be printed ... they must be
constantly and carefully guarded from invasion and encroachment from any quarter").
397. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. at 330; see also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. at 20 ("no
call for a garrison state"); United States v. Ballard, 12 F. Supp. at 325 ("The fountain head of
dictatorship is at the convergence of legislative and executive power .... Whenever the legisla-
tive and executive coalesce, the rights of man dwindle in exact ratio to their adhesiveness."). On
the points mentioned, see also Paust, International Law, supra note 359.
398. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 565, quoted in Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d
201, 216 n.18 (8th Cir. 1982); see also Taylor and Marshall v. Beckham, 178 U.S. at 599 (inalien-
able right to hold an office).
399. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 561-62, quoting in part Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. at
536, 541; see also Benner v. Oswald, 592 F.2d 174, 182 (3d Cir. 1979); Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 432 F.2d 1307, 1315 (6th Cir. 1970) (Celebreeze, J., dissenting). On the
points mentioned see also Paust, Human Right to Revolution, supra note 4, at 550-55, 560-67,
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reproduced in circuit court opinions with the recognition that "[t]he
Supreme Court has made it clear in a series of cases that the right of
effective participation in the political process 'is of the essence of a
democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the
heart of representative government.' "4mo
Similarly, federal courts have recognized that "democratic govern-
ment... [is] government premised upon individual human rights,"4 1
that under human rights law the "will of the people is the basis of
authority" of governments, 40 2 and that law and liberty are "intimately
linked" such that without "enforcement of the law ... there could be
no human rights. ' '1 °3 Thus, the web of interconnection grows with
expanding conceptual strands of liberty, law, individual rights of equal
participation, authority, and concepts of democratic government -
the very notions, among others, that the Founders associated with
democratic values and human rights.
Obviously first amendment interests concerning freedom of speech
and association can be interrelated with the right to participate in
political processes. Justice Douglas noted in Scales that the censorial
power is properly in the people over the government and not in the
government over the people, and that Jefferson had aptly noted the
danger to the "rights of man" posed by a creeping governmental in-
cursion into areas previously left free from governmental regulation
because of free speech and liberty interests at stake.4°4 The notion that
"free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable
rights of man" has also found attention in the federal courts,4° 5 and in
the Supreme Court it has been noted that a state cannot stop a "person
from making a speech about the rights of man.'' 4 6 More recently, in
the Second Circuit, it was also noted that the first amendment had a
human rights purpose: "Licensing of the press was abandoned in Eng-
580, and references cited therein; and Paust, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 241-44, 248-50, 252,
260-62, 266.
400. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, supra note 399, at 1315 (Celebreeze, J., dissent-
ing), quoting D.C. Fed'n of Civil Assocs. v. Volpe, 434 F.2d 436, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
401. See Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
402. See United States v. Vargas, 307 F. Supp. 908, 919 (D. P.R.), quoting art. 21(3) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On this point, see references cited supra notes 170, 399;
see also supra note 394.
403. See Lesley v. Oklahoma, 407 F.2d 543, 549 (10th Cir. 1969) (Jones, J., concurring); see
also supra note 395.
404. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. at 272.
405. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 318 U.S. at 127, 139 ("right of men"); Novosel v. Na-
tionwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 899 n.6 (3d Cir. 1983); Wammack v. City of Batesville, 522 F.
Supp. 1006, 1008 (E.D. Ark. 1981).
406. Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. at 231, quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. at 544.
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land in 1694, but the memories of this imposition upon the natural
rights of man lingered sufficiently to lead to the enactment of the First
Amendment almost a century later."
'4°7
Federal courts have also recognized that an arrested person has a
"human right to talk" to his mother4 08 and that human rights to free-
dom of association are also at stake in the work environment in con-
nection with labor union activities4" 9 or, more generally, out on the
streets.41° The human right to freedom of religion 4l ' and the related
need for a separation of church and state in order to assure the reli-
gious "rights of man" or "mankind" 412 have also received the atten-
tion of federal courts; and yet the Supreme Court has also recognized
that the Founders believed that the rights of man are rooted in God
and that we have been a religious people.
41 3
Another set of interests associated with human rights has involved
freedom of movement, 414 the right to travel, 415 emigration,416 and im-
migration. 417 There has often been a reference in such cases also to
407. S.E.C. v. Lowe, 725 F. 2d 892, 908 (2d Cir. 1984) (Brieant, J., dissenting). For other
recognitions of the human rights purpose of the first amendment, see Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 121-122; United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95; United States v.
Johnston, 318 F. 2d 288, 291.
408. See Fuller v. United States, 407 F.2d 1199, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
409. See American Fed'n of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. at 549; Sheldon
v. O'Callaghan, 497 F.2d 1276, 1281 (2d Cir. 1974); Squillacote v. Local 248, Meat & Allied
Food Workers, 534 F.2d 735, 738 (7th Cir. 1976); N.L.R.B. v. Sterling Elec. Motors, 112 F.2d at
65; Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 F. at 929; see also Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. v. Gee, 139 F. at
584 ("rights of man" in such context "not to be measured by braggarts or bullies, or vulgarity, or
profanity").
410. See Wilson v. Eureka City, 173 U.S. at 36 ("right of persons to assemble and parade was
a well-established and inherent right, which could be regulated but not prohibited").
411. See Kedroof v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. at 109 n.13; Illinois ex rel. McCollum
v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. at 246 n. 11. As early as 1758, Vattel had written that "liberty of
conscience is a natural and inviolable right." I E. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS ch. 12, § 128
(1758), reprinted in E. VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 56 (J. Chitty ed. 1856).
412. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. at 503 n.14; McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. at 623 n.4; Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. at 35 n.15.
413. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578; School Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 213; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 448.
414. See New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. at 15-16; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. at 182;
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. at 293 n. 10 ("natural rights of free men"), 313; see also Rodriguez-
Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d at 1388 (excluded alien's freedom from arbitrary detention).
415. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. at 769-70; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. at 14; Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. at 110.
416. See In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. at 907; Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1120 ("Emigration
is, undoubtedly, one of the natural rights of man"); see also supra cases cited in notes 218, 275,
279, 295.
417. See Ng Kam Fook v. Esperdy, 375 U.S. at 956; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. at 161 n.16; see also United States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1978) (careless
actions of immigration officials in another case "implicated a human right"); Nguyen da Yen v.
Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975) (removal of child from Vietnam counterposed
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the relationship between such human rights and liberty. 418 More gen-
erally, the courts have recognized that the rights to life419 and personal
liberty 420 are basic human rights. Interestingly, the courts have also
declared that the right to counsel granted in the sixth amendment "is
one of the safeguards deemed necessary to insure fundamental human
rights of life and liberty,"'42' while courts have also recognized that the
right to counsel is itself a basic human right.422 Similarly, federal
with child's human rights to liberty and due process); In re Sugano, 40 F.2d at 962; United States
ex rel. Murphy v. McCandless, 40 F.2d at 645; Go Lun v. Nagle, 22 F.2d at 248; Charley Hee v.
United States, 19 F.2d at 341; Johnson v. Damon ex rel. Leung Fook Yung, 16 F.2d at 66;
Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F. at 69.
418. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. at 770; Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. at 293 n.10, 313;
New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. at 16; Nguyen da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d at 1201.
419. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. at 136; Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. at 69;
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 462; Arizona Employer's Liab. Cases, 250 U.S. at 424 (state may
prohibit self-maiming and attempts at suicide); New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. at 207
(same); Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 238 U.S. at 201; Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S.
at 531; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. at 107; Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S.
at 203; Miller v. Cornwall R.R., 168 U.S. at 134; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. at 584-85, 589;
Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. at 160; Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. at 287; Budd v.
New York, 143 U.S. at 550; Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. at 467; Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 48-49; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553; Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. at 127; Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007, 1017 (8th Cir. 1976); Minor v. United
States, 375 F.2d at 175 n.1; Tinkle v. United States, 254 F.2d 23, 28 (8th Cir. 1958); Kraft v.
United States, 238 F.2d 794, 799 (8th Cir. 1956); In re Marshall, 102 F. at 324; United States v.
Eberhart, 127 F. at 256; Mills v. Green, 67 F. at 829; United States v. Patrick, 54 F. at 351;
United States v. Sanges, 48 F. at 86; Tuchman v. Welch, 42 F. at 557; In re Tie Loy, 26 F. at 614;
In re Parrott, I F. at 506; Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 803 (W.D. Mich.
1974); see also infra note 444.
420. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at 483; Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. at 101; Draper
v. United States, 358 U.S. at 321; Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. at 69; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. at 462; Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 238 U.S. at 201; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. at
17; Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. at 531; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183
U.S. at 107; Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. at 203; Miller v. Cornwall R.R., 168 U.S. at 134;
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. at 584-85, 589-90; Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. at
160; Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. at 287; Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. at 550; Church of the
Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. at 467; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 48-49; United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553; Helms v. Hewitt, 655 F.2d 487, 494 (3d Cir. 1981); Mattis
v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1017; United States v. Majourau, 474 F.2d 766, 770 (9th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Ramey, 464 F.2d 1240, 1242 (5th Cir. 1972); Reed v. United States, 401 F.2d 756, 760
(8th Cir. 1968); Minor v. United States, 375 F.2d 170 at 175 n.1; Ortiz v. United States, 317 F.2d
277, 279 (5th Cir. 1963); Tinkle v. United States, 254 F.2d at 28; Kraft v. United States, 238 F.2d
at 799; United States v. Eberhart, 127 F. at 256; United States v. Patrick, 54 F. at 351; United
States v. Sanges, 48 F. at 86; see also United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. at 755 ("freedom" is a
"basic human right"); United States v. Smith, 411 F.2d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 1969); Lesley v.
Oklahoma, 407 F.2d 543, 549 (10th Cir. 1969); Thomas v. Hunter, 153 F.2d 834, 839 (10th Cir.
1946); see also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. at 540 (liberty of contract as natural right);
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. at 28 (liberty of contract as inalienable right); Patterson v. Bark
Eudora, 190 U.S. at 174 (same); Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. at 165 (same); Jones v. Great
S. Fireproof Hotel Co., 86 F. at 375 (liberty of contract as inalienable right of man).
421. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 462, quoted in Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. at 70;
Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. at 56; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 343; Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. at 69; Minor v. United States, 375 F.2d at 175 n.1; Tinkle v. United States, 254
F.2d at 28; Kraft v. United States, 238 F.2d at 799.
422. See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. at 678; Lane v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 477
F.2d 847, 850 (5th Cir. 1973).
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courts have declared in connection with the fourth amendment that
"arrest on mere suspicion collides violently with the basic human right
of liberty, '423 but have also recognized the relation between human
rights, privacy and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures
independent of liberty per se.
424
Liberty interests have also been prominent in federal cases recog-
nizing human rights with respect to the family relationship or rights to
a family. More specifically, human rights have been related to "the
liberty interest in family privacy, '425 "the importance of the fam-
ily," 426 "freedom to marry, '427 "rights to conceive and raise one's
children," 428 "the right to procreate, ' 429 freedom from compulsory
sterilization and "the right to have offspring. ' 430 Additional mention
has been made of the interrelated right of unmarried persons to have
contraceptives, 431 and the relationship between human right precepts
and "maternity leave,"'432 "the responsibility of parenthood, '433 "the
elemental human right of physical contact with one's family and
423. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. at 101; Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. at 321;
Ortiz v. United States, 317 U.S. at 279; United States v. Majourau, 474 F.2d at 770; United
States v. Ramey, 464 F.2d at 1242; Hee v. United States, 19 F.2d at 341; see also Forti v. Suarez-
Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (prolonged arbitrary detention violates human
rights), modified 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988); infra notes 444, 448, 506.
424. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 436 n.1; Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. at 243
n.2; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 27-28; Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. at 193; United States
v. de Hernandez, 731 F.2d 1369, 1372 (9th Cir. 1984); id. at 1375 (Jameson, Dist. Judge, dissent-
ing); see also Kawanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. at 483 (fundamental human right to
privacy threatened when industrial espionage is condoned).
425. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. at 846;
Duchesne v. Sugarman, 546 F.2d 817, 824-25 (2d Cir. 1977).
426. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. at 461; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 651; Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 648 F.2d 135, 164 n.ll, 168 n.18 (3d Cir. 1981);
Duchesne v. Sugarman, 546 F.2d at 825.
427. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S.Ct. at 3267; Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. at 383, 398; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. at 12; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
at 541; Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1336 (10th Cir. 1981); Drummond v. Fulton County
Dep't. of Family and Children's Servs., 547 F.2d 835, 851 (5th Cir. 1977); Bradbury v. Wain-
wright, 538 F. Supp. 377, 378 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
428. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 771; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 651; Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 502; Logan v. Hollier, 711 F.2d 690, 691 (5th Cir. 1983); Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 648 F.2d at 164 n. 11; Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d
533, 537 (10th Cir. 1979); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 546 F.2d at 825.
429. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S.Ct. at 3267; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
at 472 n.7; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. at 541; Andrade v. City of Phoenix, 692 F.2d 557, 564
(9th Cir. 1982) (Wallace, J., concurring); Bradbury v. Wainwright, 538 F. Supp. at 378.
430. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. at 536, 541; Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898, 902 (3d
Cir. 1982); Dike v. School Bd. of Orange County Florida, 650 F.2d 783, 786 n. I (5th Cir. 1981).
431. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 452, quoting Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398, 1402
(1st Cir. 1970).
432. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 640; Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., Inc.,
550 F.2d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 1977).
433. In re Dobric, 189 F. Supp at 640.
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friends, '434 "the children's right to remain with and be raised by their
natural parents, '435 "rights of fatherhood, ' 436 "the liberty ... to di-
rect the upbringing and education of children, '437 and liberty rights
concerning the natural or adoptive family which do not pertain to "the
foster relationship.
'438
Human rights were also mentioned by Justice Marshall when con-
sidering equal protection interests of poor families and the question
"whether there is a 'right' to welfare assistance. '439 Privacy interests
near or outside the family context have also been addressed by the
members of the Court in terms of human rights;440 and so have the
rights to property, 44 to a "portion of the soil,' ' 44 2 and "to pursue any
lawful business or vocation, in any manner not inconsistent with the
equal rights of others." 4 4 3 To the list of concerns associated with
434. Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 548 n.57 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
435. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Sers. Agency, 648 F.2d at 164.
436. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. at 461.
437. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 502.
438. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't. of Family and Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200,
1207 (5th Cir. 1977).
439. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 521 n.14, citing the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, art. 25 (right of all persons "to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing," and so forth); see also
United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. at 391 (argument of
counsel) (unalienable "right to buy food, fuel, or other harmless necessaries of life"); T. SMITH,
supra note 171, at 56 (inherent right to life is "the gift of God" and "includes a right to the means
necessary to support it. Thus every individual is entitled to a sufficient portion of the fruits of the
earth to preserve life, and no class of persons are entitled to acquire or possess all to the entire
exclusion of others. Upon this principle the indigent are supposed to be entitled to a support
from the more opulent portion of the community. So also, every individual is entitled to be
protected in the preservation of his health, and from such practices as may prejudice it."). On
the present problems concerning adequate enjoyment of this right by all persons in the U.S., see,
e.g., Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry Into
Criteria and Content, 27 How. L.J. 145, 187-89 (1983), and references cited therein [hereinafter
Paust, Human Dignity].
440. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. at 313 (privacy and private association); Kawanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. at 487 (fundamental human right to privacy threatened when
industrial espionage is condoned).
441. See Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 238 U.S. at 201; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. at
17; Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. at 531; Northern Sec. v. United States, 193 U.S. at
361; Miller v. Cornwall R.R. Co., 168 U.S. at 134; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. at 584-85;
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. at 294; Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S.
at 324; Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. at 90; Ralston v. Turpin, 129 U.S. at 675; Ogden v.
Saunders, 25 U.S. at 346; Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 310 ("the right of
acquiring and possessing property, and having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and
unalienable rights of man"); Midwest Video Corp. v. F.C.C., 571 F.2d 1025, 1057-58 (8th Cir.
1978) ("human right to own property is a most fundamental right"); Hanley v. Moody, 39 F.2d
at 200; see also supra text accompanying notes 220-224.
442. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. at 559, 579 (natural "right of every section of the human
race to a reasonable portion of the soil"). Marshall's statement in Worcester (id. at 559) was
quoted in Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. at 383. Regarding this right, see also supra note 439.
443. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. at 203; Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. at 662; Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. at 692, 694; Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. at 757
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human right precepts one can add judicial attention to the human
rights of prisoners, 4 "4 the involuntarily committed, 445 juvenile detain-
ees denied bail,446 those persons who have been subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment, 447 and those punished without benefit of a judi-
cial trial in the United States.448 One federal judge even declared that
"admiralty recognizes the human rights that are involved" in apprais-
ing claims of seamen." 9
Perhaps more recognizable have been judicial concerns for human
rights in connection with general race discrimination,450 school deseg-
regation issues,451 equal protection of indigents, 452 and the rights of
(such right tied to "inalienable... right of men to pursue their happiness"); Cummings v. Mis-
souri, 71 U.S. at 321; Humes v. City of Little Rock, 138 F. at 932; In re Grice, 79 F. 627, 640
(N.D. Tex. 1897), misquoting Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N.Y. 509, 515 (1878); Portland Bank v.
Apthrop, 12 Mass. 252, 256 (1815); see also Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. at 274 (argument of
counsel: "natural right to labor"); In re Parrott, 1 F. at 498 (Hoffman, J.) ("inviolable" right "to
labor for a living"); id. at 506 ("The right to labor is, of all others, after the right to live, the
fundamental, inalienable right of man .. .inalienable right"), 507 (an "absolute, fundamental
and natural right ... guaranteed under the treaty").
444. See Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454; Watts v. Hadden,
651 F.2d 1354, 1384 (10th Cir. 1981); Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335, 1338 (7th Cir. 1973);
Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187, 1193 (D. Conn. 1980); United States v. Weil, 46 F.
Supp. at 326; see also Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d at 1388; Fernandez v. Wil-
kinson, 505 F. Supp. at 795-98; supra note 423.
445. See Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 870 (3d Cir. 1981); Walters v. McKinnis, 221 F. at
750.
446. See Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483, 485 (D.D.C. 1960).
447. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. at 2696 n.34; Woods v. Florida, 107 S.Ct. at
447; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 268, 320. For further exposition, see Hartman, supra note
359; Paust, Constitutional Prohibitions of Cruel, Inhumane or Unnecessary Death, Injury or Suf-
fering During Law Enforcement Process, 2 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 873 (1975). See also Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 882-85, 890 (torture); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. at 1541 (tor-
ture); 18 Op. Att'y Gen. 219, 220 (1885) ("justice" can be administered abroad by consular court
against private acts involving "cruel and inhuman tortures" as arbitrary punishment, "without
any legal proceedings," for theft).
448. See Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. at 629 (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 prohibits bill of attainder
which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial); see also Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. at 443
("inherent right of defence"); De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1397
(5th Cir. 1985); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. at 1542 (summary execution prohibited); id.
694 F. Supp. 707, 710-11 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (disappearance after abduction). For a related prob-
lem, see Paust, The Unconstitutional Detention of Prisoners by the United States Under the Ex-
change of Prisoner Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 204 (R. Lillich ed.
1981).
449. Lipari v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 493 F.2d 207, 215 (3d Cir. 1974). On this point, see
also Paust, More Revelations About Mayaguez (and its Secret Cargo), 4 BOSTON C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 61, 66-67 (1981).
450. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. at 12; Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 279
U.S. at 279; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. at 577; Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697, 703
(3d Cir. 1949) (race discrimination re: private pool where police used to exclude persons from
use violates privileges and immunities clause).
451. See Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1972); Taylor v. Board of Educ.,
191 F. Supp. 181, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
452. See Lane v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 477 F.2d 847, 850 (5th Cir. 1973)
(equal protection denied by "government-sanctioned inequality between indigents and non-indi-
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women.453 There has also been attention to the human right to be free
from discrimination on the basis of national origin, but not always
successfully.454 "[F]reedom from a maimed body" has also been rec-
ognized as an "inalienable right of a human being, ' 455 and the right to
a reputation has been mentioned as an "inherent and indefeasible"
right.456 Predictably, one of the categories of right receiving the most
attention has been the due process requirement found in the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. 4
57
Of further interest are cases addressing unlawful activities which
involve recognized violations of human rights of the victims of such
activities. 458 Another interesting set of cases implicitly recognizes pri-
vate rights to money damages for human right deprivations but affirms
gents in the granting or withholding of human rights"); see also United States v. Weil, 46 F.
Supp. at 326; supra note 439.
453. See Mulqueeny v. National Comm'n. on the Observance of Int'l Women's Year, 549
F.2d 1115, 1117 (7th Cir. 1977); see also Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. at 414 (argument of coun-
sel). For further exposition, see, e.g., Guggenheim, The Implementation of Human Rights by the
UN Commission on the Status of Women, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 239 (1977), and references cited
therein; M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 166, at 612ff
454. See Spiess v. Itoh & Co., 643 F.2d 353, 362 (5th Cir. 1981). For further expostion, see,
e.g., M. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 166, at 737-78, 861 ff; Comment,
Civil Rights Laws and American Treaties: Stagnating in Judicial Limbo, 5 Hous. J. INT'L L. 323
(1983); Note, Commercial Treaties and the American Civil Rights Laws: The Case of Japanese
Employers, 31 STAN. L. REV. 947 (1979); Paust, Is the President Bound, supra note 395, at 732-
34 nn.44-47, and references cited therein.
455. Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 803 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
456. See Miller v. Cornwall R.R., 168 U.S. at 134; Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing
Co., 9 F. Supp. at 758.
457. See Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454; Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. at 14; United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. at 755 (right to jury is one of "our great
constitutional safeguards aimed at protecting freedom and other basic human rights"); Williams
v. Zuckert, 371 U.S. at 536 (in administrative hearings); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. at 216
(right to jury); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. at 42, 122; United Public Workers of Am. v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 76 (5th amend, and others); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 26, 28 (due
process clause of 5th amend.); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. at 136 (due process clause of
14th amend.); Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U.S. at 172; Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. at 443 ("inherent
right of defence secured by the due process of law clause"); Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269,
1276 (9th Cir. 1979); Nguyen da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d at 1197, 1201; Karr v. Schmidt, 460
F.2d 609, 620 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Smith, 411 F.2d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 1969); United
States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844, 863 (2d Cir. 1965); Giordenello v. United States,
241 F.2d 575, 582 (5th Cir. 1957); Johnson v. United States, 218 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir. 1954);
United States v. Levi, 177 F.2d 833, 836-37 (7th Cir. 1949); Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d
961, 963 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1949); United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 640-41
(2d Cir. 1946); Thomas v. Hunter, 153 F.2d 834, 839 (10th Cir. 1946); In re Sugano, 40 F.2d at
962; United States ex rel. Murphy v. McCandless, 40 F.2d at 645; Nottebaum v. Leckie, 31 F.2d
at 560; Ex parte Kozlowski, 277 F. at 88; Colyer v. Skefington, 265 F. at 69; Walters v. McKin-
nis, 221 F. at 750; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 164 F. at 389 ("fundamental human right of
being judged only after having been duly tried"); Smith v. Fair, 363 F. Supp. 1021, 1023 (N.D.
Ohio 1973); Young v. Wainwright, 320 F. Supp. 80, 87 (S.D. Fla. 1970) (self-incrimination);
O'Donnell v. Watson Bros. Trans. Co., 183 F. Supp. 577, 582 (N.D. I11. 1960); see also Runkle v.
United States, 122 U.S. at 558 ("the most sacred questions of human rights" are at stake); supra
note 448.
458. See Hoston v. Silbert, 681 F.2d 876, 885 (1982); Roberts v. Collins, 544 F.2d 168, 176-
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that "notwithstanding a deepseated feeling that price-tagging of funda-
mental human rights is dangerous business," a plaintiff litigating
under a statutorily created jurisdictional basis setting an amount in
controversy must meet the burden of establishing that amount in con-
troversy. 459 Finally, and quite importantly with respect to the human
right to an effective remedy noted in the next section of this article,
numerous opinions at all levels of the federal judiciary have quoted
with approval Judge Murrah's statement in 1945 that federal courts
retain their historic receptivity to human rights claims:
[W]e yet like to believe that wherever the Federal courts sit, human
rights under the Federal Constitution are always a proper subject for
adjudication, and that we have not the right to decline the exercise of
that jurisdiction simply because the rights asserted may be adjudicated in
some other forum.
46°
Indeed, as the trends noted above demonstrate, numerous other fed-
eral opinions can be marshaled to support the general points made in
Judge Murrah's oft-quoted statement. More generally, the Supreme
Court also affirmed in its famous decision in Paquete Habana that "in-
ternational law is a part of our law, and must be ascertained and ad-
ministered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
77 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Robinson, 503 F.2d 208, 218 (7th Cir. 1974) (convictions
under 18 U.S.C. § 242).
459. See King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1975); The Comm. for GI Rights v.
Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Gomez v. Wilson, 477 F.2d 411, 421 n.56
(1973). Of course, another basis for jurisdiction over human rights claims is federal question
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Paust, Effective Litigation, supra note 182, at 231-32 & nn.20 and 23;
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 885-86; Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1544
(N.D. Cal. 1987); see also infra note 460.
460. Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D. Kan. 1945) (Murrah, J.), appeal dismissed
per stipulation, Mitchell v. McElroy, 326 U.S. 690 (1945), quoted in Fair Assessment in Real
Estate Assoc., 454 U.S. at 124; Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. at 343; Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at
517; Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. at 248; McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. at 674 n.6; Pugh
v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189, 1201 (5th Cir. 1977); McRedmond v. Wilson, 533 F.2d 757, 760
(2d Cir. 1976); Gay v. Board of Registration Comm'rs, 466 F.2d 879, 884 (6th Cir. 1972); Becker
v. Thompson, 459 F.2d 919, 926 (5th Cir. 1972); Garvin v. Rosenau, 455 F.2d 233, 237 (6th Cir.
1972); Moreno v. Henckel, 431 F.2d 1299, 1309 (5th Cir. 1970); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d
519, 523 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. La Vallee, 373 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1967). Similar
statements appear in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. at 156; Ng Kam Fook v. Esperdy,
375 U.S. at 956; Evans v. Tubbe, 657 F.2d 661, 665 (5th Cir. 1981); Gray v. Morgan, 371 F.2d
172, 175 (7th Cir. 1966); see also supra text accompanying note 211 (Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. at
133); Morgan's La. & Tex. R.R. & S.S. v. Texas Cent. Ry., 137 U.S. at 192 ("inherent right of
resort to the courts"); Miller v. Cornwall R.R., 168 U.S. at 134 ("inherent and indefeasible" right
of access to courts and to a remedy); infra notes 471-476. Of course, human rights are guaran-
teed "under" the Constitution in several ways, e.g., through art. III, § 2, cl. 1 and art. VI, cl.2 (see
supra note 369), through the original amendments (see supra notes 92-93, 390), through the 13th,
14th, and 15th amendments (see supra notes 261-264, 390), and through the privileges and im-
munities clause of art. IV, § 2 (see supra note 390); see also supra notes 387-389, 459; Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 885-87.
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determination." ,461
As trends in actual decision over the last two hundred years clearly
demonstrate, human rights are such matters of right and they have
been incorporated directly, indirectly and through the ninth amend-
ment 462 in an ever expanding number of judicial opinions. Perhaps in
view of some of these trends (for they have never been documented so
fully before) Circuit Judge Gibbons criticized the majority opinion in
Jaffee v. United States,4 63 noting that one of the "fragile protections"
set up "against human rights violations ... is the admonitory law of
intentional torts, designed to require public accountability for individ-
ual conduct, official or private, going beyond the bounds of social ac-
ceptability. ' 464 In criticizing the decision of the majority that the
complaint of a U.S. serviceperson subjected to involuntary human ex-
perimentation involving nuclear tests by the military had failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted, Judge Gibbons, after
citing several human rights instruments, aptly noted:
The international consensus against involuntary human experimentation
is clear. A fortiori the conduct charged, if it occurred, was in violation of
the Constitution and laws of the United States and of the state where it
occurred or where its effects were felt. That any judicial tribunal in the
world, in the last fifth of this dismal century, would choose to place a
class of persons outside the protection against human rights violations
provided by the admonitory law of intentional torts is surprising. That it
should be an American court will dismay persons the world over con-
cerned with human rights and will embarrass our Government. That
this court, which once had a deserved reputation for sensitivity to human
rights issues, should undertake to do so is a saddening demonstration of
the extent to which it has lost the spirit which once animated our
deliberations.
The opinion of the court is couched in terms of unwillingness to cre-
ate a "new" cause of action. This cloak of deference to the legislative
branch is disingenuous, for what the majority has done, by radical judi-
cial legislation with totalitarian effects, is to wipe out causes of action
designed to require official accountability. These causes of action have
been a part of the common law for centuries and were recently reap-
461. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (Gray, J., opinion). Similar language appears in Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (Gray, J., opinion); see also infra notes 505-515, and accompa-
nying text; Paust, The President Is Bound By International Law, supra note 395.
462. Cases specifically mentioning human rights and the ninth amendment include: Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. at 153; United Public Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 76, 95; Mattis v.
Schnarr, 547 F.2d at 1017-18 n.25; Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d at 620; see also Mapeo, Inc. v.
Carter, 573 F.2d 1268, 1279 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978). On
use of the ninth amendment, see Paust, Human Rights, supra note 4.
463. 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981).
464. Id. at 1249 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). On this point, see also Paust, Is the President
Bound, supra note 395, at 740-43, 751-58, 766-72, and references cited therein.
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proved by the Supreme Court.465
As Judge Gibbons seemed to affirm, servicepersons are also human
beings with human rights. The next section also expands upon his
general points about causes of action and remedies, those made by the
Supreme Court in Paquete Habana, and those contained in the widely
quoted statement of Judge Murrah.
III. THE RIGHT TO A REMEDY AND RELATED CONCERNS
A. The Precepts and Predominant Trends
Article 8 of the authoritative Universal Declaration of Human
Rights expressly affirms that "[e]veryone has the right to an effective
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fun-
damental rights granted him by the constitution or by law."' 466 As
prior trends in U.S. decision demonstrate, the Constitution and do-
mestic U.S. laws guarantee or "grant" such fundamental rights. Simi-
larly, international law, which is a part of supreme federal law,
4 6 7
grants such fundamental rights. Thus, the human "right to an effec-
tive remedy" expressly set forth in the Universal Declaration is appli-
cable by its terms in the context of domestic U.S. litigation. As part of
human rights law, the right to an effective remedy is also itself a part
of supreme federal law for purposes of direct incorporation, indirect
incorporation, or mirrored/equivalent incorporation under the ninth
amendment.468 For these reasons, Article 8 of the Universal Declara-
tion is of significant utility in demonstrating to a federal court why
litigants have a right to a private remedy for human right deprivations.
Of course the numerous cases using human right precepts docu-
mented above are further evidence of the long-term judicial practice in
this country of recognizing both the utility of human rights norms and
the right to a private remedy for their deprivation. As recognized pre-
viously, this is especially true with respect to those cases in which
Judge Murrah's affirmation of the historic receptivity of federal courts
465. Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d at 1249-50.
466. Supra note 3; on the authoritativeness of the Universal Declaration, see also supra notes
182, 369-370. The fundamental right to an effective remedy, and thus to a "cause of action" to
obtain such a remedy, is now a customary standard with respect to nonimmunity recognized
under international law; see also infra note 545. Such a customary norm, tied also to the U.N.
Charter, should preempt any inconsistent law; see also U.N. CHARTER, art. 103.
467. See. e.g., supra text accompanying note 461; Paust, Effective Litigation, supra note 182,
at 230-33, 236-42, 244; Paust, Human Dignity, supra note 439, at 212-22, and references cited
therein; supra note 359.
468. See generally Paust, Human Dignity, supra note 439, at 212-22; see also Paust, Litigating
Human Rights: A Commentary on the Comments, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 81, 99 (1981) [hereinafter
Paust, Litigating Human Rights]; George, Defining Filartiga: Characterizing International Tor-
ture Claims in United States Courts, 3 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 1, 20-21 (1984); supra notes 359, 370.
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to human rights claims is quoted approvingly. 469 Early in our history,
at a time when human right precepts had already received the atten-
tion of our courts, Chief Justice Marshall, in his landmark opinion in
Marbury v. Madison,470 affirmed more generally:
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection
... [Blackstone] says, "it is a general and indisputable rule, that where
there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit, or action at law,
whenever that right is invaded."
471
Moreover, in striking confirmation of judicial power and responsibility
to hear human right claims, the Chief Justice recognized seven years
later that our judicial tribunals "are established . .. to decide on
469. See supra note 460.
470. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553
(reproduced in text accompanying note 267 supra.).
471. Id. at 163; see also id. at 146 (argument of counsel) ("It is a settled and invariable
principle, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper
redress. 3 BI. com. 109."); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344,
380 (1922) (argument of counsel) ("the rule that where there is a right there is a remedy"); In re
Metro. Ry. Receivership, 208 U.S. 90, 100 (1908) (argument of counsel) ("There are two funda-
mentals of the common law, which are essentials of that due process of law which is guaranteed
by the Constitution. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ashby v. White, I Salkeld, 19, 21
(1703) (Holt, C.J., dissenting)]. No person can be denied a hearing before he is prevented from
asserting a claim of right."). In one British report of Ashby it was stated: "it is a vain thing to
imagine that there should be a right without a remedy; want of right and want of remedy are
termini convertibiles." Michaelmas Term, 2 Queen Anne. in B.R., 87 Eng. Rep. 810, 815, 6 Mod.
Cases 45, 53. Chief Justice Holt was also reported to have declared: "if the plaintiff has a right,
he must in consequence have a remedy to vindicate that right; for want of right and want of
remedy is the same thing. If a statute gives a right, the common law will give a remedy to
maintain that right, a fortiori where the common law gives a right, it gives a remedy to assert it."
I Salkeld at 21. On British remedies for violations of international law, see also infra note 502.
Later, Chief Justice Marshall would declare: "The right of coercion is necessarily surren-
dered to government, and this surrender imposes on government the correlative duty of furnish-
ing a remedy." Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 346-47 (1827) (Marshall, C.J.).
The Chief Justice made the same point about "the duty on the government to furnish adequate
remedies" in Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley's Lessee, 27 U.S. at 517; see also Mahon v. Justice,
127 U.S. 700, 717 (1888) (Bradley, J., dissenting) ("There must be some remedy for such a
wrong. It cannot be that the states, in surrendering their right of obtaining redress by military
force and reprisals, have no remedy whatever."); infra notes 473-475. On the implied right to a
remedy at common law and the maxim Ubijus ibi remedium, see, e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916), also citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW
OF ENGLAND 123 (1765); Riggs v. Martin, 5 Ark. 506, 508 (1844) ("It is a maxim of universal
justice pervading the whole system of the common and civil law that wherever a party has a legal
right he is entitled to a legal remedy to enforce it").
Of further interest is the recognition of the Court in 1848: "It is in close conformity to, and
congenial with, the seventh amendment of the Constitution, and with the saving in the Judiciary
Act of the right to a remedy at common law, [that] wherever the common law should be compe-
tent to give it (such right is reserved and secured]." See New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v.
Merchants' Bank of Boston, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 409 (1848) (Daniel, J., concurring); see also
Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 522, 533 (1872) (Clifford, J., opinion) (adding: "the
right to such a remedy is reserved and secured to suitors by the saving clause contained in the
ninth section of the Judiciary Act"); Leon v. Galceran, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 185, 188 (1870) (Clif-
ford, J., opinion) (same).
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human rights. '472
Similarly, other justices have declared that the right "to free access
to courts of justice" is one of the "natural rights" guaranteed by the
Constitution,4 73 that there is an "inherent right of resort to the
courts, ' 474 and that the right "to institute and maintain actions of any
kind in the courts" is one of the "fundamental privileges and immuni-
ties which belong essentially to the citizens of every free
government.
'475
One hundred years ago, Justice Matthews expressed a related point
about the responsibility of the judiciary to provide appropriate reme-
dies and the consequence of a breach of that responsibility when he
recognized that "[t]o take away all remedy for the enforcement of a
right is to take away the right itself."' 476 Such a consequence, if it
472. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133 (1810) (Marshall, C.J., opinion).
473. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. at 282-83 (1901) (Brown, J., opinion); see also City of
Dallas v. Mitchell, 245 S.W. 944, 946 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) ("when legislative encroachment by
the nation, state, or municipality invade these original and permanent [natural] rights, it is the
duty of the courts to so declare, and to afford the necessary relief"); and supra text accompany-
ing notes 257-258.
474. Morgan's La. & Tex. R.R. & S.S. v. Texas Cent. Ry., 137 U.S. at 192 (Fuller, C.J.,
opinion); see also Miller v. Cornwall R.R., 168 U.S. at 134 (" 'inherent and indefeasible rights',"
including right to have courts open so" 'every man, for an injury done.. ., shall have remedy'"
by due course of law), quoting Constitutions of Pennsylvania: 1709, art. IX, secs. 1, 11; 1838,
art. IX, secs. 1, 11; 1873, art. I, secs. 1, 11.
475. See Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. at 764 (1884) (Bradley, J.,
concurring) (referring also to Justice Washington for this view; see Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas.
546 (C.C.R. Wash. 1825) (No. 3230) (Washington, J.)); see also supra text accompanying note
257; Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-25, 827-28 (1977) ("fundamental constitutional right of
access to the courts"); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577-80 (1974) ("right of access to the
courts ...assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary
allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights" such as those recognized
in the Civil Rights Act of 1871); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969); Bank of Augusta v.
Earle, 38 U.S. at 592 (Taney, C. J., opinion) ("We think it is well settled that by the law of
comity among nations, a corporation created by one sovereignty is permitted to make contracts
in another, and to sue in its courts"); cf J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONsTrrU-
TIONAL LAW 579-81 (2d ed. 1983) (right of access limited more recently to cases involving fun-
damental rights - which would cover human rights claims - or freedom from arbitrary denial
and denials otherwise violative of equal protection or due process). Each of these last citations,
however, makes no mention of the cases cited in notes 471-473 supra or Butcher's Union Co.,
supra. An interesting state court decision is Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299, 302 (1866). On the
interrelationship between privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Constitution and human
rights or "treaties," see supra note 390.
476. Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1884) (Matthews, J., opinion). For the same
point stated more elegantly, see Hammond-Knowlton v. United States, 121 F.2d 192, 205 n.37
(2d Cir. 1941) (Frank, J.) ("It is idle chatter to speak of a legal wrong for which there is no legal
redress; a so-called legal right without a legal remedy is... but a shabby mythical entity like the
'grin without a cat' which Lewis Carroll's Alice justifiably could not understand."). Earlier and
more simply, Madison had expressed the view shared by the Founders that "a right implies a
remedy." See THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (J. Madison); see also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,
783 (1982) (White, J., dissenting), quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U.S. 388, 395 (1971) (Brennan, J., opinion) ("To the extent that the Court denies an otherwise
appropriate remedy, it denies the victim the right to be made whole and, therefore, denies him
'the protection of the laws.' "); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 414 (1897) (White, J., opinion)
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resulted from the choice of a federal judge to ignore the human right
to an effective remedy for human right deprivations, could also have
grave implications for the United States. 477 Indeed, it would place the
United States in the unenviable position of a violator of international
law, since a federal denial of a judicial remedy in the United States for
relevant human rights violations would necessarily clash with the af-
firmative obligation to guarantee an "effective remedy" in competent
national tribunals that is expressly set forth in Article 8 of the Univer-
sal Declaration, which, as noted above, is itself a significant indicia of
the human right obligations of the United States under the United Na-
tions Charter.
Importantly also, when interpreting a provision of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms 478 that is similar to Article 8 of the Universal Declaration,
("To say that courts have inherent power to deny all right to defend an action and to render
decrees without any hearing whatever is, in the very nature of things, to convert the court exer-
cising such an authority into an instrument of wrong and oppression, and hence to strip it of that
attribute of justice upon which the exercise of judicial power necessarily depends.").
477. See infra text accompanying note 484. As Circuit Judge Edwards noted recently,
"[t]here is evidence ... that the intent of [the drafters of the Judiciary Act of 1789]... was to
assure aliens access to federal courts to vindicate any incident which, if mishandled by a state
court, might blossom into an international crisis.... If.. .[there is] a denial ofjustice. . ., under
the law of nations the United States would become responsible for the failure of its courts and...
[such] might thereby escalate into an international confrontation." See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d at 782-83, and references cited therein; see also Kalamazoo Spice Extraction
Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422, 428 (6th Cir. 1984) ("great
national interest" at stake and "failure of this court to recognize a properly executed treaty
would indeed be an egregious error because of the position that treaties occupy in our body of
laws"); Henfield's Case, 1 F. Cas. at 1108 (failure to punish violator of international law or force
such person to make reparation renders U.S. "in some measure an accomplice in the guilt, and
... responsible for the injury"); I Op. Att'y Gen. 106, 107 (1802) (government "ought to take
every reasonable measure to cause reparation to be made by the offender. But if the offender is
subject to the ordinary processes of law," the government may not be required to make repara-
tion); 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 158-59 (J. Elliot ed. 1901) (Davie in North Carolina in 1788: denial of
justice if foreigners not given redress re: rights under treaties presents need for federal judicial
competence); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 68 (4th ed. 1899) (failure to punish violator
of law of nations makes state an "accomplice or abettor"); P. JESSUP, THE USES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 101 (1959) (a state may be held responsible for the decision of one of its courts
which violates a treaty or international law"); Q. WRIGHT, supra note 359, at 72 (nation-state
cannot comply with U.N. Charter obligations if its courts refuse protection); infra note 479; infra
text accompanying note 484. It is also important to note that criminal responsibility can attach
in the case of judicial tolerance of certain violations of international law. See United States v.
Altstoetter (The Justice Case), 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILI-
TARY TRIBUNALS 3 (1950). Further, the judiciary's commitment to law would be compromised
in such a case and its decision to tolerate illegality would function the same as though the court
had been an accomplice of the actual perpetrators.
478. 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5, art. 6 (1950); see also id., arts. 5(3), 5(5), 13, 50. The
pertinent part of Article 6 declares: "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of
any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reason-
able time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law." Article 13 of the Euro-
pean Convention adds: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority .... "
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the European Court of Human Rights declared in a clear and trench-
ant manner:
One can scarcely conceive of the rule of law without there being a possi-
bility of having access to the courts.... The principle whereby a civil
claim must be capable of being submitted to a judge ranks as one of the
universally "recognized" fundamental principles of law; the same is true
of the principle of international law which forbids the denial of
justice.
479
479. Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) paras. 34-35 (1975), reprinted in
R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POL-
icy 563, 570-71 (1979). The phrase "denial of justice" has had a close association with human
right precepts, at least since the nineteenth century, and the right of aliens to an effective remedy
in domestic tribunals. See, e.g., M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 166, at
739-40, and references cited therein; George, supra note 468; Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility of
States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 550-51 (1961)
(Harvard draft Convention, arts. 6-8); F. GARCIA-AMADOR, L. SOHN & R. BAXTER, RECENT
CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 2-3, 5-7, 23-
25, 186-99, 362, 364, 373, 390-91 (1974); The Van Bokkelen Case (1888), in 2 J. MOORE, HIs-
TORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES
HAS BEEN A PARTY 1807, 1842 (1898); see also L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H.
SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 685 (1980) (failure to provide judicial remedies); A. FREEMAN,
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL OF JUSTICE (1938); R. Lillich,
supra note 182, at 26-29.
In the Van Bokkelen case, Haiti had maintained that an alien would have "natural rights or
of mankind" (2 J. MOORE, at 1823, 1844), and the arbitrator agreed that "[u]nder the public law
or law of nations aliens enjoy purely natural rights in whatever state they may be." Id. at 1845.
But the arbitrator also found that a treaty-based right of access included a right to a remedy,
adding: "whether free access to the tribunals of a country for the purpose of prosecuting or
defending a suit be described as a remedy or as a right, is unimportant. It is in this relation a
matter of description rather than of substance. It is the proceeding with which we are concerned,
and not the name of it. The right or privilege to make a judicial assignment ... involves the
application of a remedy .... 'Remedies,' says Mr. Justice Story, 'are part of the consequences of
contracts.'" Id. at 1827. The arbitrator also declared: "'Free access to the tribunals of justice'
that was limited to admission to the courts, without the privilege to plaintiff or defendant of
employing the usual, ordinary processes of the court, would be a delusion and a snare.., he
must necessarily be entitled to invoke in his behalf all the customary and civil processes of the
courts which are open to citizens." Id. at 1846, also quoting 1877 draft rules of the Institute of
International Law at Geneva. Money damages of $60,000 were awarded and finally paid to Van
Bokkelen. See id. at 1852ff. By the twentieth century, it had been recognized more generally
that state responsibility can attach to the deprivation of an opportunity to recover damages from
a wrongdoer or to the failure to provide a remedy. See, e.g., In re Janes (United States v. United
Mexican States), 4 R.Int'l Arb. Awards 82, 87, 94-96, 98 (1925); Harvard Draft Convention on
the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, art. 13(2), in 55 AM. J. INT'L L.
545 (1961); International Law Commission Draft Convention on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/134 & Add.l (1961), reprinted in [1961] 2 Y.B. INT'L COMM'N 46, art. 7(3), at 47, U.N.
Do. A/CN.4/SER.A/1961/Add.1; RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 495 (§ 71 1(a) and Comment a to § 711), 500 (Comment e thereto), 506 (Report-
ers' Note 2 thereto) (denial of access to domestic courts, judicial denial of human rights, and
denial of remedies for injury inflicted by the state or a private person) (Tentative Draft No. 6
1985) [hereinafter Draft Restatement].
Moreover, Hamilton articulated a concern for "the denial or perversion of justice" to aliens
by our courts in the eighteenth century. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton), quoted in
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 783; see also supra note 477; Comegys v. Vasse,
26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193, 216 (1828) (Story,J.) ("right of justice" re: violation of international law);
Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607) ("failure of justice"); I Op. Att'y
Gen. 30, 32 (1793) (Randolph, Att'y Gen.) (quoting British: "The laws of nations ... do not
allow reprisals, except in case of... justice absolutely denied, in re minime dubia, by all the
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The right of access to the courts and the concomitant right to an effec-
tive remedy are thus recognized as fundamental human rights having
a basis in customary international law. 480 Moreover, the fact that the
tribunals, and afterwards by the prince"). On the general point recognized in Colder, see also
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 768 (1982) (White, J., dissenting), 451 U.S. 401, 429 (1981)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Accountability of each individual for individual conduct lies at the
core of all law - indeed, of all organized societies.") On the right of an individual to reparation
for a denial of justice, see also infra note 602.
More generally, the phrase denial of justice has also been associated with the precept of due
process. See, e.g., Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 527 n.21 (1982) (statute of limitation acceptable
"'unless the time allowed is manifestly so insufficient that the statute becomes a denial of jus-
tice.' "); Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R., 393 U.S. 156, 159 (1968) (can set aside a verdict if the
amount is "so high that it would be a denial of justice"); Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 63
(1902), citing T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 451 (5th ed. 1883); Smith v. Sworm-
stedt, 57 U.S. 288, 303 (1850); Exparte Crane, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 190, 192 (1831) (Marshall, C.J.,
opinion) (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 471, at I l1); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 213, 288 (1827) (Johnson, J., dissenting) ("In international law, the subject is perfectly
understood, and the right generally acquiesced in; and yet the denial of justice is, by the same
code, an acknowledged cause of war"); Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 329 (1796)
(Wilson, J., dissenting); Haddens v. Chambers, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 236, 236 (1795) (Smith, J., opin-
ion) ("it would be a denial of justice to refuse him the only remedy, which he can have on this
occasion"); Hoare v. Allen, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 102, 104 (1789); Gorgerat v. M'Carty, I U.S. (I
Dall.) 366, 367 (1788) (argument of counsel); Bridges v. Wixon, 144 F.2d 927, 943 (9th Cir.
1944) (Healy, J., dissenting); In re Chicago & E.I. Ry., 121 F.2d 785, 789 (7th Cir. 1941) ("bur-
densome costs and long delays ... in some instances might be said to be a denial of justice");
Bufalino v. Irvine, 103 F.2d 830, 832 (10th Cir. 1939) (re: deportation proceeding: "In order to
render such a hearing objectionably unfair, there must be some practice which contributes to a
denial of justice, or an essential element of due process must be absent"); Kielema v. Crossman,
103 F.2d 292, 293 (5th Cir. 1939) (same); United States v. French, 95 F.2d 922, 932 (8th Cir.
1938); Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 16 F. 25, 33 (D. Cal. 1883) ("to require
the complainant to pursue each defendant separately would ... amount to an absolute denial of
justice"); Cronin v. Patrick County, 89 F. 79, 84 (W.D. Va. 1882) ("To refuse permission to file
these pleas would be a denial of justice"); Stewart v. Potomac Ferry Co., 12 F. 296, 303 (E.D. Va.
1882) ("To have postponed the claims.., would have been a denial of justice"); The Adolph, 7
F. 501, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1881) ("In this case it would be a denial of justice to remit the seamen to
their remedy in personam against the owner in Sweden").
480. See M. McDOUOAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 166, at 739-40, and refer-
ences cited therein; George, supra note 468; supra notes 471, 473-475, 477, 479 and infra 494-
495. Circuit Judge Edwards has recently confirmed this point, at least in part: "Under the law
of nations, states are obliged to make civil courts of justice accessible for claims of foreign sub-
jects against individuals within the state's territory." Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d at 783, citing 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 165a, at 366 (H. Lauterpacht 8th
ed. 1955). On the fundamental nature of such a right, see also supra notes 475, 479.
Similarly it had been recognized early that "by the law of nations" a private person has the
right to "pursue and recover" property taken in violation of international law. See Miller v. The
Ship Resolution, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 1, 4 (1781); infra note 491. Counsel had also argued before the
Court in 1839 that "under the law of nations" an individual deprived of a right under the law of
nations "is entitled to redress." See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 536 (1839)
(argument of counsel). And in several early cases it was recognized that when ships and/or
cargo were taken in violation of the "law of nations," one can obtain restitution, damages and/or
costs. See, e.g., The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 348-49 (1822); The Josefa
Segunda, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 338, 344, 347-48 (1820) (argument of counsel); The Anna Maria, 15
U.S. (2 Wheat.) 327, 335 & appendix, note 1, at 70 (1817); The Venus, 12 U.S (8 Cranch) 253,
289 (1814); Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 76, 105, 107-08, 112, 115
(1804) (argument of counsel); id. at 117, 124-26; Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 11, 16,
25 (1801) (argument of counsel); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 157-58 (1795) (Patterson,
J.); id. at 160 (Iredell, J.); id. at 169 (Rutledge, C.J.); Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
6, 9, 15 (1794) (argument of counsel); id. at 16 (order of the Court); Talbot v. The Commanders
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right to an effective remedy expressed in Article 8 of the Universal
Declaration finds support in every relevant human rights instru-
ment481 is supportive of both the fundamental and customary nature
of such a right.
4 82
Significantly, the U.S. Executive Branch has also affirmed many of
these points more generally in its relatively famous brief in Filartiga:
It has long been established that in certain situations, individuals may
sue to enforce their rights under international law .... The... interna-
tional law of human rights . . .endows individuals with the right to
invoke international law, in a competent forum and under appropriate
circumstances. The highly respected Constitutional Court of Germany
has recognized this right of individuals. The court declared that,
although "contemporary generally recognized principles of international
and Owners of Three Brigs, 1 U.S. (1 Dali.) 95, 98, 108 (1784); cf La Amistad, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 385, 389-91 (1820) (restitution only, because of strong public policy to remain neutral
vis-a-vis belligerents).
-481. For pertinent articles of the European Convention, see supra note 478. Others include:
American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, 1969, art. 25 (1) at I ("Everyone
has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court
or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the con-
stitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention .. "), reprinted in 65 AM. J. INT'L
L. 697 (1971), as supplemented by the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, art. 18 ("Every person may resort to the courts to ensure respect for his legal rights. There
should likewise be available to him a simple, brief procedure whereby the courts will protect him
from acts of authority that, to his prejudice, violate any fundamental constitutional rights"),
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4 Rev. (1965); 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, art. 7(l)(a) ("Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This com-
prises: a) the right to an appeal to competent national organs .... ), reprinted in 77 AM. J. INT'L
L. 904 n.13 (1983), and 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 1966, art. 2(3)(a) and (b) "Each State party... undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person
.*. shall have an effective remedy...; (b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall
have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authori-
ties .. "), see also id., art. 9(4); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, adopted by G.A. Res. 1904 (XVIII), 18 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. 15, at 35-37, U.N. Doc. A/5515, art. 6 ("States Parties shall assure to everyone
within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies through the competent national tribu-
nals.. .. as well as the right to seek from such tribunals just and adequate reparation or satisfac-
tion for any damage suffered .. "); Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, art. 16,
189 U.N.T.S. 137, 19 U.S.T. 6223 [1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees] ("A refugee
shall have free access to the courts of law on the territory of all Contracting States... [and] in the
Contracting State in which he has his habitual residence the same treatment as a national in
matters pertaining to access to the courts .. "); Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons, 1954, art. 16, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (basically the same as 1951 Refugee Convention, supra).
Also of interest is the shared expectation expressed in a 1985 International Conference on Crimi-
nal Justice: Education, Reform, and Human Rights Protection in the Arab World recommenda-
tion "guaranteeing the citizen's right to access to the ordinary courts" as well as other means of
protection. I.S.I.S.C. Conference pamphlet at 4-5, preamble and recommendation 1(13) (M.C.
Bassiouni trans. from Arabic 1986).
482. For evidence of this sort of reasoning, see, e.g., Memorandum for the United States in
Filartiga, supra note 370, at 9-13, adding: "uniform treaty consideration... provides a strong
indication that the proscription . . . has entered customary international law," citing A.
D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 103, 124-28 (1971); Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 878, 882-84; Memorial of the United States before the International Court
of Justice at 71-2, in Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(United States v. Iran), [1980] I.C.J. 1.
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law include only a few legal rules that directly create rights and duties of
private individuals by virtue of international law itself," an area in which
they do create such rights and duties is "the sphere of the minimum
standard for the protection of human rights."
As a result, in nations such as the United States where international
law is part of the law of the land, an individual's fundamental human
rights are in certain situations directly enforceable in domestic
courts .... 483
The Executive added that when the existence and content of a relevant
human right are supported by general consensus: "a refusal to recog-
nize a private cause of action in these circumstances might seriously
damage the credibility of our nation's commitment to the protection of
human rights ... [When content is thus demonstrable by patterns of
generally shared expectation] private enforcement is entirely appropri-
ate."' 484 Significantly also, the Executive affirmed that the Universal
Declaration "goes beyond the UN Charter in specifying and defining
the fundamental rights to which all individuals are entitled. '4 5 The
right to an effective remedy in national tribunals expressed in Article 8
of the Declaration is thus implicitly recognized also by the U.S. Exec-
utive as a fundamental human right.
Earlier in our history, several state court decisions had similarly
recognized the propriety of private lawsuits against individuals for vio-
lations of general international law. After ruling that the burning of a
courthouse by Confederate soldiers was an unlawful act of war in vio-
lation of "the laws of nations," the Supreme Court of Kentucky
declared:
There must be a remedy, and of that remedy the State judiciary has juris-
diction. There is nothing in the Federal Constitution which deprives a
State court of power to decide a question of international law inciden-
tally involved in a case over which it has jurisdiction; and for every
wrong the common law... provides an adequate remedy. To sustain
this action, therefore, it is not necessary to invoke any statutory aid....
Wherefore, on international and common law principles, we adjudge
that the petition in this case sets forth a good cause of action .... 
486
483. Memorandum for the United States in Filartiga, supra note 370, at 20-21, citing Paquete
Habana at the end of the quoted language. For an example of judicial acceptance of this point,
see, e.g., Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. at 798. For evidence of other relevant efforts by
the Executive branch to clarify its understanding of an appropriate role for the judiciary, see
infra note 590.
484. Filarfiga Memorandum, supra note 370, at 22; see also Paust, letter, 18 VA. J. INT'L L.
601, 603-06, 608 (1978).
485. Filartiga Memorandum, supra note 370, at 9 (emphasis added).
486. Christian County Court v. Rankin & Tharp, 63 Ky. (2 Duvall) 502, 505-06 (1866). This
case was cited for such a point later in W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 780
n.31 (2d ed. 1920). Such a case reaffirms the availability of civil sanctions for acts that are also
criminally sanctionable under international law (in this case the law of war, war crimes); see also
infra notes 487-90, 501, 503.
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The Kentucky court also recognized such a cause of action and right
to a remedy in several other cases. 487 In one such case the court spoke
of "a right to maintain this action for adequate damages, ' 488 the pro-
priety of "civil remedies for private wrongs, ' 489 and the "tortious"
nature of acts of soldiers in "violation of the law of international war,"
adding that the soldier's "act was illegal, and he is personally responsi-
ble in this action for all the consequences of his own unjustifiable and
tortious act."
'490
Analogous cases were decided by the Supreme Court of South Car-
olina in the 1780s with respect to unlawful acts occurring at the time
of the American Revolution. 49 1 Thus judicial recognition of the pri-
vate right to a remedy for violations of international law predates the
U.S. Constitution and relevant federal statutes. In an early case in
Pennsylvania, it was decided that no cause of action existed where
there was no violation of the law of nations by the Continental Con-
gress, the Pennsylvania Board of War, or General Schuyler,
492
although plaintiff's counsel had rightly argued: "that every right must
have a remedy is a principle of general law."'493 Several years later, in
1824, and in response to what was found to be a violation of the law of
nations by the U.S. seizure of a French vessel abroad, the U.S.
Supreme Court entertained suit by a private party for damages while
noting that if such law is violated "justice demands that the injured
party should receive a suitable redress. '494 In 1828, Justice Story sim-
487. Dills v. Hatcher, 69 Ky. (6 Bush) 606 (1869); Ferguson v. Loar, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 689,
692-95 (1869) (soldier is liable to private person for value of mule taken in violation of the laws of
war, laws of nations); Lewis v. McGuire, 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 202, 203 (1867) (individual liable for
violation of the laws of war, laws of nations); Terrill v. Rankin, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 453, 457-62
(1867) (same); see also Hogue v. Penn, 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 663, 666 (1868) (not mentioning violation
of international law as such).
488. Terrill v. Rankin, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 461.
489. Id. at 462.
490. Id. at 457.
491. See, e.g., Turnbull v. Ross, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay 20, 23) 9, 10 (1785) (right to return of
property, wherever found, taken in violation of laws of nations); Whitaker v. English, 1 S.C.L. (1
Bay 15) 6 (1784). The right to recover property recognized in Turnbull had been recognized in
Miller v. The Ship Resolution as a right under "the law of nations." See supra note 480. For
other cases prior to 1789 that had recognized remedies for a violation of the law of nations, see,
e.g., supra notes 480 and infra 492; see also infra note 501 (Res. of Cont. Cong.).
492. See Respublica v. Sparhawk, I U.S. (1 Dall.) 357, 363 (1788).
493. Id. at 359. In Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court would affirm this point fifteen
years later. See supra text accompanying note 471.
494. The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 367 (1824) (Story, J., opinion). For recognition of
a private right "by the law of nations" to "pursue and recover" property taken in violation of
international law, or to obtain restitution, damages and costs, see supra notes 480 and 491. In
1795, the Supreme Court also recognized the propriety of a "remedy by a writ of prohibition"
concerning the detention of a vessel in a manner violative of the "law of nations." See United
States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121, 132 (1795). An 1821 House committee report had also
contained an extract of an 1818 report of the African Institution which recognized that an earlier
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ilarly remarked: "with reference to principles of international law, he
has a right, both to the justice of his own and the foreign
sovereign."
495
After the Civil War, the U.S. Supreme Court also ruled that a
plaintiff could not sue a private defendant when the relevant acts were
lawful belligerent acts in accord with the law of nations.496 In such a
case, the Court noted, a person is "relieved from civil responsibil-
ity."'497 Clearly however, when international law is violated, "civil re-
sponsibility" was thought to exist. Also of interest are early cases in
New York applying standards under the law of nations to private con-
tracts,498 and in California recognizing that "[b]y the law of nations,"
private rights to property "were 'sacred and inviolable'. .. .
Indeed, since the dawn of the United States, it has been recognized
that an individual can both sue and be sued in federal courts for con-
duct in violation of international law.5o0 An extraordinary number of
decisions have recognized the propriety of private claims or causes of
action involving rights under or violations of international law,50' and
British decision in the case of the French slave ship Le Louis had affirmed that if a governmental
vessel engaged in a search of another vessel in violation of international law "the discovery ...
unlawfully produced" could not be taken advantage of by the government or its agents. See The
Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825), appendix at 25. In a general sense, the British case of
Le Louis points to a result similar to that mentioned in later U.S. cases. See, e.g., Cook v. United
States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933) (violation of international law by U.S. obviates jurisdictional compe-
tence); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir.
1974) (violation of international law by U.S. agents would obviate jurisdiction).
495. See Comegys v. Vasse, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193, 216 (1828) (Story, J., opinion), quoted later
in Williams v. Heard, 140 U.S. 529, 543 (1891) (Lamar, J., opinion). As Story noted, such is a
"right of justice." Id. The right in that case was also protected by treaty.
496. See Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594, 605-06, 608 (1878).
497. See id. at 605.
498. See Goodrich and De Forest v. Gordon, 15 Johns. 6 (Sup. Ct. of Judicature N.Y. 1818)
(private contract for ransom of vessel captured by British is "sanctioned by the law of nations");
Seton v. Low, I Johns. I (Sup. Ct. of Judicature N.Y. 1799) (interpretation of insurance policy);
see also infra note 517.
499. See Teschemacher v. Thompson, 18 Cal. 11, 22-3 (1861) (private property rights guar-
anteed by the law of nations, independent of treaty stipulations, when territorial cession oc-
curred), quoting Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410, 436 (1838).
500. See Paust, Litigating Human Rights, supra note 468, at 84-88, 90-91, and references
cited therein; Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Low Claims: Inquiries Into the
Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 41, 48-50 (1985); Randall, Further Inquiries
into the Alien Tort Statute and a Recommendation, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 473, 492-94,
496-501 (1986), and references cited therein; see also Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. United
States), 1959 I.C.J. 6, 27-28 (U.S. courts are competent to apply international law in cases involv-
ing private claims alleging violations of international law). See also infra note 501.
501. Such cases occur with or, mostly, without statutory aid or recognition. See, e.g., Niel-
son v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929) (private right under treaty not to be taxed); Jordan v.
Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) (private right under
treaty); Berg v. British and Afr. Steam Navigation Co., 243 U.S. 124, 153-56 (1917); Maiorano v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 213 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1909) (private rights); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
1, 195 (1901); Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 408 (1900) (re: action
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numerous criminal prosecutions of individuals for violations of inter-
concerning title to land derived from treaty); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); La Abra
Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 458, 461 (1899) (even though claims before
U.S.-Mexico commission were those of governments, private company had claim of right under a
"treaty and the award of the commission," and such right is undoubtedly "susceptible of judicial
determination"); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899); The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 53 (1897);
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890); United
States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227, 233 (1886); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 419
(1886) ("The treaty.., being.., the supreme law of the land, of which the courts are bound to
take judicial notice, and to enforce in any appropriate proceeding the rights of persons growing
out of that treaty ...."); Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884)
(private rights); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 563 (1884) (Field, J., dissenting)
(" 'treaties must continue to... be obeyed by the people, applied by the judiciary and executed
by the President' "); Haustein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879) (private rights under treaty);
Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 517 (1878); The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187-88 (1871)
(ship collision at sea); Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 32, 34-5 (1870); Fellows v. Denniston,
72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761, 768-72 (1867); Beard v. Federy, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 478, 491-92 (1866)
("rights... entitled by the law of nations to protection"); Fremont v. United States, 58 U.S. (17
How.) 542, 557 (1854) (private property rights protected by customary law); Kennett v.
Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38, 50 (1852) (Taney, C.J., opinion) (individuals are "personally
bound" by treaties and "can do no act, nor enter into any agreement" in violation thereof);
United States v. Brooks, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 442, 460 (1850) (private rights under treaty); The
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 413 (1849); United States v. The Cargo of the Brig Malek
Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 235 (1844) (compensation in damages is also a possible remedy re:
piracy); United States v. The Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518, 595-96 (1841) (Story, J.,
opinion) (private rights and protection under treaties and the general law of nations); Bank of
Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 536 (argument of counsel re: individual rights
and duties under the law of nations); Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410, 436, 439 (1838)
(private property rights governed by law of nations); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,
562 (1832) (Marshall, C.J., opinion); Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 247-48 (1830)
(Story, J., opinion) (treaty); Carneal v. Banks, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 181 (1825) (private property
rights protected by treaty); Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 489 (1824) (same); The
Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 367, 369-80 (1824) (violation of law of nations abroad by the
U.S., private party is to "receive a suitable redress"); The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7
Wheat.) 283, 348, 350-55 (1822); Orr v. Hodgson, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 453 (1819) (private prop-
erty rights protected by treaty); The Anne, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 435, 447-48 (1818); Chirac v.
Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817) (private property rights protected by treaty); Harden v.
Fisher, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 300 (1816) (same); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 420 (private
"privilege" under the law of nations), 423 (1815); id. at 454 (Story, J., concurring: private "privi-
lege" under the law of nations); Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198
(1815); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128-29 (1814); id. at 153 (Story, J.,
dissenting); Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1812) (private property
rights protected by treaty); Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 348-49 (1809)
(Marshall, C.J.) ("The reason for [art. III, § 2, cl. 1] .. .was, that all persons who have real
claims under a treaty should have their causes decided by the national tribunals ... Whenever a
right grows out of, or is protected by, a treaty ...whoever may have this right, it is to be
protected."); Rose v. Himley, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 276-77 (1808) (Marshall, C.J., opinion);
Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 454, 458 (1806); United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) (Marshall, C.J., opinion); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 272,
279, passim (1796); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 159-61 (1795); Glass v. The Sloop
Betsy, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 6, 14 (1794) (district court is "competent to enquire, and to decide,
whether... restitution can be made consistently with the law of nations and the treaties ....");
Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794) (Jay, C.J., opinion)
(alien's individual right "revived at the peace, both by the law of nations and the treaty of
peace"); Miller v. The Ship Resolution, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 4 ("by the law of nations" a private
person "may pursue and recover" property taken in violation of international law "in whatever
country it is found"); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Benjamins v. British
European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979) (private cause
of action implied from Warsaw Convention); People of Saipan v. United States, 502 F.2d 90, 96-
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99 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1974); Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461, 464-65 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (standing and private cause of action), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973); Gandolfo v.
Hartman, 49 F. 181, 182-83 (S.D. Cal. 1892) (private contract in violation of treaty "is absolutely
void, and should not be enforced in any court"); Manning v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 9 F. 726, 729
(C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (" 'rights, and were entitled by the law of nations to protection in them' "),
quoting Beard v. Federy, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 491-92; In re Parrott, I F. 481 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880);
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp.
at 798; Moxon v. Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 943 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895); In re Metzger, 17 F. Cas.
232, 234 (D.C. S.D.N.Y. 1847) (No. 9511); M'Grath v. Candalero, 16 F. Cas. 128 (D. S.C. 1794)
(No. 8810); Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607); In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas.
213, 217-18 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (No. 102) (Field, J., opinion); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 253 (1907)
(private or government suit); 8 Op. Att'y Gen. 411, 417-18 (1857); 3 Op. Att'y Gen. 484, 490
(1839); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 123 (1802); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 106, 107 (1802); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58-
59 (1795); and cases cited supra in notes 486-491, 494; see also The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11
Wheat.) 1 (1826). Of course, all of these cases are relevant with regard to the incorporation of
international law, individual standing, private causes of action, remedies, and so forth.
Also relevant here are the many cases recognizing that a treaty can confer title to land in the
U.S. to private individuals even without an act of Congress and that such a right is judicially
protectable. See, e.g., Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10 (1899); Best v. Polk, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
112, 116 (1873); Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 247 (1872); Crews v. Burcham, 66 U.S. (1
Black) 352, 356 (1861); Doe v. Wilson, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 457, 463 (1859); Mitchel v. United
States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 748 (1835); Godfrey v. Beardsley, 10 F. Cas. 520, 522 (C.C.D. Ind.
1841) (No. 5497). Similarly relevant are the cases recognizing that the construction of treaties is
the peculiar province of the judiciary and that Congress has no power to settle or interfere with
property rights conferred by treaties, "except in cases purely political." See, e.g., Jones v.
Meehan, 175 U.S. at 32; Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 247 (Clifford, J., opinion) ("no
constitutional power to settle or interfere with rights under treaties, except in cases purely polit-
ical"); Reichart v. Felps, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 83, 89 (1867) (Grier, J., opinion) (same, adding: "The
construction of them is the peculiar province of the judiciary, when a case shall arise between
individuals"); Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at 749; see also Santiago Ainsa v. New
Mexico & Ariz. R.R., 175 U.S. 76, 81-84 (1899); Smith v. Stevens, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 321, 327
(1870). Interestingly, these latter cases thus demonstrate an exception to the so-called "last in
time" rule whereby, in the case of an unavoidable clash between a treaty and an act of Congress,
the last in time prevails. One might call this the "rights under treaties" exception, "except in
cases purely political." Further, since human rights law is hardly "purely political," this recog-
nized exception could prove valuable for the continued protection of fundamental human rights.
See Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship, supra note 359.
For further evidence of the early expectation that individuals "could resort to the federal
courts to enforce their treaty-based claims," see Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1919 (1983), citing Memo-
randum from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (the British Minister Plenipotentiary)
(May 29, 1792), reprinted in I AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS 201, 210-11,
215 (1832). For early recognition of private rights and obligations under the law of nations, see
supra note 11; see also 3 H. GROTIUS, supra note 11, ch. 18, § I ("what is permissible for private
individuals ... by the law of nations"). An early draft of Article III of the U.S. Constitution also
declared that "the Judiciary [shall] have authority to hear and determine ... by Way of Appeal
... all cases in which foreigners may be interested in the Construction of any Treaty... or on the
Law of Nations...." Document VII of the Committee of Detail, reproduced in 2 Farrand, supra
note 83, at 157. The draft was dropped, possibly because the federal judiciary was given far more
than mere appellate jurisdiction and Document VII was conditioned on an appellate competence.
See also 3 Farrand supra note 78, at 608 (appeal of "all Causes wherein Questions shall arise on
the Construction of Treaties made by U.S. - or on the Law of Nations") (the Pinckney Plan),
117 ("as well as the trial of questions arising on the law of nations, the construction of trea-
ties .... ") (1787 Pinckney plan); 2 Farrand supra note 83, at 136 (the Pinckney Plan), 143
(legislative power to punish "offences against the law of nations"), 168 (same in Committee of
detail Doc. IX), 182 (Madison's report), 316, 570, 595, 614-15; 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FED-
ERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 292, 244, 238 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) ("foreigners where treaties
are in their favor"), 22. As the cases noted above demonstrate, subsequently there was no real
distinction made between suits resting on treaties as such or the more general law of nations; see
also Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 359. Before the North Carolina Convention, W.
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national law have occurred throughout our history. 502 Civil or crimi-
Davie had also recognized that "treaties..., by the law of nations,... are the supreme law of the
land to their respective citizens or subjects. All civilized nations have concurred in considering
them as paramount to an ordinary act of legislation." W. Davie, speech of July 28, 1788, repro-
duced in 3 Farrand, supra note 78 at 347; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton)
("cases arising upon treaties and the laws of nations" are appropriate); THE FEDERALIST No. 22
(A. Hamilton) ("treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must be considered as part
of the law of the land. Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must, like all other laws,
be ascertained by judicial determinations."); 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 477, at 158 (Davie in North
Carolina in 1788: "It was necessary that treaties should operate as laws on individuals. They
ought to be binding upon us the moment they are made. They involve in their nature not only
our own rights, but those of foreigners" and should be protected by the federal judiciary); id. at
267 (Rutledge in South Carolina in 1788: "every treaty was law paramount, and must operate
... this treaty is binding in our courts and in England" re: private duties); id. at 277-79 (Pinck-
ney: treaties are "paramount to the laws of the land," create individual rights and duties, and
have the force of law); Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism and the
Common Law of Crimes in the Early Republic, 4 LAW & HIsT. REV. 223, 232 (1986) ("law of
nations" was "within the federal judicial power ... within the language of Article III .... ").
From the many cases and authorities noted above (and infra note 502), it is evident that in terms
of the views of the Founders and patterns of practice before, during, and for years after the
Constitutional Convention customary international law was directly incorporable for both civil
and criminal sanctions despite a lack of express reference to custom in the Constitution outside of
article I, § 8, clause 10 (the concurrent power of Congress to define and punish offenses against
the "law of nations"). Thus, constitutionally, in terms of views of the Founders and relevant
practice, "[t]he judicial power"(art. III, § 1) includes the power to apply customary international
law (see also supra note 570) and the Executive is bound to faithfully execute such "Laws" (art.
II, § 3; see also Paust, The President Is Bound by International Law, supra note 395).
There is also early evidence of the expectation that private causes of action and remedies for
violations of international law were also appropriate in state courts. In 1781, a resolution of the
Continental Congress recommended that states further "authorize suits to be instituted for dam-
ages by the party injured" by a violation of international law, "and for compensation to the
United States for damage sustained by them from an injury done to a foreign power by a citizen."
See 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1137 (G. Hunt ed. 1912). See also supra
text accompanying notes 486-493, 498-499.
502. See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-30 (1942); United States v. Ajona, 120 U.S.
479 (1887); United States v. Ortega, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 467 (1826); United States v. Pirates, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820); Common-
wealth v. Schaffer, 4 U.S. xxvi, xxxi (Mayor's Ct. Pa. 1797) (argument of Ingersol & Thomas);
Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 156 (Paterson, J.), 159-61 (Iredell, J., concurring) (1795);
United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297, 298-99 (1793) (charge of Wilson, J.); Respublica v.
De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 109, 113, 115 (1784); Nathan v. Virginia, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 77, 78
(1781) (argument of counsel); United States v. White, 27 F. 200, 201-02 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1886);
United States v. Baker, 24 F. Cas. 962, 965 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 14,501); Charge to Grand
Jury, 30 F. Cas. 1026 (C.C.D. Ga. 1859) (No. 18,269a); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192
(C.C.N.Y. 1807) (No. 16,342); United States v. Liddle, 26 F. Cas. 936 (C.C.D. Pa. 1808) (No.
15,598); United States v. Jones, 26 F. Cas. 653 (C.C.D. Pa. 1813) (No. 15,494); United States v.
Hand, 26 F. Cas. 103 (C.C.D. Pa. 1810) (No. 15,297); Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1101-04,
1107-08, 1120 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360); Dole v. New England Mutual Marine Ins. Co., 7 F.
Cas. 837, 847 (C.C.D. Mass. 1864) (No. 3966) (Clifford, J., on circuit); Respublica v. Cobbett,
Wharton's State Trials 322 (Pa. 1797); 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 299-313 (1865); 1 Op. Att'y Gen.
68, 69 (1797); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 61, 62 (1796); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795); 1 Op. Att'y Gen.
52 (1794); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792); Palmer, The Federal Common Law of Crime, 4 LAW
& HIST. REV. 267, 276-78 (1986) (adding: "Livermore stated that the only reason why inferior
federal courts should be established was toenforce the law of nations"); Preyer, supra note 501;
Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL. L. REV. 99, 112-
18 (1972), and references cited therein; Randall, supra note 500, at 498, 500; see also Dow v.
Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 166 (1879) (Field, J., opinion) ("soldiers ... remain subject to the laws of
war" and "may be tried and punished"); The Admiral, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 603, 615 (1865); United
States v. The Cargo of the Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232, 235 (1844); United
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nal sanctions for private violations of international law were often
interchangeable depending on who was seeking enforcement, an indi-
vidual, the government or both.50 3 And there have been several in-
States v. The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (I 1 Wheat.) at 9, 20, 29 (arguments of counsel); id. at 40-
41 (opinion); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 76-7, 99 (1825) (argument of counsel); id. at
122; United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, app. 8 n.1 (1820) (argument of counsel
using speech by John Marshall: "piracy under the law of nations"); United States v. Palmer, 16
U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818) ("offences against the human race"); The Hiram, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
440, 446 (1816) ("cases punishable under the law of nations"); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) 110, 134 (1814) (Story, J., dissenting) ("crime; by the laws of war"); United States v.
Guinet, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 321 (1795) (prosecution of neutrality violation); The Ambrose Light, 25
F. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1885); Williams' Case, 29 F. Cas. 1330 (C.C.D. Conn. 1799) (No. 17,708); 7
Op. Att'y Gen. 367, 369 (1855); 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 559 (1833); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 509, 513 (1821); 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at 68; J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CON-
VENTION OF 1787 29 (notes on Randolph's remarks on May 29, 1787 re: defects of the confeder-
ation: "that they could not cause infractions of treaties or of the law of nations, to be punished");
E. McDOWELL, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1975 168, 171
(1976) ("crime... an offense against the human rights of passengers and crew").
For relevant British cases, see The Fortuna, 165 Eng. Rep. 1240, 1241, 1 Dodson's Rep. 81,
85 (1811) ("any trade contrary to the general law of nations ... may subject the vessel employed
in that trade to confiscation"); Madrazo v. Willes, 106 Eng. Rep. 692, 694, 5 Sergt. & Lowb. 313,
3 BE ALD 353, 358 (1820) (Best, J.) ("If a ship be acting contrary to the general law of nations,
she is thereby subject to confiscation"), quoted in Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.)
193, 213 (1836); 3 Elliot, supra note 85, at 507 (Nicholas in Virginia, 1788, recounting British
punishment of "offence against the law of nations"). In Madrazo, Judge Bailey also recognized
the broad right of aliens to a remedy: "A British Court ofjustice is always open to the subjects of
all countries in amity with us, and they are entitled to compensation for any wrongful act done
by a British subject to them." Id. (emphasis added). These cases also appeared in the appendix
to The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
President Washington's Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793 had warned U.S. citizens that
they were liable to punishment under the law of nations and would be prosecuted in U.S. courts.
See, e.g., Proclamation of Neutrality No. 3, April 22, 1793, reprinted in 11 Stat. 753 (App. 1859),
cited and discussed in 1 Op. Att'y Gen. at 58. For early recognition of a "crime against the law
of nations," see supra note 11 and infra note 597.
In 1781, the Continental Congress had recommended to the states that they enact laws to
punish offenses against the law of nations. See 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
1136-37 (G. Hunt ed. 1912). The 1781 resolution listed certain violations and ended with general
clauses incorporating all "infractions of treaties and conventions to which the United States are a
party" and all "offences against the law of nations, not contained in the foregoing enumeration."
Id. at 1137; see also Note, Enforcing the Customary International Law of Human Rights in Fed-
eral Courts, 74 CAL. L. REV. 127, 129-30 n.15 (1986).
503. See cases and opinions cited supra in notes 486-488, 501-502; United States v. The
Cargo of the Brig. Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 235 (both confiscation and compensation in
damages are possible remedies); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 160 (alien can proceed
"criminaliter or civiliter, to have restitution of his vessel"); United States v, La Jeune Eugenie, 26
F. Cas. 832, 845-48 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551); Davison v. Seal-skins, 7 F. Cas. 192, 194
(C.C.D. Conn. 1835) (No. 3661) (civil suit to recover property taken by pirates is also possible); 3
Op. Att'y Gen. 484, 490 (1839) (same); I Op. Att'y Gen. 141, 147 (1804) (foreign minister may
civilly "prosecute" an offence against the law of nations "either in the district or the Supreme
Court of the United States, or by an indictment in the district court" - civil prosecution in the
district court probably would have occurred under the Alien Tort Act); Paust, Litigating Human
Rights, supra note 468, at 84-85, 90-91; Randall, supra note 500, at 41, 48-50, 498-99; Note, supra
note 502, at 129, 130 n. 15 (Continental Congress had early recommended to the states that they
punish offenses against the law of nations and also "'authorize suits for damages by the party
injured' "), 137 & n.63 (quoting Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 864 (D.
Md. 1961)), 147 n. 119 ("both civil and criminal liability in any jurisdiction where the perpetrator
might be found"); see also Dickinson, The Law of Nations As Part of the National Law of the
United States, 101 PA. L. REV. 26, 29-30 (1952); supra note 372.
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stances of litigation by private persons against our governments (both
federal and local) and foreign governments concerning actions that in-
volved violations of international law.50 For example, in one of the
more recent human rights cases, District Judge Rogers recognized
that "[i]nternational law is a part of the laws of the United States
which federal courts are bound to ascertain and administer in an ap-
propriate case." 5 5 "[A]rbitrary detention," he noted, "is prohibited
by customary international law"50 6 and "[t]herefore is judicially reme-
dial as a violation of international law."'50 7  He added "[t]his Court is
bound to declare such an abuse and to order its cessation .... [T]he
courts cannot deny... protection .... "508
The propriety of judicial attention to rights and duties of individu-
als under customary international law has also been affirmed more ex-
pressly by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1942:
From the very beginning of its history this Court has recognized and
applied the law of war as including that part of the law of nations which
prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of...
individuals. 5°9
And, as noted previously, the Court had recognized earlier in a
landmark opinion that international law "must be ascertained and ad-
ministered by the courts ... as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented. ' 510  With respect to treaty-based rights,
the Supreme Court has also noted that certain rights are:
capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the
country... A treaty, then, is a law of the land as an Act of Congress is,
whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the pri-
504. See, e.g., Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
677 (1900); United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. at 233; Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. at 517;
The Apollon, 22 U.S. at 367, 369-71; The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. at 350-55; Brown v.
United States, 12 U.S. at 128-29, 153; Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 9, 16;
Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980); see also Paust, Federal Jurisdiction
Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International
Law Under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191 (1983) [hereinafter
Paust, Federal Jurisdiction]; Randall, supra note 500, at 496, 509; supra note 494.
505. Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. at 798.
506. Id.; see also supra notes 423, 448.
507. Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F.Supp. at 798.
508. Id. at 799-800.
509. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27-28; see also Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
at 536 (argument of counsel: "the law of nations is ... as binding and obligatory upon courts of
justice, and upon individuals, as any other part of the common law"); Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S.
at 436-37 (a private right acquired by custom "is as inviolable as if it was founded on a written
law."), 439 (duty to apply international law); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 421; Miller v.
The Ship Resolution, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 33 (court duty to administer "the law of nations dispas-
sionately and righteously").
510. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (emphasis added); see also supra notes 467, 509
and infra notes 511, 513, 515, 570, 596.
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vate citizen or subject may be determined. 51"
Applying this language more recently, Circuit Judge Trask, in a
concurrence, affirmed that if a "treaty contains language which con-
fers rights or obligations on the citizenry ... then, upon ratification, it
becomes a part of the law of the land under Article VI."'5 2  The
Supreme Court, with a more mandatory tone, has also noted in this
regard:
A treaty.., by the express words of the Constitution, is the supreme law
of the land, binding alike National and state Courts, and is capable of
enforcement, and must be enforced by them in the litigation of private
rights.
5 13
Similarly, the Court has declared, with respect to private rights guar-
anteed by a treaty, that a treaty:
stands on the same footing of supremacy as do the provisions of the
Constitution and laws of the United States. It operates of itself without
the aid of any legislation, state or national; and it will be applied and
given authoritative effect by the courts.
514
Early in our history, while addressing the purpose of article III, sec-
tion 2, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution and the general right to judi-
cial protection of treaty-based rights, Chief Justice Marshall affirmed:
The reason for inserting that clause in the constitution was, that all per-
511. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. at 598-99, adding: "the court resorts to the treaty for a
rule of decision for the case before it, as it would to a statute." The same point can be found in
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 419, Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. at 438, and In re Metzger,
17 F. Cas. at 234 ("It has been repeatedly decided by the supreme court that under ... the
constitution, a treaty becomes equivalent to a law of congress, and where its stipulations apply,
they must be observed and enforced by the court, in adjudging.., upon individual rights .... ");
see also Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. at 563 (Field, J., dissenting) (" 'treaties must
continue to operate as part of our municipal law, and be obeyed by the people, applied by the
judiciary and executed by the President, while they continue unrepealed' "); Baker v. City of
Portland, 2 F. Cas. at 473 (treaty "is the supreme law of the land, and the courts are bound to
enforce it fully and fairly"); Blandford v. State, 10 Tex. App. 627, 640-41 (1881) (treaties are "to
be regarded and enforced by the State judiciary as equivalent to acts of the Legislature, without
the aid of legislative enactments ... duty of the courts of the State to take cognizance of, con-
strue, and give effect to the treaties"); Commonwealth v. Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697, 702-03
(1878) (treaty is "a living law, operating upon and binding the judicial tribunals, state and fed-
eral, and these tribunals are under the same obligations to notice and give it effect as they are to
notice and enforce the constitution ....").
512. People of Saipan v. United States, 502 F.2d at 101 (Trask, J., concurring); see also id. at
96-97 (private cause of action); cf. Paust, Effective Litigation, supra note 182, at 238-42, and
references cited therein.
513. Maiorano v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 213 U.S. at 272-73 (emphasis added); see also Fellows
v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 366, 372 (1857); Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 439;
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 360, 370-71; Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9
U.S. (5 Cranch) at 348-49; Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dail.) at 237 ("National or federal judges
are bound by duty and oath to the same conduct" as state judges); In re Parrott, I F. at 502;
cases cited supra notes 509, 511, and infra note 515.
514. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. at 341; see also LaAbra Silver Mining Co. v. United
States, 175 U.S. at 458, 461 (private claim of right under a treaty is undoubtedly "susceptible of
judicial determination"); Blandford v. State, 10 Tex. App. at 640-41.
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sons who have real claims under a treaty should have their causes de-
cided by the national tribunals.... Whenever a right grows out of, or is
protected by, a treaty, it is sanctioned against all the laws and judicial
decisions of the states; and whoever may have this right, it is to be
protected. 51
5
Private acts in violation of treaties conferring private rights also
received the early attention of the Court in connection with attempts
to enforce private contracts. As Chief Justice Taney declared in 1852,
individual citizens are "personally bound" by treaties. 51 6 An individ-
ual, the Chief Justice noted, "can do no act, nor enter into any agree-
ment" in violation of a treaty, adding: "And if he does so he cannot
claim the aid of a court of justice to enforce it.''517 Later, while quot-
ing the Chief Justice, a lower federal court affirmed that a private con-
tract in contravention of a treaty recognizing ,equal treatment for
Chinese and U.S. citizens "is absolutely void, and should not be en-
forced in any court." 51
8
More recently, in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,519 the District Court for
the Eastern District of New York awarded punitive damages of ten
million dollars to private litigants, primarily because of the serious na-
ture of the violation of international law engaged in by the private
defendant. 520 The district court noted that Congress, by enacting the
Alien Tort Statute, had also given the federal courts "power to choose
and develop federal remedies to effectuate the purposes of the interna-
tional law incorporated into United States common law. ' 521 The
court noted further that it "must adopt a remedy appropriate to the
ends and reflective of the nature of the condemnation" of torture made
generally by the international community;522 and, since it viewed the
particular infraction as being quite serious, the court decided that pu-
515. Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 348-49 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.).
516. Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38, 50 (1852). On this point, see supra note
501; Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 359.
517. Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38, 50 (1852); see also Hurd v. Hodge, 334
U.S. 24, 35 (1948) (private agreements subject to public policy of the United States manifest in
treaties); and supra note 498. It was recognized earlier in England that "a claim founded on
piracy, or any other act which, in the general estimation of mankind, is held to be illegal and
immoral, might.., be rejected in any Court upon that ground alone." The Diana, 165 Eng. Rep.
1245, 1247, 1 Dodson's Rep. 95, 100 (1813); see also Madrazo v. Willes, 106 Eng. Rep. 692, 693,
5 Sergt. & Lowb. 313 (1820) (Bayley, J.), stating: "It is true, that if this were a trade contrary to
the law of nations, a foreigner could not maintain this action."
518. Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 F. 181, 182-83 (S.D. Cal. 1892).
519. 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
520. Id. at 863-67.
521. Id. at 863; see also Randall, supra note 500, at 499 (Act recognizes "the duty of the
tortfeasor to compensate the injured alien.").
522. Id. at 863.
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nitive damages were appropriate. 523 The court also noted that
although punitive damages have rarely been awarded by international
or domestic tribunals in cases involving violations of international law
such cases exist as precedent and that, moreover, "[t]he Supreme
Court... has recognized that punishment is an appropriate objective
under the law of nations, saying. . . that [a particular infraction] '...
may be punished by all the penalties which the law of nations can
properly administer.' "524
Actually, the law of nations hardly ever prescribes appropriate
penalties or civil sanctions. This fact, however, has not inhibited ap-
plication of civil or criminal sanctions for more than two hundred
years (and whether or not a statutory aid exists). Moreover, as recog-
nized at least since 1792, the power to develop remedies to effectuate
international law recognizably exists: "the law of nations ... is en-
forced by ... the municipal law of the country; which ... may...
facilitate or improve the execution of its decisions, by any means they
shall think best, provided the great universal law remains
unaltered."5
25
B. Deviant Opinions in Tel-Oren
Despite such clear guidance and ample precedent, however, a few
federal judges still stray from the proper application of international
law and seem needlessly to be unaware of the rich history of judicial
attention to individual rights and duties under international law. One
such instance is evident in the controversial and unexpected opinions
of Judges Edwards and Bork in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,526 a
523. Id. at 863-67.
524. Id. at 865, quoting The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (II Wheat.) 1, 41 (1826) (Story, J.,
opinion). On the punitive damages issue, the court also cited I'm Alone (Can. v. U.S.), 3 U.N. R.
Int'l Arb. Awards 1069; Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259, 266-67 (D.D.C. 1980)
(Green, J., opinion) (also awarding attorney's fees; id. at 267-68). 577 F. Supp. at 865; see also
The Apollon, 22 U.S. at 374 ("vindictive damages"), 377 ("aggravated or vindictive damages")
(also awarding attorney's fees; id. at 376, 379); Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) at 115, 124 (there, no "vindictive" damages); C. PARRY & J. GRANT, ENCYCLOPAEDIC
DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83, "damages, punitive" (1986).
525. See Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 160, 162 (1792) (M'Kean, C.J.) (also recogniz-
ing a resolution of the Continental Congress of Jan. 15, 1780, resolving "that the trials in the
Court of Appeals be according to the usage of nations, and not by Jury" - a point related to the
need to apply an international versus local content, and an historic fact that is probably related to
the lack of a jury trial in suits under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1350 or 1330(a) and 1602-1607); see also draft
opinion of Justice Paterson (c. 1797), transcript in 300 Bancroft Collection 555-75 (N.Y. Pub.
Lib.), reprinted in Casto, The Federal Courts' Original Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Vio-
lation of the Laws of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 528 (1986) ("the common law... compre-
hends the law of nations .... common law .. .annexes a sanction or penalty of a fine and
imprisonment"); Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. at 116-17; supra text accompanying notes
486-494.
526. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Interestingly, the Government's Brief submitted to the
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relatively recent decision in the Circuit Court for the District of Co-
lumbia. Of the two opinions, that of Judge Edwards is closer to the
precedents, but at least one point at issue seemed to throw his analysis
off - that of individual duties or liability under international law. As
Judge Edwards stated, without evident familiarity with the cases and
opinions noted above, "I do not believe the law of nations imposes the
same responsibility or liability on non-state actors ... as it does on
states and persons acting under color of state law."'527 Later he added,
wrongly:
I do not believe that the law of nations.., holds individuals responsible
for most private acts; it follows logically that the law of nations provides
no substantive right to be free from the private acts of individuals, and
persons harmed by such acts have no right, under the law of nations, to
assert in federal courts.
528
After calling twice for "direction from the Supreme Court" 529 and
rightly noting that "[t]hrough the 18th century and into the 19th,
writers and jurists believed that rules of international law bound indi-
viduals as well as states," a530 he opined, incorrectly, that by the twenti-
eth century a view (shared by a few positivist textwriters) "became
firmly entrenched" that "states alone were subjects of international
law, and they alone were able to assert rights and be held to duties
devolved from the law of nations."' 531 Greater attention to the gui-
dance offered already by the Supreme Court (as noted above) should
U.S. Supreme Court urging denial of the petition for a writ of certiorari argued: "The panel's
inability to agree upon a rationale for its ruling ... coupled with the length and complexity of the
three concurring opinions, leaves the precise basis and scope of the appeals' judgment unclear.
Left undisturbed, that ambiguous judgment would have little, if any, precedential value." See
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Jan. 30, 1985, at 8-9, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 427,
431-32 (Mar. 1985).
527. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 776 (Edwards, J., concurring); see also
infra note 540.
528. Id. at 780 n.4; see also id. at 792. Unfortunately, law students have begun to follow
such unfounded theory instead of recognizing actual trends in judicial decisionmaking which
refute such nonsense. See Note, Enforcing International Human Rights Law in Federal Courts:
The Alien Tort Statute and the Separation of Powers, 74 GEO. L. J. 163, 167, 190, 196-97 (1985).
But see id. at 165 ("human rights norms are now part of the Alien Tort Statute's law of nations
clause"). It is also nonsense to argue that individual responsibility, civil and/or criminal, has
been limited here or abroad "to a small class of 'crimes against humanity'...." See id. at 197,
supposedly following the unfounded theory of Professor Hassan noted in Hassan, International
Human Rights and the Alien Tort Statute: Past and Future, 5 Hous. J. INT'L L. 131, 134 n.16,
136 (1982). Professor Hassan's actual remarks, however unempirical, were less restrictive. See
Hassan, id. at 136-37.
529. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic at 776, 792; see also id. at 775, 795.
530. Id. at 794, citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153; Respublica v. De
Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) I11.
531. Id., at 794, citing Korowicz, The Problem of the International Personality of Individuals,
50 AM. J. INT'L L. 533, 535, 541 (1956); Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 63
L.Q. REV. 438, 439-40 (1947). This error is being repeated. See Note, supra note 502, at 130-31;
cf id. at 131-32 (exception re: post-World War II human rights).
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have led Judge Edwards to abandon his impression that twentieth cen-
tury persons have no rights or duties "devolved from the law of na-
tions." Unfortunately, he seemed to be unfamiliar with the ample
judicial precedent concerning the use of human right precepts and
more general international law in private litigation. His conclusion,
which is conspicuously out of line with relevant trends in domestic
judicial decisionmaking, is more difficult to understand when he rec-
ognizes that "a number of [twentieth century] jurists and commenta-
tors" disagree with his viewpoint and that, at the international level,
the International Military Tribunal also affirmed in the twentieth cen-
tury that the law of nations "imposes duties and liabilities upon indi-
viduals as well as upon States. '5 32
Notably absent also from Judge Edwards' analysis was any men-
tion of the fact that human rights law has received even greater atten-
tion domestically and internationally in the twentieth century and
that, as a part of such law, individuals have the express right to an
effective remedy in national tribunals for deprivations of their human
rights.5 33 Similarly, he, like his colleagues, made no mention of the
532. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 792; see also Paust, My Lai and Viet-
nam, supra note 502; Paust, Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 504, at 211-15, 223-25, and refer-
ences cited therein; Randall, supra note 500, at 492-501, and references cited therein.
533. See also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 780 n.4 ("Plaintiffs here are not
able to point to a right to sue in international law"). On this right, see supra text accompanying
notes 466-482. Judge Edwards even goes so far as to say that "the law of nations never has been
perceived to create or define the civil actions to be made available," adding: "the law of nations
simply does not create rights to sue." 726 F.2d at 778-79. He also stated that "for two hundred
years, it has been established that the law of nations leaves up to municipal law whether to
provide a right of action to enforce obligations created by the law of nations." Not surprisingly,
he is unable to cite a single case standing for such invented notions. Of course, article 8 of the
Universal Declaration stands in opposition to such rash and erroneous assertions, and so do the
many cases and opinions noted above. See, e.g., supra notes 477, 479-480, 483, 486-491, 501,
509.
Strangely, Judge Edwards does recognize: "In obvious contrast is a treaty, which may create
judicially enforceable obligations ... Unlike the law of nations .... treaties establish both obliga-
tions and the extent to which they shall be enforceable ... As Judge Bork states, for two hundred
years it has been established that treaties by their terms and context may create enforceable
obligations." 726 F.2d at 778 n.2. He adds: "a treaty and the law of nations are entirely differ-
ent animals." Id. A recent student note follows the approach of Judge Edwards. See Note supra
note 385, at 958. To be kind, it is far from obvious, however, that they are. More generally, the
phrase "law of nations" has been used like the phrase "international law" to cover both custom
and treaty-based law. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 999 (international law), 1076 (law of
nations) (3d ed. 1933); C. PARRY & J. GRANT, supra note 524, at 210, "law of nations" (is
synonymous with "international law"); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 560 (argu-
ment of counsel: "all the voluntary and customary law of nations"); La Nereyda, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 108, 142'(1823) (argument of counsel quoting The Estrella); The Estrella, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 298, 307 (1819) ("The customary and conventional law of nations"); L'Invincible, 14
U.S. at 248 (argument of counsel: "customary, and conventional law of nations"); Thirty Hogs-
heads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815) (Marshall, C.J., opinion) ("The law
of nations... is in part unwritten, and in part conventional"); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at
215 (argument of counsel: "the conventional, or customary, law of nations"); id. at 227 (Chase,
J., opinion) ("The law of nations may be considered of three kinds, to wit: general, conventional,
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significant brief by the Executive in Filartiga quoted above with regard
both to private rights and duties under international law. 534 Again, he
identified a few of the federal judicial decisions and an opinion of the
U.S. Attorney General, all from the twentieth century, which stand as
"support for the concept of individual responsibility, 5 35 and he noted
other early cases on this point. 536 He was unable to cite a single fed-
eral case supporting his view that it is now "firmly entrenched" that
individuals are "not able to assert rights and be held to duties devolved
from the law of nations. ' 537 To be kind to Judge Edwards, his review
of the actual trends in decision was far from adequate and his reason-
ing and conclusions on this point are less than convincing. There are
no cases dictating his conclusions, nor has any federal judge previously
declared that private duties are nonexistent under international law.
Such a statement would, in fact, be patently false.
Seemingly at the base of Judge Edwards' curious remarks about
individual responsibility was an unnecessary confusion with respect to
the nature and functioning of international legal processes and the role
of domestic tribunals in the identification, clarification and application
or customary"); Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 1026, 1031 (1859) (No. 18,269a) (Wayne, J.)
("The law of nations is in part natural, in part conventional"); Christian County Court v. Rankin
& Tharp, 63 Ky. (2 Duvall) 502, 505-06 (1866); 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 299 (1865) ("law of
nations" includes treaties and "laws of nations ... are of binding force upon the departments and
citizens of the Government, though not defined by any law of Congress"); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57,
58-59 (1795); Resolution of 1781, 21 JOURNAL OF CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1136-37 (offenses
against the law of nations include all infractions of treaties and conventions); J. BOuVIER, supra
note 151, at 4-5; 1 KENT'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 28, at 3-4, 12, 19-20,passim; E. VATTEL,
THE LAW OF NATIONS preliminaries, §§ 24-27 (1758), reprinted in E. VATTEL, THE LAW OF
NATIONS 62-3 (J. Chitty ed. 1856); H. WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (3d
ed. 1846) (international law as law of nations); I.L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 480, at 4; J.
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 1 (5th ed. 1955); see also The Commercen, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.)
382, 391 (1816) ("modern conventional law of nations); the draft of art. III of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, supra note 501; Davie, supra note 501; and cases cited supra in notes 2, 501. Moreover, in
the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh Supreme Court cases to use the phrase "inter-
national law," the interchangeable use of the phrase "law of nations" also appears. See The
London Packet, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 371, 373 & n.a (appendix) (1817); The Eleanor, 15 U.S. (2
Wheat.) 345, 362 & n.a (appendix) (1817); The Anna Maria, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 327, 335 & n.a
(appendix) (1817); The Dos Hermanos, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 76, 99 & n.a (appendix)(1817); The
Commercen, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 382, 387, 389-91 n.b., 397-98 (1816); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 388, 418-25, 433-35, 438, 449, 454 (1815).
Similarly, Congress, in exercising its power to define and punish offences against the "law of
nations" under art. I, § 8, cl. 10, has punished offences regulated by treaty as well as those
regulated by the more general law of nations. The last two British works (Oppenheim & Brierly)
were cited otherwise by Judge Edwards but ignored on this point. In any event, as noted above,
customary law has been found to "create enforceable obligations." See, e.g., supra notes 486-491,
501-502. On the customary nature of article 8 of the Universal Declaration, see also M. McDou-
GAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 166, at 272-74, 302, 325-30.
534. See supra text accompanying notes 483-485.
535. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 792-93, & n.24.
536. See id. at 793 (Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607)), 794 (United
States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153; Respublica v. De Longchamps, I U.S. (1 Dall.) 111.
537. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 794; see also id. at 776, 780 n.4.
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of international law, a role demonstrated clearly even in federal judi-
cial opinions since the late 1700s. Judge Edwards seems to have as-
sumed that merely because there had been a lack of full and effective
judicial remedies for all private persons at the international level, non-
state actors could (and can) assert rights only through diplomatic
processes, 538 that states alone were (and are) able to assert rights, 539
and that only states or those acting "under color of state law" were
(and are) liable.540 Not one of these assumptions is correct however,
and the actual trends in judicial decision noted above provide sufficient
refutation.
In several of our own cases, non-state actors have asserted rights
538. See id. at 792 & n.22. This error is being repeated. See Note, supra note 528, at 176-77
& nn.109-110. But see id. at 177 n.115.
539. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 792, 794. For a related and con-
fused definition of the "law of nations" that is equally erroneous in its insistence on state involve-
ment, see Cohen v. Hartman, 634 F.2d 318, 319 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Note, supra note 502, at
139-41 (recognizing that two earlier cases had adopted a "statist conception of international law"
prior to the "seminal" decision in Filartiga).
Judge Edwards also stated that "[c]lassical international law was predominantly statist" and
the fact "[tihat the International Court of Justice permits only party-states to appear in cases
before the court highlights this outlook." 726 F.2d at 792 n.22. Again, he demonstrates confu-
sion here with respect to the nature and functioning of international law both at the international
and domestic levels. It does not follow that merely because private claims cannot be brought
directly before the I.C.J. that they can be brought nowhere else. Further, "classical" interna-
tional law of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as demonstrated herein by actual trends in
decision, was not "predominantly statist," although remedies at the international level were pri-
marily state-controlled. Within the overall process, domestic courts and other remedial
processes were expected to play and did play a primary role with respect to individual claims; see
also Interhandel Case (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6, 27-28 (U.S. courts are competent to apply
international law in case where private foreign claims are brought against U.S. Executive, and
such domestic remedies must first be exhausted before private claim can be taken up by foreign
state). Here, Judge Edwards would turn history on its head to deny private claims and remedies
in domestic courts, but history cannot be thus manipulated. The trends in actual decision with
respect to private claims, private violations, and private remedies should no longer be ignored.
Importantly also, not one of the writers that Judge Edwards cites for his viewpoint addressed
actual trends in judicial decision at the domestic level. See 726 F.2d at 792-94, and references
cited therein. All referred to remedies available at the international level; and, significantly, the
early textwriters disagreed among themselves on this latter question. See infra note 601. This is
the area of disagreement that Judge Edwards got a glimpse of, not remedies at the domestic level.
540. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 792-93. This error is being re-
peated. See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1546 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Kirgis, Comment,
82 AM. J. INT'L L. 323, 329, 330 n. 31 (1988); Note, supra note 528, at 190, 194, 196-98, also
quoting Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Human Rights Claims: The
Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga, 22 HARV. INT'L L. J. 53, 110 n.240 (1981) (erroneously
suggesting a need for acts to be "sufficiently state-related"). But see Note, supra note 528, at 198
(human rights law is violated by nonstate actors re: terrorism); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770
F.2d 202, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., opinion) ("Alien Tort Statute ... may conceivably
have been meant to cover only private, nongovernmental acts...," although relevant customary
international law thought not to "reach private, nonstate conduct of this sort for the reasons
stated by Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren ... at 791-96 .. "); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp.
at 1540-41 ("defendant's contention that the law of nations extends only to relations between
sovereign states is unsupported" and "[t]he Second Circuit has expressly disavowed this ....
purely private torture will not normally implicate the law of nations .... ").
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under international law in our domestic tribunals. 541 And in several
U.S. cases, private individuals who were not acting "under color of
state law" were recognizably liable both civilly and criminally for vio-
lations of international law. 542 Indeed, Judge Edwards' purported dis-
tinction between private liability flowing from acts "under color of
state law" and acts "separate from any state's authority or direc-
tion"5 43 had simply been invented, 5 " for there are no cases or opinions
of our Attorneys General even suggesting such a dichotomy, much
less that individual responsibility under international law is somehow
less clear or proper if the private actor was not acting "under color of
state law." If anything, purely private conduct is more clearly sanc-
541. See supra notes 483, 485-491, 500-501, 503, 511, 514, 519; see also supra notes 516-518.
542. See supra notes 483, 486-491. 500-503, 511-513, 519; see also 2 J. KENT supra note 28,
at 3 ("The law of nations... is equally binding in every age, and upon all mankind"); E. VAT-
TEL, supra note 411, at preliminaries, § 11 (all persons are "bound to the performance of their
duties towards the rest of mankind"); A. GENTILI, supra note 11 (pirates "had violated the
common law of nations ... Piracy is contrary to the law of nations"); supra notes 516-518.
543. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 793; see also id. at 776, 780 n.4, 792,
794-95.
544. He nearly blames Professor Louis Sohn for this invented dichotomy. See id. at 793,
citing Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than
States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 9-11 (1982). Actually, Professor Sohn made no such distinction but
asserted instead that today there can be doubt "that individuals are punishable." See id. at 11. It
is true that Professor Sohn had stated, quite incorrectly, that events at the end of World War II
"completely changed the status of individuals under international law" (see id. at 9); and Judge
Edwards followed suit: "Commentators routinely place the origin of this development [i.e., indi-
vidual liability] at the Nuremberg Trials." Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 793,
citing Sohn supra at 9-1I. But, again, Professor Sohn made no distinction between those acting
"under color of state law" and those who do not. Moreover, as our own judicial decisions from
the time of Respublica v. De Longchamps and Henfield's Case demonstrate, Professor Sohn's
assertion about the "origin" of individual responsibility (Edwards' phrase) or the "complete
change" of individual status (paraphrasing Sohn) is simply incorrect. Individual responsibility
was recognized at least since 1474 and, in our own country, in hundreds of cases from the time of
the American Revolution. See, e.g., Paust, After My Lai, supra note 502, at 106, 108-118, and
references cited therein.
Importantly also, Sohn's article should have provided sufficient guidance to Judge Edwards
concerning "the liability of private individuals" in the twentieth century. Compare 726 F.2d at
792-94 with Sohn, supra at 10-11 & nn.30 and 35. Professor Sohn rightly noted that such liability
exists also at the international level, although many of the treaties he cited are by their terms
enforced primarily in domestic tribunals, so it is not proper to associate even Sohn's erroneous
statement about the "origin" of such responsibility with the confusion evident in Edwards' opin-
ion about sanctions available at the international level and the relationship between a lack of full
and complete remedies in the international arena and supposedly "logical" conclusions that there
are no rights "to be free from the private acts of individuals" or "to assert in a federal court." 726
F.2d at 780 n.4. Edwards seems to note that, here at least, Sohn is innocent. See id. at 792
("shift since 1945 in individual rights and duties under international law"), 793 ("individual
liability . . . well-implanted in the law of nations"). It is a bit of a mystery, however, why
Edwards chose to follow the older and erroneous views of a few positivists (i.e., Korowicz and
Lauterpacht, see 726 F.2d at 794) instead of Sohn's, the treaties cited by Sohn, and the other
writers, cases and opinions noted by Judge Edwards which recognize the fact of individual liabil-
ity under international law (see 726 F.2d at 792-94). The dichotomous myth invented by Judge
Edwards has also recently misled others. See Note, supra note 385, at 961. But see id. at n.1 17
(noting no distinction between state and non-state actors under the 1949 Genocide Convention
and 1926 Slavery Convention).
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tionable, since there is not even a possible hint of any claim to immu-
nity in such cases.
It is worth stressing here, however, that when international law
has been violated, even those acting in the name of the state should not
be entitled to immunity.5 45 Judges Edwards and Bork were both in
545. See, e.g., Paust, Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 504, at 220-47, and references cited
therein; Note, supra note 385, at 963-65; Note, supra note 502, at 176 n.278, 181 n.294; Bazyler,
Litigating the International Law of Human Rights: A "How to"Approach, 7 WHITTIER L. REV.
713, 732-35 (1985); Lillich, remarks, 79 PROC. AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 84, 91 (1985); Draft Brief
Concerning Claims to Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Human Rights: Nonimmunity for Viola-
tions of International Law Under the FSIA, 8 Hous. J. INT'L L. 49 (1985), and cases cited
therein; Comment, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and International Human Rights
Agreements: How They Co-Exist, 17 U.S.F. L. REV. 71 (1982); Comment, A Theory for the
Application of the Customary International Law of Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE
J. INT'L L. 332 ,357-59 (1988); Comment, The Former American Hostages' Human Rights
Claims Against Iran: Can TheyBe Waived? 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 101, 114-17 (1981); cf Randall,
supra note 500, at 509; Note, supra note 528, at 201; Halberstam, Sabbatino Resurrected: The
Act of State Doctrine in the Revised Restatement of US. Foreign Relations Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L
L. 68 (1985). On the meaning of Sabbatino, compare Halberstam, supra, with letter, 18 VA. J.
INT'L L. 601 (1978). Since the first article was published, the Sixth Circuit has also recognized a
"treaty exception" to the act of state doctrine which obviously could apply to a violation of a
treaty protecting human rights. See Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military
Government of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422, 425-27 (6th Cir. 1984); see also Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 425-28 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S.Ct. 683
(1989); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1534, 1540-41 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en
banc), vacated & remanded on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 623
F. Supp. 246, 253-56 (D.D.C. 1985); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. at 862 (where clear
violation of international law exists, it is appropriate for judicial application and "there is no...
justifiable offense to" a foreign state when jurisdiction is exercised); cases cited in Draft Brief on
Nonimmunity, supra; American Int'l Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522, 524-
26 (D.D.C. 1980); Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585, 604 (1980); Alfred Dunhill London,
Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 707-11 (1976) (app. 1, Letter from the Legal Adviser,
U.S. Dep't of State); Leigh & Sandler, Dunhill: Toward a Reconsideration of Sabbatino, 16 VA. J.
INT'L L. 685, 697 (1976); Paust, Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 504, at 242-44, and numerous
references cited therein. Contra Siderman v. Argentina, No. CV82-1772-RMT (MCx) (March 7,
1985) (Takasugi, J., opinion). In addition to the cases on nonimmunity cited in Paust, Federal
Jurisdiction, supra, see United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass.
1821) (No. 15,551) (law of nations "may be enforced by a court of justice, whenever it arises in
judgment" and re: "an offence against the universal law of society.., no nation can rightfully
permit its subjects to carry it on, or exempt them . . .[and] no nation can privilege itself to
commit a crime against the law of nations .. "); 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 356, 362-63 (1859) ("A
sovereign who tramples upon the public law of the world cannot excuse himself by pointing to a
provision in his own municipal code ... public law must be paramount to local law in every
question where local laws are in conflict"); 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 725, 726 (1835) (Vattel thinks that a
foreign consul should be given immunity from criminal prosecution " 'unless he violates the law
of nations by some enormous crime' "), quoting J. KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAW, Lect. 2, at 44 (1826), quoting 2 E. VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, ch. 2, § 34 (1758); see
also infra notes 578-579.
As recognized implicitly in the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the pretended cloak of sovereignty ends where human rights begin. See generally Paust,
Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 504, at 221-25, 229-3 1, and references cited therein; 79 PROC.
AM. SOC. INT'L L. 363, 378 (1985); Note, supra note 502, at 168; see also supra note 466; Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21(3); Paust, Authority: From a Human Rights Perspec-
tive, 28 AM. J. JURISP. 64 (1983); Paust, Political Oppression in the Name of National Security:
Authority, Participation, and the Necessity Within Democratic Limits Test, 9 YALE J. WORLD
PUB. ORD. 178 (1982); United States v. Von Leeb (The High Command Case)(1948); 11 TRIALS
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error, therefore, when they stated that jurisdiction over Libya is neces-
OF WAR CRIMINALS 462, 489 (1950) ("International law operates as a restriction and limitation
on the sovereignty of nations.") One such condition involves the duty of every state, through
joint and/or separate action, to respect and observe "human rights and fundamental freedoms in
accordance with the Charter." See 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law, G.A.
Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); see also U.N.
CHARTER, preamble, arts. 1(3), 55(c), 56; Paust, Effective Litigation, supra note 182, at 235-38,
and references cited therein. For these reasons, it should be universally recognized that an illegal
act is incapable of protection by the judiciary. To hold otherwise would be to further illegality,
to give it extraterritorial recognition and legal effect, to fulfill its illegal nature at the hands of a
court of law. This a court of law must not do. Thus, a violation of law poses the one necessary
exception to immunity, one implicit necessarily in any truly legal system; see also supra notes 477
and infra 578-579.
Acts taken in violation of international law are not and cannot be acts performed in the
exercise of a state's legitimate sovereign authority since no state has the authority to violate
international law. Moreover, such acts are recognizable treated also as if they are outside the
sovereign function and are like merely "private" acts which are not entitled to immunity. See,
e.g., Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F.Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980) (cannot claim sovereign
immunity because no lawful discretion exists to perpetrate conduct in violation of international
law); M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 703 n.537
(1961); Wright, Legal Positivism and the Nuremberg Judgment, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 405, 410-11
(1948); Wright, War Criminals, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 265-66 (1945), and references cited
therein; see also Estate of Domingo & Viernes v. Philippines, No. C82-1055V (W.D. Wash.
1985), appeal denied, DC CV-82-1055 DSV (9th Cir. 1985); Persinger v. Iran, 690 F.2d 1010,
1019 (D.C.Cir. 1982) (advance sheets; opinion excluded from bound volume) (no discretion to
violate international law), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 404, 412 (1983), vacated on other grounds, 729
F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1984); The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), and references cited
therein; La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. at 846 ("no nation can rightfully permit [a violation] ... no
nation can privilege itself to commit a crime against the law of nations"); Henfield's Case, 11 F.
Cas. 1099, 1104 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (foreign "sovereign having no right to command
what is contrary to the law of nature"); H.R. REP. 94-1487, at 6605, 6613, 6616 ("private" acts
of government are meant to be outside grant of immunity); Olsen by Sheldon v. Mexico, 729 F.2d
641, 645 (9th Cir. 1984) (no immunity for "private or commercial acts (jure gestionis)"), cert.
denied sub nomine United Mexican States v. Olsen, 469 U.S. 917 (1984); International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg, quoted in M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra ("the State... moves
outside its competence").
Similarly, there is no threat to a foreign state's legitimate "independence" posed by applica-
tion of the precept of non-immunity for violations of international law because no state is "in-
dependent" in an absolute sense and no state's relative "independence" allows it to violate
international law. Thus, no state is "independent" of international law; see also Olsen by Shel-
don v. Mexico, 729 F.2d at 650 (F.S.I.A. reflects realities of interdependence and jurisdiction
thereunder does not pose and impermissible affront to sovereignty); The Peterhoff, 72 U.S. (5
Wall.) 28, 57 (1866) ("we administer the public law of nations, and are not at liberty to inquire
what is for the particular ... disadvantage of our own or another country"); H. WHEATON,
ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 119-20 (3d ed. 1846) (even outside military intervention
could be permissible because sovereignty was not absolute even within a state's own territory and
it could not be exercised in a manner "inconsistent with the equal rights of other States.");
Wildhaber, Sovereignty and International Law, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 425, 430 (Grotius, Vattel, Locke), 432 437-38, 440-41 (R. MacDonald & D. Jon-
ston eds. 1983).
Additionally, the recent Supreme Court opinion in Amerada Hess can be distinguished when
a private lawsuit rests upon a human rights claim. In such a case Article 8 of the Universal
Declaration expressly guarantees the right to an effective remedy in domestic tribunals, a right
and guarantee that has become part of our treaty obligations under the U.N. Charter as well as a
right and obligation under customary international law. See supra notes 369-70 and accompany-
ing text, and supra text accompanying notes 466, 480-85; Paust, Effective Litigation, supra note
182, at 228-30, 234-37, 239, 257. By initially interpreting the F.S.I.A. in a manner that denies
the private right to an effective remedy for human rights violations, one would set up a conflict
between such an express right to a remedy (based in treaty law) and the F.S.I.A., one of the
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sarily barred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,546 although
plaintiffs may not have been adequately aware of the norm of nonim-
munity for violations of international law to properly present their
claim.5
47
Judge Edwards also erred when he attempted to impose limits on
the applicability of the Alien Tort Statute. He assumed that torts that
do not occur on U.S. territory, that do not amount to "universal
crimes," or that where not committed abroad by "American citizens"
would necessarily involve "disputes wholly involving foreign
states. '5 48 He added that such limits are consistent with extraterrito-
circumstances recognized by the Court that will trigger the § 1604 exception. See Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 109 S.Ct. 683, 691 (1989) ("This exception applies
when international agreements 'expressly conflic[t]' with the immunity provisions of the FSIA,"
when international agreements "create private rights of action"). Moreover, courts should inter-
pret statutes (like the FSIA) consistently with international law if at all possible. See, e.g. Paust,
Rediscovering the Relationship, supra note 359, at 400 n.9. Thus, proper interpretation of § 1604
should help guarantee the express right to an effective remedy for human rights violations. Even
if there is an unavoidable clash with the statute, application of the "rights under treaties" excep-
tion to the last-in-time rule and/or the preference for the primacy of customary international law
will allow the right to an effective remedy to prevail. On these latter doctrines, see id., at 410-14,
418-45.
546. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 776 n.1 (Edwards, J.), 805 n.13
(Bork, J.). Judge Bork made the same error in another recent case, although there was no men-
tion of section 1604 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the precept of nonimmunity
for violations of international law and the federal cases supporting that precept. See Persinger v.
Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 843 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., opinion).
Further, it is the judiciary that has been granted the power (indeed, the textual commitment)
under Article III of the Constitution to apply treaty law in cases or controversies before the
courts. See Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 359, at 760 n.1, 777 & n.101. The same
holds true with respect to customary international law. See Paust, Rediscovering the Relation-
ship, supra note 359, at 420 n.55; infra note 570. Additionally, the courts have no power to
rewrite § 1604 of the FSIA as if it granted an immunity for public acts in violation of interna-
tional agreements. Courts should also interpret federal statutes consistently with and in order to
effectuate international law, and should interpret the Alien Tort Statute and the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act accordingly; see also Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic,
830 F.2d at 425-27, rev'd, 109 S.Ct. 683 (1989); Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship, supra note
359 at 400 n.9. In particular, such legislation should be interpreted in order to effectuate the
express human right to an effective remedy guaranteed in Article 8 of the Universal Declaration
and our treaty obligations under the U.N. Charter.
547. In their opinions, Edwards and Bork merely provide their conclusions. Lack of further
cites or discussion suggests unfamiliarity with the claim of nonimmunity under the FSIA for
violations of international law and relevant cases or other citations. Judge Edwards even nearly
admits a lack of "working familiarity" with international law and its incorporation into domestic
law. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 782. Unfortunately, most lawyers and
judges have never taken a course on international law, much less a course or seminar on human
rights law; see also D'Amato, Book Review, 34 J. LEGAL EDuc. 742 (1984); Gordon, American
Courts, International Law and "Political Questions" Which Touch Foreign Relations, 14 INT'L
LAW. 297, 309-11 (1980); Lillich, Comment, The Teaching of International Human Rights Law
in U.S. Law Schools, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 855 (1983); Q. WRIGHT, supra note 359, at 81; Paust,
Comment, Foreign Affairs are Foreign to Me, INT'L PRAC. NOTEBOOK 11 (I.L.A. June 1980).
Justice Blackmun also complained of the lack of an adequate briefing in Amerada Hess. See 109.
S.Ct. 683, 692 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
548. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 788.
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rial jurisdictional competence under international law. 549 Unfortu-
nately, he did not consider fully the objective territorial basis of
jurisdiction, the protective basis, or the universality principle.
550
Whether or not violations of human rights are "universal crimes, '5 51 it
is clear that universal jurisdiction is appropriate and that in no way do
human rights violations ever constitute "disputes wholly involving for-
eign states."55 2 Violations of human rights are matters of interna-
tional concern.5 53 Additionally, customary international law allows
jurisdiction over "the settlement of claims between persons - nation-
als or aliens - present in the territory"55 4 under the well-recognized
fiction that civil claims follow the person or, as recognized by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Filartiga, that such claims are transitory.55 5 Judge Ed-
wards simply ignored these points from Filartiga and may not have
been adequately briefed about the customary rule.
With respect to questions about the legality of torture and terror-
ism, Judge Edwards missed the point that despite a lack of consensus
on the outer limits of proscription, there are core areas of agreed pro-
549. Id.
550. On these bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction, see, e.g., Paust, Federal Jurisdiction,
supra note 504, at 201-02, 204-14, and references cited therein.
551. See Paust & Blaustein, War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due Process: The Bangladesh Ex-
perience, 11 VAND. J. TRANSL. 1, 29-30 (1978); Paust, Aggression Against Authority: The Crime
of Oppression, Politicide and Other Crimes Against Human Rights, 18 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
283, 290-92 (1986); see also supra note 172, and infra note 601.
552. See, e.g., Paust, Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 504, at 221-25, and references cited
therein; see also Randall, supra note 500, at 67, 494, 500.
553. Supra note 552. For a pre-U.N. view, see also E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PRO-
TECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD OR THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 14 (1922) (even the
use of force is permissible "in exceptional circumstances" when human rights are habitually
violated); supra notes 11, 166-67, 544.
554. See J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 128
(2d ed. 1981); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (A. Hamilton) ("The judiciary power of every
government ... in civil cases lays hold of all subjects of litigation between parties within its
jurisdiction though the causes of dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant part of the
globe."); Wroth, The Massachusetts Vice Admiralty Court and the Federal Admiralty Jurisdic-
tion, 6 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 250, 264-67, passim (1962) (early practice in Massachusetts was to
blend admiralty in rem jurisdiction against a vessel found within the state with common law
personal jurisdiction over transitory claims against a person found within the state so that per-
sonal obligations followed one's property into the state in addition to following one's person); see
also Talbot v. Commanders and Owners of Three Brigs, 1 U.S. (I Dall.) 95 (1787) (common law
court refusal to distinguish jurisdiction of prize court and itself); supra note 480.
It was also recognized early in our history that "by the law of nations" a private person
"whose property has been illegally captured [in violation of international law], may pursue and
recover that property in whatever country it is found ...." See Miller v. The Ship Resolution, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) at 4. Thus, the private right in property taken in violation of international law is
"transitory" or follows the property; see also supra J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH.
555. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 885. The jurisdictional bases for Filartiga under
international law were thus: (1) universality (human rights), and (2) territorial (with the fiction
that claims follow the person, see supra note 554). On transitory torts, see also Forti v. Suarez-
Mason, 672 F. Supp. at 1540 n.6; Randall, supra note 500, at 61-62 & n.298, 67.
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hibition. 556 One core area of prohibition is especially verifiable, that
involving violations of human rights law. 5"7 For this reason, it would
have been relatively easy to avoid matters of dispute and to find that
terrorist attacks on children, for example, are clearly prohibited as vio-
lations of human rights law. Judge Edwards was correct, however, in
recognizing that the Alien Tort Statute provides a forum for private
causes of action involving violations of international law558 as well as a
domestic cause of action.5 59 He also noted correctly that the Filartiga
opinion established (although not for the first time) several
propositions:
First, the "law of nations" is not stagnant and should be construed as it
exists today among the nations of the world .... Second, one source of
that law is the customs and usages of civilized nations, as articulated by
jurists and commentators.... Third, international law today places lim-
its on a state's power to torture persons held in custody, and confers
556. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 795-96. Judge Bork also missed this
point. See id. at 806-07. Bork also cites this author while missing the main point made in the
material cited about prohibited terroristic strategies. See id. at 807. Others have also missed this
point. See Note, supra note 528, at 198. The main point was that despite disagreement concern-
ing a definition of terrorism, an adequate and neutral definition can be recognized and, moreover,
that impermissible strategies of terrorism, regardless of name, are already proscribed under
human rights law. Indeed, soon after Tel-Oren, the United Nations recognizably condemned "all
acts of terrorism ... in all its forms, wherever and by whomever committed," and so has the
United States Congress. Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/I 7554 (9
Oct. 1985) (on behalf of the members of the Council, also endorsing the Secretary General's
statement of 8 Oct. 1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. at 1565; U.N. Security Council Res. 579, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/579 (1985), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 243 (1986); G.A. Res. 40/61, 40 U.N. GAOR,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/61 (1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 239 (1986); Paust, An Introduction to
and Commentary on Terrorism and the Law, 19 CONN. L. REV. 697, 697-701 (1987); Paust,
Terrorism and the International Law of War, 64 MIL. L. REV. 1, 21 (1974), reprinted in 14 REV.
DE DROIT PENAL MIL. ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE 13 (1975); H.R. Con. Res. 228, 99th
Cong., 1st sess. (1985), §§ 1(1), 4(b), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1562, 1563-64 (1985); International
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83, §§ 503, 505, 507-508,
558(4) (Aug. 8, 1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1558, 1558-59, 1562 (1985).
557. See, e.g., Lillich & Paxman, State Responsibility for Injury to Aliens Occasioned by Ter-
rorist Activities, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 217, 305, 308-09, 312 (1977); Paust, Terrorism and the Inter-
national Law of War, supra note 556; Paust, Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 504, at 194, and
references cited therein; see also Friedlander, Terrorism and International Law: What is Being
Done?, 8 RUT.-CAM. L. J. 383, 387-88 (1977); Randall, supra note 500, at 526 & n.251; Note,
Terrorism as a Tort in Violation of the Law of Nations, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 236, 243-44
(1982). Importantly also, in human rights law torture is one matter that is prohibited per se, that
is, without possible justification. See, e.g., European Convention, supra note 478, arts. 3 and
15(2); American Convention, supra note 481, arts. 5(2) and 27(2); 1966 Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, supra note 481, arts. 4(2) and 7; Universal Declaration, supra note 3, art. 5.
558. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 777, 779-80; see also id. at 782-88.
On this point, see Paust, Litigating Human Rights, supra note 468, at 83-86, 91, 94, and refer-
ences cited therein; Randall, supra note 500, at 18 n.66, 50, 479-88, 494, 499; Note, supra note
502, at 145 n.107, 147, 159.
559. See supra note 558; see also Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. at 1539-40. It is not
inconsistent to recognize that the statute provides a domestic cause of action although the human
right to an effective remedy is based in international law and is incorporable also in other ways
(e.g., through the constitution, other statutes and the common law). Cf Note, supra note 502, at
161, 166.
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"fundamental rights upon all people" to be free from torture ...
Fourth, section 1350 opens the federal courts for adjudication of the
rights already recognized by international law .... 560
In response to the last quotation, Judge Bork offered what seems to
have been his main point of disagreement with Judge Edwards:
[F]ar from rejecting the four propositions [Judge Edwards] ... extracts
from Filartiga, I accept the first three entirely and also agree with the
fourth, but in a more limited form - namely, "section 1350 opens the
federal courts for adjudication of rights already recognized by interna-
tional law" but only when among those rights is that of individuals to
enforce substantive rules in municipal courts.
5 61
In Judge Bork's view, the Alien Tort Statute requires that a plaintiff
demonstrate a right to sue or a right to a remedy under international
law 562 and, thus he argues, the statute itself does not actually provide a
right of action or function as domestic implementing legislation of
such a nature.
5 63
As Judge Edwards pointed out, however, "[t]here is simply no ba-
sis in the language of the statute, its legislative history or relevant pre-
cedent to read section 1350 as though Congress had required that a
right to sue must be found in the law of nations." 5'64 He added, quite
appropriately: "[tihe language of the statute is explicit: by its express
terms, nothing more than a violation of the law of nations is required
to invoke section 1350. Judge Bork['s invented] ... restriction ... is
not even suggested by the statutory language. ' 565 "Indeed," Judge
Edwards continued, "a 1907 opinion of the United States Attorney
General" expressly recognized that section 1350 provides both a right
to sue and a forum."
566
As the U.S. Attorney General confirmed, private plaintiffs can sue
private defendants for a violation of international law under the Alien
560. 726 F.2d at 777, citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 881, 884-85, 887; see also
Amerada Hess v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d at 425; Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. at
1539, passim; Commonwealth v. Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) at 702 (a treaty is "a living law").
561. 726 F.2d at 820 (Bork, J., concurring).
562. See id. at 800, 820; see also id. at 801, 811. Contra Randall, supra note 500, at 18 n.66,
43 n.191, 46, 50, 479-88, 494, 499; Note, supra note 528, at 175; Case Comment, Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic: Redefining the Alien Tort Claims Act, 70 MINN. L. REv. 211, 221-23
(1985); infra notes 564-568. Of course, with respect to human rights such a right exists. On the
supposed need for express sanctions, see also infra note 597.
563. See 726 F.2d at 801, 808, 810-12, 820; Jaffee v. Boyles, 616 F. Supp. 1371 (W.D.N.Y.
1985).
564. See 726 F.2d at 779. Judge Edwards' point is all the more valid when one realizes that
early expectation was that the law of nations was enforced primarily by the municipal law of
each country, law that can be shaped to facilitate or improve execution of the law of nations.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 525.
565. 726 F.2d at 779; see also supra text accompanying notes 525 and infra 571-573.
566. See 726 F.2d at 780. The opinion added that a "remedy exists." 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250,
253 (1907); see also Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. at 1539-40; supra note 562.
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Tort Statute, and the statute provides both "a right of action and a
forum. ' 567 Following suit, Judge Edwards also declared that "section
1350 itself provides a right to sue."'5 68 Thus, the statute can function
as relevant domestic implementing legislation with respect to treaty-
based rights and obligations that are not otherwise of a "self-execut-
ing" nature.569 Customary law, of course, would be inherently "self-
executing."
570
Additional recognition of the point that the statute provides a rem-
edy can be found in the first opinion to address the new statute.571
There, the Attorney General affirmed the early expectation that when
private individuals were injured by private U.S. citizens as the result of
a violation of a treaty, "there can be no doubt that the company or
individuals who have been injured by these acts of hostility have a
remedy by civil suit in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction
being expressly given" by the statute.5 72 As one federal court also rec-
ognized, when the plaintiff is directly injured by a violation of interna-
tional law, "he may bring an action in tort therefore. '573 Similarly,
another federal court has recognized that "[o]nce a tort can be con-
sidered to be in violation of the law of nations, § 1350 allows immedi-
ate access to a federal court.
' 574
567. See 726 F.2d at 780, quoting 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 252-53 (1907). This opinion was
also quoted previously in Paust, Litigating Human Rights, supra note 468, at 94. The opinion
added that a "remedy exists." 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 253 (1907).
568. 726 F.2d at 780; see also Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. at 1539-40.
569. Importantly, the Alien Tort Act performs the very role that implementing legislation
plays by providing a cause of action and a remedy even when no express right to a remedy
pertains in a given case at the international level and/or in a particular treaty. Some text writers
have missed this point. See, e. Randall, supra note 500, at 50 n.243, 490, 499. On "self-execut-
ing" treaties, see also Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship, supra note 359, at 402-403 n.13;
Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 359.
570. See, e.g., Duponceau, quoted in Henfield's Case, 11 F.Cas. at 1122 n.6 ("law of nations,
being the common law of the civilized world.., acts everywhere proprio rigore"); Paust, Effec-
tive Litigation, supra note 182, at 236, 240, 244; Paust, Litigating Human Rights, supra note 468,
at 96. Constitutionally, such authority derives most directly from Article III, section 1 ("The
Judicial Power") and section 2, clause 1 ("all cases ... arising under ... the Laws of the United
States," since customary international law is part of the law of the United States), and Article VI,
clause 2; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 11, Reporters' Note 4 (1987); supra note 546.
571. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57 (1795).
572. Id. at 59.
573. Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 865 (D. Md. 1961); see also
M'Grath v. Candalero, 16 F. Cas. at 128 ("If an alien sue here for a tort under the law of nations
or a treaty ... the suit will be sustained"); Paust, Litigating Human Rights, supra note 468, at 94
n.89.
574. Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 324, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1966). Plaintiffs
in Tel-Oren also pointed out that in no other case has there been even a hint;! tht one should
"prove the existence of a private right of action outside the statute itself." Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari in the Supreme Court of the Untied States, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, at 16
n.8, citing, as examples, Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 1978); Nguyen Da
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Importantly, the breach of international law need not have been "a
tort only," nor even a "tort" at the international level. It was suffi-
cient that a violation of international law occurred that was potentially
recognizable as a civil "tort" under relevant domestic law; and numer-
ous acts were potentially recognizable as a "tort" or as leading to a
private cause of action.5 75 In 1802, two opinions of the Attorney Gen-
eral provided additional evidence of early expectations concerning
civil liability for violations of international law. The first of these rec-
ognized that a lawful seizure of a prize of war was not "tortious" and
thus, that the captors were not "liable. '5 76 The second opinion noted
that an ordinary fraud and theft of goods and a ship by the captain
from its owners involved no violation of international law. Nonethe-
less, the Attorney General seemed to note that theft can be a "tortious
act" and can also be a continuous act for purposes of jurisdiction.5 77
Indeed, in an important early Supreme Court case on the nonim-
munity of foreign sovereigns for violations of international law, the
Court recognized that property taken "tortiously" by a foreign sover-
eign (because its capture by the foreign sovereign on the high seas as a
prize was actually in violation of the law of nations) is subject to judi-
cial control and disposition when brought subsequently within our ter-
ritorial jurisdiction.5 78 The Supreme Court recognized further that it
Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194,1201 n.13 (9th Cir. 1975). Indeed, inHuynh ThiAnh, the Sixth
Circuit stated that Congress constitutionally can "create a federal common law of torts for
aliens." 586 F.2d at 629. Thus, the court impliedly recognized that Congress did so in enad
thcting section 1350.
575. As the district court said recently in Filartiga, "[t]he word 'tort' has historically meant
simply 'wrong' or 'the opposite of right,' " and, thus, the 'tort' to which the statute refers [seems
to] mean a wrong 'in violation of the law of nations.'" 577 F. Supp. at 862; see also supra text
accompanying notes 490, 573, and infra notes 576-578, 583; Randall, supra note 500, at 32-4.
576. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 106, 107 (1802).
577. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 123 (1802).
578. The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 350-55 (1822); see also The Apollon,
22 U.S. at 373 (violation of law of nations by the U.S. was a "marine tort"), 377 (violation was a
"trespass") (1824); The Estrella, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 298, 299-301, 304, 307-09 (1819) (exception
to immunity of privateer with commission from government of Venezuela when the neutral na-
tion examines "whether a trespass has been committed on its own neutrality by the vessel which
has made the capture" - i.e., treated like a violation of the law of nations exception to immunity
when such vessel acts "illegally"); L'Invincible, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 238, 257-58 (1816) (exception
to immunity of privateer with French commission where neutral's own rights under law of na-
tions are invaded); Dole v. New England Mutual Marine Ins. Co., 7 F. Cas. at 847 (pirate "can-
not upon any ground claim immunity from the tribunal").
Presenting nearly the same issues as those related in The Santissima Trinidad, was a case
arising out of the impermissible action of a German warship of the Imperial German Navy dur-
ing World War I addressed in Berg v. British and African Steam Navigation Co. (The Prize Ship
"Appam"), 243 U.S. 124, 153-56 (1917), quoting from The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7
Wheat.) at 154-55. There, alien private plaintiffs were allowed to sue for "restitution ... con-
formably to the laws of nations and the treaties and laws of the United States" for the German
government's violation of both the law of nations and relevant treaties. Importantly, the
Supreme Court recognized jurisdiction and the right to a remedy despite the intervention of the
German ambassador and claims that the U.S. court lacked jurisdiction and that since other pro-
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did not matter that the violator of international law was a public or
private perpetrator, 79 and international law was to be applied despite
any lurking "foreign affairs" implications. As noted previously, state
courts had also recognized civil remedies for private violations of in-
ternational law, including the "tortious" nature of such violations. 580
It is also significant that Judge Bork's view runs counter to more
general expectations at the time of the enactment of the Alien Tort
Statute that, as expressed by Madison in The Federalist, "a right im-
plies a remedy."s 8' As noted above, Chief Justice Marshall recognized
the duty of government to afford protection of the laws whenever an
individual receives an injury, and he quoted Blackstone for the well-
recognized "rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal
remedy by suit, or action at law." s58 2 Additionally, when natural law
ceedings had been instituted in Germany, the U.S. court should decline jurisdiction. See id. at
147, 152. The Court also noted that "an illegal capture would be invested with the character of a
tort." See id. at 154. There, as in The Santissima Trinidad, the capture took place on the high
seas.
579. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 351; see also supra cases cited in notes 545, 578. It is not irrele-
vant that in a reverse circumstance, when foreign plaintiffs sue the United States for a violation of
the law of nations by seizure of a foreign ship in foreign territory, the private plaintiffs are enti-
tled to damages, including attorney fees, travel expenses to bring suit, and punitive damages for
an intentional act committed in violation of international law. See, e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 362, 371, 374, 376-79 (1824); see also Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120-21
(1933); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (seizure of foreign vessel by U.S. in time of war
in violation of customary international law - recovery of money damages and costs); The Flying
Fish, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178-79 (1804). The British also recognized the liability of their
government for related violations of international law. See, e.g., The Felicity, 2 Dodson's Rep.
381 (1819); see also The Acteon, 2 Dodson's Rep. 48 (1815); The Maria, 1 C.Rob. 341 (1799).
The Russian Supreme Court ordered compensation to be paid in several cases where Russian
naval forces destroyed neutral vessels in violation of international law during the Russo-Japanese
War. See, e.g., F. SMITH, THE DESTRUCTION OF MERCHANT SHIPS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW 91-94 (1917). On the general duty of governments to compensate private owners for the
destruction of neutral vessels, see id. at 75, 80, 85, 98; see also id. at 83-84 ("international law...
is the inevitable and predominating criterion when other states are concerned," adding: "and
commanders acting in accordance with such invalid regulations would be guilty, along with their
governments .. "). On this last point, see also United States v. Pirates, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184,
201-02 (1820) (fact that a person who violated the law of nations had a commission from a
foreign government did not allow immunity from criminal sanctions); and cases cited supra in
notes 545, 578.
These cases actually represent further evidence of a shared expectation among nation-states
that immunity is not permissible for acts in violation of international law even if immunity might
otherwise exist for more ordinary tortious acts engaged in by the same government completely
within its own territory. Importantly also, suits against the U.S. government for its violations of
international law were possible at least since 1824. This demonstrates not only the recognition of
nonimmunity of governmental acts in violation of international law, but also individual standing,
a cause of action, and the right to an effective remedy in domestic courts.
580. See, e.g., cases cited supra in notes 486-490.
581. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (J. Madison).
582. See supra text accompanying note 375; see also D'Amato, Judge Bork's Concept of the
Law of Nations Is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92, 95, 101 (1985) ("having a cause of
action refers to having 'recognized legal rights' that a litigant claims were invaded" and phrase
"cause of action" did not become a term of art until 1848); Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S.
(5 Cranch) 344, 348-49 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.) (private "claims under a treaty" are "causes" to
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was at stake, many of the early judges recognized the right of individu-
als to sue in "tort" under the expansive "action on the case." By the
early 1770s, for example, Massachusetts courts had recognized that "if
one is under obligation from the ties of natural justice to pay another
money and neglects to do it - the law gives the sufferer an action
upon the case ... mere justice & equity is sufficient foundation for this
kind of equitable action. '58 3 In view of the early acceptance of such
expansive forms of action for "tortious" injuries suffered, it would
have been incredulous to assume that Congress would abandon the
"indisputable rule" that recognition of a right necessitates recognition
of a remedy and to require that the plaintiff in tort prove both that a
right and a right to a remedy existed at international law. If anything,
such a right to sue was necessarily implied.
With respect to a common law basis for private remedies, Judge
Bork argued next that although it is "unexceptionable" that interna-
tional law has always been a part of the common law of the United
States, he "cannot accept" the point that even in the absence of a stat-
ute "common law automatically provides a cause of action for interna-
tional law violations, as it would for violations of other federal
common law rights."' 584 It is apparent, however, that Judge Bork was
unfamiliar with the many cases and opinions noted above which al-
lowed a private cause of action or remedy for violations of interna-
tional law in the absence of statutorily-based actions or remedies.
Again, as a representative affirmation of this point, the Supreme Court
of Kentucky had expressly recognized that, for a violation of interna-
tional law, "the common law ... provides an adequate remedy" and
that to sustain a private action "it is not necessary to invoke any statu-
be "decided by the national tribunals," and treaty rights are "to be protected") (emphasis added);
Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 133, 159 (1795) (Iredell, J., concurring) ("all . . . trespasses
committed against the general law of nations, are enquirable"); I Op. Att'y Gen. 45, 46 (1794)
(private suit against governor of Guadaloupe, "the cause of action arose from the seizure and
condemnation of a vessel");see also supra text accompanying notes 491-494; supra note 501.
"[A]II causes" were to be encompassed in the original act. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9,
1 Stat. 78.
583. Palfrey v. Palfrey, quoted in W. CUSHING, supra note 65, at 92, 98-99; and in W. NEL-
SON, supra note 65, at 55. The narrow confines of trespass were found too inhibiting and eight-
eenth century tort actions were soon based also on action on the case, a catchall notion intended
to serve justice. See generally Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L.
REV. 359 (1950); Nelson, The Reform of Common Law Pleading in Massachusetts 1776-1830
Adjudication as a Prelude to Legislation, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 97 (1973); cf Talbot v. Jansen, 3
U.S. at 159 ("all... trespasses committed against the general law of nations, are enquirable, and
may be proceeded against, in any nation .... ).
584. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 810; see also id. at 801. Bork seems
also to have missed the point evident from Huynh Thi Anh that since "Congress has the constitu-
tional authority... to create a federal common law of torts for aliens," Congress impliedly did so
in enacting section 1350. See supra note 574.
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tory aid." 585
As part of what seems to have been an overall strategy to deny
relief, Judge Bork also made the erroneous assertion that "interna-
tional law does not ... recognize the capacity of private plaintiffs to
litigate its rules in municipal courts .... ,,586 Not only is such a state-
ment out of line with predominant trends in actual litigation and the
widespread expectation that it is both appropriate and desirable for
private plaintiffs to litigate such matters domestically, 587 but Judge
Bork ignored the express right to an effective remedy in national tribu-
nals documented in the authoritative Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.588 Curiously, he also ignored relevant guidance from the Ex-
ecutive branch which affirmed quite clearly that "it has long been es-
tablished that . . . individuals may sue to enforce their rights under
international law" and that the "international law of human rights
similarly endows individuals with the right to invoke international
law."589 "As a result," the Executive added, "an individual's funda-
mental human rights are in certain situations directly enforceable in
domestic courts." 590
While addressing these points, Judge Bork also stated that
"[n]either the law of nations nor any of the relevant treaties provides a
cause of action that [individuals] ... may assert in courts of the United
States."59 1 Of course, his statement was incorrect 592 and was obvi-
585. See supra note 486.
586. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 822; see also id. 813, 816-17.
587. See, e.g., R. FALK, supra note 359; L. ERADES & W. GOULD, supra note 359, at 223-24,
passim; P. JESSUP, THE USES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 63-66, 71-73, 88-100 (1959); R. MAS-
TERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS (1932); P. POTrER, A MANUAL DIGEST OF
COMMON INTERNATIONAL LAW 73-74 (1932); Dickinson, supra note 503, at 27, 31, 45 & n.56;
Lillich, supra note 359, at 9, 12, passim; see also 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 106, 107 (1802); 1 Op. Att'y
Gen. 57, 58 (1795); Interhandel Case (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6, 27; and materials cited supra
in note 359 and infra notes 601-602.
588. See supra text accompanying note 466.
589. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, supra
note 370, at 20-21 (emphasis added).
590. Id. at 21 (emphasis added). The Executive memorandum did not address other situa-
tions in which an individual's rights might be enforceable or incorporated indirectly. On indirect
incorporation, see supra note 359. Interestingly, a 1942 draft of an international bill of rights
prepared by a special legal committee within the U.S. Department of State had also declared:
"These human rights shall be guaranteed by and constitute a part of the supreme law of each
state and shall be observed and enforced by its administrative and judicial authorities .. " See
Lockwood, supra note 359, at 913.
591. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 799; see also id. at 800 ("human rights
law grants no private right of action"), 801, 817 ("as a general rule, international law does not
provide a private cause of action"), 822.
592. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 466, 479-485; see also Note, supra note 502, at
166, 170 (more generally, human rights also "imply a private right of action in individuals").
Apparently Judge Bork did not understand the acceptance today of the Universal Declaration
(including article 8 thereof) as an authoritative, if not customary, legal standard and its function
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ously in sharp contrast to the Executive guidance noted above.
593
also as an authoritative guide to the content of the human rights provisions of the United Nations
Charter. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 809, 818. And, of course, he totally
ignored the language of article 8 of the Universal Declaration. On these points, and in contrast
to several sub-issues raised by Judge Bork, see also Paust, Effective Litigation, supra note 182, at
234-37, 239-42, 244, and references cited therein.
593. See supra text accompanying notes 589-590. Judge Bork also ignored the Executive
recognition, affirmed by the Second Circuit in Filartiga, that the Universal Declaration supple-
ments the U.N. Charter by "specifying and defining the fundamental rights to which all individu-
als are entitled." Compare Memorandum for the United States, supra note 370, at 9; and 630
F.2d at 882 with Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 809, 818. And Judge Bork did
not understand the legal import of a circumstance where the provisions of various treaties point
to the existence of the same right or precept. Unlike the Executive and Second Circuit, he as-
sumed incorrectly that treaties not yet ratified by the United States could serve no legal function
in our courts. Compare Paust, Effective Litigation, supra note 182, at 230-31, 237 with 726 F.2d
at 809-10, 812 (so-called "well-established rule").
Judge Bork also argued that the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American
Convention on Human Rights "expressly oblige states to enact implementing legislation." 726
F.2d at 818-19. Here he missed the point, however, that these treaty provisions supplement the
existence of the more general right to a remedy found in the Universal Declaration and in cus-
tomary international law. Further, the articles he cited have qualifying phrases that he ignored.
For example, article 2(2) of the Covenant states: "Where not already provided for .. " And
article 2 of the American Convention states: "Where ... not already ensured .... It begs the
question to assume that such provisions are not partly "self-executing" (e.g., where a constitu-
tion, as broadly interpreted for nearly two centuries, already provides for a right to a remedy).
Such provisions seem only to seek, as a cautionary measure, to assure any further measures "as
may be necessary" if additional domestic measures are "necessary"; see also Iwasawa, supra note
359, at 660, and references cited therein ("The travaux priparatoires indicate, however, that the
parties to these treaties never intended to deny their self-executing character by inserting domes-
tic implementation clauses ... [Such a] clause merely reinforces the customary international law
rule that a state ... is bound to give every measure necessary to give full effect to the treaty
..... ); Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 359, at 775 n.97. Of course, the object and
purpose of any human rights treaty includes that of guaranteeing and effectuating human rights
and it would be incompatible with the object and purpose of such a treaty to construe any por-
tion thereof in a manner inconsistent with such a purpose and with the general right to an effec-
tive remedy guaranteed in the Universal Declaration, as mirrored in such a treaty. By
international law, such a purpose-thwarting result is not allowed. See, e.g., Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, arts. 18, 19(c), 31(1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF./39/27, at 289 (1969), re-
printed in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). This is so even when a treaty is signed but not yet ratified. See
id., art. 18 ("obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty").
The United States accepts the view that the Vienna Convention is presumptively customary.
See, e.g., 2 DRAFT RESTATEMENT, Pt. III, supra note 479, introductory notes 1-2, and references
cited therein; J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, supra note 554, at 951 (2d ed. 1981). In
particular, article 18 is among the provisions which are considered to be customary. See, e.g., 2
DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra, § 312(3) and Reporters' Note 6, quoting a report of the Interna-
tional Law Commission ([1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 172, 202) ("appears to be generally
accepted"), citing Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Merits), P.C.I.J. (ser.A) No.
7, at 30 (1926); Dalton, Remarks, 78 PRoC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 278 (1984) (quoting Sec. of State
Rogers: "in his report to the President in 1971 characterized the rule in article 18 as 'widely
recognized in customary international law' "), also citing 1979 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 692-93.
Moreover, Judge Bork ignored the independent right to a remedy recognized in article 25 of
the American Convention and the interrelationship between the more general Universal Declara-
tion and the American Convention as one can recognize from a reading of the preamble and
articles 29(d) and 64 of the American Convention. See Advisory Opinion on the Definition of
Other Treaties Subject to the Interpretation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, IN-
TER-AM. C.H.R., No. OC-1/82, Sept. 24, 1982, paras. 32-52, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 51, 59-65
(1983). Nor did Judge Bork seem to realize that the same provisions of the American Conven-
tion necessitate a reading of the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
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Further, in view of Judge Bork's pretense of deference to the Execu-
tive branch on such matters because of nearly ever present "foreign
affairs" implications, 594 it seems to have been quite disingenuous to
ignore the most relevant and widely known Executive guidance avail-
able in the form of the U.S. Memorandum. Additionally, one can
make the counterpoint that "foreign affairs" implications should not
be used in order to avoid the application of law. 595 Law, after all, is
what the courts are bound to apply.
596
As if to ignore the same Executive guidance as well as predomi-
nant trends in decision throughout our history, Judge Bork also em-
braced the tired and hopeless theory of a few textwriters that rights
and duties under international law are those of states solely and exclu-
which clearly affirms in article 18 thereof: "Every person may resort to the courts to ensure
respect for his legal rights."
594. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 799, 801, 803-05, 822. Bork stated
that such implications provided "the fundamental reason [for his conclusion] ... that it is im-
proper for judges to infer a private cause of action .... Id. at 822. And he impliedly warned,
despite his judicial oath, that foreign affairs "considerations," at his hand, "might [even] deprive
an individual of a cause of action clearly given by a state, by Congress, by a treaty, or by interna-
tional law." Id. at 804.
595. On the related practice of other judges who seemingly engage in the "talismanic incan-
tation" of phrases such as "foreign affairs" in order to avoid the application of law, see Paust, Is
the President Bound, supra note 395, at 724-32, passim. Not surprisingly, foreign affairs implica-
tions (as opposed to relevant international law, the Alien Tort Statute, the Executive Memoran-
dum in Filartiga, and so forth) were at the heart of Judge Robb's stated reasons for his decision
in Tel-Oren. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 823-27; see also Paust, Is the
President Bound, supra note 395, at 730-32 (approach of Judge Robb in another case); Note,
supra note 502, at 170-71, 178 n.284, 179 n.286, 180-85; Note, supra note 385, at 950-51 (Judge
Bork's "rejection of the statute," notwithstanding separation of powers concerns, "amounts to an
abdication of the judicial function"), 951-52 (Judge Robb's use of the political question doctrine
is "misplaced," in "error," "cannot be justified," and is "not in accord with precedent"); Case
Comment, supra note 562, at 236-37 ("such reflex application of the doctrine must be challenged
... [and] may constitute an unconstitutional abdication of judicial power"); Note, Separation of
Powers and Adjudication of Human Rights Claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 60 WASH. L.
REV. 697, 711-13, 715-16 (1985); see also Note, supra note 385, at 950 n.57, quoting Judge Ed-
wards in criticism of Judge Bork: "[v]igorously waiving in one hand a separation of powers
banner, ironically, with the other hand he rewrites Congress' words and renounces the task that
Congress has placed before him." 726 F.2d at 790 (Edwards, J., concurring). As another stu-
dent has recognized: "That the framers of the Judiciary Act of 1789 granted jurisdiction to
district courts over tort claims involving treaties and the law of nations indicates that they fore-
saw adjudication of cases touching on foreign relations and nonetheless granted the judiciary
power to hear them." Note, supra note 502, at 183; see also Note, supra at 714-15 (Act shows
claims intended to be justiciable and "supposed deference is actually an abdication of the respon-
sibility assigned .... ); supra notes 477, 545.
596. See, e.g., Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 366, 372 (1857) (ratified treaty "be-
comes the supreme law of the land, and the courts can no more go behind it for the purpose of
annulling its effect and operation, than they can behind an Act of Congress"); Fernandez v.
Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. at 798-800; Paust, Is the President Bound, supra note 395, at 724-34,
750-57, and references cited therein; see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404
(1821) (Marshall, C.J., opinion) ("to decline the exercise ofjurisdiction which is given ... would
be treason to the constitution"); supra notes 460-461, 471-475, 509, 511, 513, 515, 545-546, and
infra note 570.
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sively. 597 Interestingly, even some of the "supporting" material that
he used contains sufficient qualifying language to alert one to the fact
that international law does address private rights and duties.
5 9 8
Although Judge Edwards also argued that the "states alone" view be-
came "firmly entrenched" by the early twentieth century,5 99 such a
view was not correct 6° and was always challenged by other text-
writers of that period,6°1 if not in relevant judicial decisions.6 2 Addi-
597. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 805-06, 817. At times, Judge Bork
even used qualifiers such as "general rule" or "primary role," thus suggesting exceptions. See id.
And at other times Judge Bork was openly aware of the fact that individuals had duties under the
law of nations in the 1700s, see id. at 813-15, but he sought to restrict the phrase "law of nations"
to a few cases that he could discover from that early time. See id. at 813-15; cf id. at 815
(drafters "may well have had additional torts in mind"); see also id. at 788-89 (Edwards critical
of Bork's approach). Students have been misled. See Note, supra note 502, at 150 n.145. Of
course, as this article demonstrates, the "cases" contemplated were far more numerous. On early
"offenses," see also Paust, Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 504, at 211-12; A. GENTILI, supra note
11 (piracy and "also... the general violation of the common law of humanity and a wrong done
to mankind"); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 159 ("all... trespasses committed against the
general law of nations, are enquirable, and may be proceeded against, in any nation ....");
Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 115 ("hurts the common safety and well-being
of nations"); 1781 Resolution of the Continental Congress, note 502 supra.
Importantly also, Judge Bork's general rationale (see also 726 F.2d at 808-810) was raised as
part of a Nazi defense at Nuremberg and was expressly rejected by the Tribunal. In the face of
arguments that the 1907 Hague Conventions, and international law more generally, mentioned
no crimes or penalties and, therefore, imposed no individual criminal responsibility, the Tribunal
affirmed that such responsibility had long been recognized and need not be expressly set forth in
international instruments, nor did the types of sanctions available have to be expressly men-
tioned. See Judgment, International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) (1946), reprinted in 41 AM.
J. INT'L L. 172, 217-21, 248 (1947). The same points are relevant with respect to civil sanctions;
see also supra text accompanying notes 486-493, 501, 503, 509, 521-525; supra note 385; but see
Rogers, The Alien Tort Statute and How Individuals "Violate" International Law, 21 VAND. J.
TRANS. L. 47, 49-50, 52, 56 & n.43 (1988) (seemingly accepting the Borkian-Nazi extreme "stat-
ist" view of international law).
598. See, e.g., 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 289 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955)
("primarily a law between States ... although individuals are not normally subjects . . ., they
have certain rights and duties"); L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER, H. SMIT, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 246 (1980) ("In some circumstances.... however, international law has recognized
individual responsibility. There are innumerable references .... ").
599. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 794.
600. See supra notes 530-544 and accompanying text.
601. See, e.g., 1 OPPENHEIM 367 (2d ed. 1912) ("Several writers," including Bonfils,
Bluntschli, Fiore, Martens); E. BORCHARD, supra note 553, at 14 (human rights, rights of the
individual); I.C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 34-5 (2d ed. rev. 1945) (individuals bound and
injunctions of international law are "applicable to the private individual" - "Evidence of this
has long been reflected in the statutory law of the United States"); P. POTrER, A MANUAL
DIGEST OF COMMON INTERNATIONAL LAW 73-74 ("Private individuals inclined to refuse obedi-
ence to international law may be proceeded against by other private individuals, or by nations,
and one forum is the domestic court), 133 ("International law provides rights and liabilities for
... individuals or groups.., of individuals") (1932); J. SCOTT, NATIONALITY, supra note 180; J.
ScoTr, supra note 181; I.H. WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 19 (8th ed.
1866), reprinted at 26-27 (C.E.I.P. ed. 1936) ("Private individuals ... may ..., incidentally,
become the subjects of this law in regard to rights growing out of their international relations
with foreign sovereigns and states, or their subjects and citizens") (same point as in Wheaton's 3d
ed. 1846, at 54); G. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW 56 (2d ed. Pa. 1902) ("individuals have a
certain degree of competence.., and may come under the cognizance of international law"); T.
WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2, § 2 (6th ed. 1897); J.
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tionally, the inhibiting myth that Judge Bork would resurrect had
SPIROPOULOS, L'INDIVIDU EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL 44ff (Paris 1928); supra notes 175 (Bon-
ils, Fauchille, Fiore, Heffter), 176 (Snow), 179 (American Institute of International Law), 180
(Institut de Droit International) 172 (Lansing); see also E. GLENN, HANDBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 9-10, passim (1895); Borchard, The "Minimum Standard" of the Treatment of
Aliens, PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 51, 53, 61 (1939); R. Higgins, Conceptual Thinking About the
Individual in International Law, 24 N.Y.L. Sel. L. REV. 11 (1978); D'Amato, note 582, at 102-
04; I W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 578 (2d ed. 1929)
(private rights by treaty); PEASLEE, I CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 127, 136 (Belgian Const. of
1831, art. 68, para. 2, recognition that treaties "bind Belgians individually").
During this general period, the preamble to the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 recognized
that individuals "remain under the protection and governance of the principles of the law of
nations." Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2277;
T.S. No. 539; L.N.T.S., vol. XCIV (1929) (No. 2138), reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 90
(1908); see also id., Annex, art. I ("The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies,
but also to militia and volunteer corps .. "), a provision found also in article IX of the 1874
Declaration of Brussels, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 96 (1907). The preamble to the
1899 Hague Convention No. II With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land read in
part: "populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of
international law .... 32 Stat. 1803; 1 Bevans 247, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 129
(1907). It is certainly relevant that the Report of the Commission on the Responsibility of the
Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, presented to the Preliminary Peace Con-
ference, March 29, 1919, recognized the responsibility of individuals under the law of nations
with respect to aggressive war, laws of neutrality, war crimes, and other matters. See Report,
reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (1920). Such a responsibility, of course, entailed the most
severe of sanctions, criminal sanctions, despite the fact that certain treaties did not mention
individuals as such, individual duties, crimes, criminal sanctions, and so forth. Similarly, the
peace treaties with Germany and Austria in 1919 contained articles which affirmed the duties or
responsibilities of individuals under international law which, if violated, can lead to criminal
sanctions. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace with Germany, Versailles, June 28, 1919, arts. 227-230,
reprinted in 13 AM. J. INT'L L. SuP. 151; Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated
Powers and Austria, September 10, 1919, arts. 173-176, reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP 1,
55-56 (1920). Importantly also, the 1915 massacres of Armenians by Turks were condemned by
Great Britain, France and Russia as "crimes against humanity and civilization." See R.
WRIGHT, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION 35 (1948).
602. At this same time, the Permanent Court of International Justice declared: "it cannot be
disputed that the very object of an international agreement . . . may be the adoption by the
Parties of some definite rules creating individual rights and obligations and enforceable by the
national courts." Advisory Opinion, Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No.
15, at 17-18 (1928) (emphasis added). In another case, the Permanent Court of International
Justice implicitly confirmed that individuals can receive "pecuniary reparation" for violations of
international law when it noted in dictum, where a given state had not violated international law,
"that, consequently, there is no occasion to give judgment on the question of the pecuniary repa-
ration which might have been due to [a particular individual if such state] ... had acted in a
manner contrary to the principles of international law." The S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Tur.), P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 10, at 32 (1927); see also id. at 5 ("what pecuniary reparation is due to M. De-
mons"); letter of U.S. § of State Bayard to U.S. Ambassador Connery (Nov. 1, 1887) reprinted in
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 751, 755 (1888) (The Cutting Case) ("You are
therefore instructed to say to the Mexican Government ... that an indemnity should be paid to
Mr. Cutting"); Letter of U.S. Ambassador Connery to Mr. Mariscal of Mexico (Nov. 15, 1887)
in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 845, 846, 849 (1888) (asking for reparation to
Mr. Cutting for exercise of jurisdiction in violation of international law and the "denial... of the
sanctions of justice" or lack of due process as required by international law); The Van Bokkelen
Case (1888), supra note 479; D'Amato, supra note 582, at 103.
A 1909 decision of the Central American Court of Justice had also recognized that an indi-
vidual plaintiff was "under the protection of the principles governing the Commonwealth of
Nations, as international rights of man." Diaz v. Guatemala, Resolucion dictada en la demanda
del Dr. don Pedro Andres Fornos Diaz contra el Gobierno de la Republica de Guatemala, (1909)
(3/2 decision to dismiss for failure to exhaust local remedies), reported in M. Hudson, The Cen-
Human Rights in US. Courts
rested on theories about the functioning of law at the state-to-state
level, not the trends in actual decision at the domestic level. 6° 3 In
sum, it was, and is, simply not true that individuals could not benefit
directly from international law or be subject either to civil or criminal
sanctions for violations of international law.604
Among the most ludicrous of the statements found in Tel-Oren,
however, is Judge Bork's assertion that "in 1789 there was no concept
of international human rights; neither was there, under the traditional
version of customary international law, any recognition of a right of
private parties to recover. Clearly, cases [addressing human rights
precepts] were beyond the framers' contemplation." 605 One can say
nothing further about such false, arrogant nonsense after documenting
the actual use of human right precepts in the United States from the
1720s through the 1790s and the early judicial and executive opinions
that are relevant, but that Judge Bork's statement is patently errone-
tral American Court of Justice, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 759, 769-70 (1932), English translation re-
ported in 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 737, 743 (1909). The Central American Court existed from 1908-
1918 and allowed complaints by individuals against foreign governments. See Hudson, supra at
765, 768; J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, supra note 554, at 71; Boyle, American Foreign
Policy Toward International Law and Organizations: 1898-1917, 6 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMp. L.
J. 185, 305-06 (1983).
The Diaz claim had in fact involved a claim for money damages for what the Court recog-
nized as "fundamental rights... of the human individual ..., [the] rights of man," including:
"an infringement of liberty, an injury to health, and a trespass against the property of the plain-
tiff." 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 737, 743 (1909). Individuals could also bring claims before the Rhine
navigation courts set up under the Final Act of Vienna of 1815 and before the European Com-
mission of the Danube created by the Treaty of Paris of 1856. See, e.g., Crotty, The Law of
Nations in the District Courts: Federal Jurisdiction Over Tort Claims by Aliens Under 28 U.S.C.
1350, 1 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. J. 71, 82-3 (1977).
It is also of interest that the opinion of an Attorney General cited by Judge Edwards was
from this same time period and it recognized that a private company had violated a treaty. See
26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 252-53 (1907). For other early twentieth century cases, see supra notes
501-502, 597; Paust, supra note 502, at 116-17, 131-32, 167 (laws of war prosecutions).
603. See supra note 539. Interestingly also, Lauterpacht thought that states were "principal
subjects" because, in his view, international law was "based on the common consent of individual
States." See 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 598, at 19, quoted in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
726 F.2d at 817. The early British view, however, was that such law is based on the common
consent of individuals. See note 28 supra. Moreover, today it is recognized that the primary
treaty, the U.N. Charter, was proclaimed in the name of peoples, not states or state elites. See
U.N. CHARTER, preamble ("WE THE PEOPLES .... ").
604. Paust, Litigating Human Rights, supra note 468, at 88.
605. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 813, citing mainly: Hassan, Interna-
tional Human Rights and the Alien Tort Statute: Past and Future, 5 Hous. J. INT'L L. 131, 139
(1982); Oliver, A Brief Replication: The Big Picture and Mr. Schneebaum's Reply, 5 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 151, 153 (1982); Hassan, Panacea or Mirage? Domestic Enforcement of International
Human Rights Law: Recent Cases, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 13, 19-20, 24-7 (1981). Actually, Profes-
sor Oliver added an interesting qualification to his remarks: "Except for evolving developments
in the field of human rights, individuals.., have no standing, internationally .... " (emphasis
added). Moreover, Professor Oliver did not make any of the erroneous statements about early
expectations of the Founders concerning human right precepts. These latter errors are now be-
ing repeated by certain students. See Note, supra note 502, at 155; Note, supra note 528, at 180
& n.136.
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ous. His statement, like those in the writings he cites, rests on falla-
cious myth without a single reference to the numerous cases, opinions
and historic uses of human right precepts in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries that are documented in the present article. 6°6 Such a
statement is dangerous not so much for the reason that shoddy re-
search is perpetuated, but that the judiciary can be further mis-
informed, that further policy-thwarting decisions might be made, and
that others might try to turn history on its head to deny one of the
fundamental purposes of our entire system of government and of our
constitution - to protect and promote the human rights of individual
human beings.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although few in the legal profession may be sufficiently aware, the
actual use of human right precepts in U.S. history has been substantial
and concern for human rights has been associated with most major
politico-legal developments in the United States over the last two-and-
one-half centuries. Not surprisingly then, one can also discover a rich,
often splendid history of use of human right and equivalent phrases by
U.S. courts over the last two hundred years.
The present article documents both the general use of human right
precepts in the United States and use by the judiciary. In fact, one of
the purposes of the article is to provide the fullest exposition to date of
the actual use of "human right" and equivalent phrases by U.S. courts,
trends in juridic use, categories of use, and certain factors that seem
relevant for further understanding of actual trends and potential uses
of the concept of human rights in legal decisionmaking. Primary at-
tention is given to U.S. Supreme Court opinions, although use in lower
federal court and early state court opinions is also demonstrated. In-
terestingly, despite significant attention to human right precepts
throughout our history, the use of "human right" and equivalent
phrases by the Supreme Court has been five times more frequent since
the late 1930s than during the previous history of the Court. More-
over, the trends demonstrate that there has been an increasing use of
human right precepts in the last twenty-five years.
Yet throughout our constitutional history a similar pattern of use
emerges. It is clear that the Supreme Court, as most courts, most
often utilizes human rights as legally relevant standards or juridic aids
for interpretation of constitutional, customary or statutory norms. In-
deed, use by the judiciary is quite often made with express or implicit
606. See supra writings cited in note 605.
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expectation that human rights are fundamental constitutional rights or
legal principles and history demonstrates that there is a human rights
purpose behind most of the amendments to the U.S. Constitution and
many relevant statutes.
Less frequently, although not less importantly, human rights law
has been incorporated directly by the judiciary as the basis or an alter-
native basis for decision. Yet whether human rights law has been in-
corporated directly or indirectly as an interpretive aid it is clear that
human rights norms can provide useful criteria and content. This is
especially so when documented human rights are sufficiently particu-
larized to aid in the identification and clarification of certain rights or
to supplement the meaning of relevant constitutional, statutory or
other legal provisions by providing a richer, more detailed content. A
better understanding of the actual use of human right precepts in our
history, including awareness of specific judicial language and the con-
stitutional rights or principles associated with human rights, should
also provide useful guidance.
Some of these general points are becoming clearer from writings
addressing theories of incorporation of international law into domestic
legal process or the more specific practice of litigating human rights in
U.S. courts, but attention can now be paid to actual patterns of use.
Further, with the present documentation of widespread use of human
right precepts by the judiciary throughout our history, any lingering
question whether such precepts can be used in private litigation and
judicial decisionmaking should shift to the question of how such
precepts can be used and how they can be used more effectively. Here
again past trends can be most instructive.
Awareness of actual patterns of judicial use can also aid in defeat-
ing the myth perpetuated by a few textwriters, and now by the unfor-
tunate language found in deviant opinions in Tel-Oren, that
individuals could not sue or be sued in domestic courts for violations
of international law. As the present article amply demonstrates,
human right claims and claims under more general international law
have been made by and against private litigants throughout our his-
tory. Moreover, there have been numerous references to the propriety
of this practice and, more specifically, to the right of individuals to
access to the courts and the concomitant right to an effective remedy.
Perhaps even less widely known in the legal profession is the fact
that international law now provides expressly that everyone has the
right to an effective remedy in domestic courts for acts violating one's
human rights. As part of international law, the right to an effective
remedy is also itself a part of supreme federal law under the United
Spring 1989]
652 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 10:543
States Constitution. Thus, it is of significant utility in demonstrating
to a federal court why private litigants have standing as well as the
right to an effective remedy for human right deprivations. The inter-
national right actually provides an independent basis for standing and
an effective remedy, although its use in U.S. courts would merely sup-
plement a long-term judicial practice of recognizing both the utility of
human right norms and private remedies for their deprivation.
